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Abstract 
 
Climate Change from the Streets: A Community-Based Framework for Addressing  
Local and Global Environmental Health Impacts  
 
by 
 
Michael Anthony Mendez 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in City and Regional Planning and the Designated Emphasis in 
Science and Technology Studies 
 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Professor Jason Corburn, Chair 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the emerging epistemologies of climate change in California as 
articulated by social movements, experts, and subnational governments. As the world’s eighth-
largest economy and the only state in the U.S. to implement a comprehensive program of 
regulatory and market-based mechanisms to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, California represents an important site of inquiry. The passage of Assembly Bill 32, 
the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 has made the state a global leader on climate change 
science and policy innovation. While no subnational government can halt climate change alone, 
California’s environmental policies have a long history of success and replication. Through an 
extensive analysis of the state’s climate policies and interviews with key stakeholders, this 
dissertation highlights the challenges California faces in influencing global climate policy while 
addressing the needs of local communities that are already adversely impacted by air pollution.  
 
As cities and public agencies appropriate leadership roles in climate governance, policy 
formulation is increasingly emerging as an expert-driven process that emphasizes global GHG 
reductions as the goal and geographically-neutral economic and technological fixes as the 
solution. In this process, community-based strategies that integrate climate change 
interventions with population health outcomes are often excluded. This dissertation asks how 
environmental justice advocates are engaging strategically in the policymaking process in order 
to legitimize or contest regulatory policies regarding climate change in the face of ongoing 
pollution, illness, and injustice. In answering this question, the dissertation centers on three 
areas of inquiry: (1) the public health and environmental justice aspects of municipal climate 
action plans; (2) the conflict over statewide carbon pricing and use of its revenue for 
investment in communities most impacted by air pollution; and, (3) the social implications of 
international forest carbon-offset projects allowable under California’s market-based climate 
change law. These cases provide critical insights into environmental inequities and the 
emerging epistemologies of climate change on multiple scales. The dissertation findings 
demonstrate that the implementation of climate policies can either serve to exacerbate or 
redress underlying environmental health inequities in urban communities. In particular, these 
cases highlight the environmental justice strategies that are challenging a priori policy expertise 
to produce new local, place-based conceptualizations of climate change that underscore 
population health and community well-being. 
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Prologue 
 
 
 
Figure 1: 
On January 17, 2014, an astronaut aboard the International Space Station photographed a thick 
layer of smog hovering over many regions of California during the winter months.   
Source: Astronaut photograph ISS038-E-32446 (2014) 
 
 
 
In the winter of 2013-2014, I began to write my dissertation in earnest, spending 
countless hours in my small home office in Sacramento converting years of data and 
interviews into scholarly research. During my marathon writing sessions, I often took a 
midday break for a four-mile run along the city’s largest regional park and the 
Sacramento River, which parallels the busy Interstate Highway 5 (I-5). Increasingly, those 
runs began to weigh heavier on my chest, an effect of the pollution that accumulated 
during one of the driest winters on record. From Sacramento to Los Angeles, a haze of 
gray particles hung in the air most of the winter; for more than a month, the haze 
hindered visibility of the Sierra Nevada mountain range (Figure 1). Simultaneously, a high-
pressure ridge, four miles high, settled off the West Coast, preventing Pacific storms from 
cleansing the air across most of central California. With no rain since early December 
2013, pollution levels rose sharply throughout most of the state. In the Central Valley, 
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California’s agricultural heartland and other parts of the state, fine particulate matter 
rose to unhealthy levels. No rain would alleviate much of the conditions until late January 
2014 (Barboza, 2014a). 
 
Air quality officials warned individuals on several occasions to stay indoors on “red alert 
days.” On such days, levels of particulate matter (known as PM 2.5) are three times the 
normal amount -- a level that is unhealthy for all population groups. PM 2.5 is less than a 
fraction of the width of a human hair and is emitted by diesel engines, fires, and other 
combustion sources. They are of great concern to public health experts because they are 
inhaled deep into the lungs and can impair breathing. PM 2.5 can also damage the heart 
and blood vessels (Barboza, 2014a). On one red alert day, where I had spent too much 
time writing, I ignored the warning to take my daily run. By the third mile, my head 
started to ache and I began coughing heavily. Feeling nervous over my failure to heed the 
red alert warning, I ended my run and caught my breath before walking the last mile 
home.  
 
The red alert days represented a rapidly changing reality for California air quality officials. 
Previously, air quality warnings were typically issued only in the summer and directed at 
sensitive populations, such as children, the elderly, and those with respiratory problems. 
Warming temperatures and extreme drought conditions, however, are increasing health 
risks for all population groups. In turn, air quality warnings in California are becoming 
more commonplace during the winter months (Cuff, 2015). In the Central Valley, where 
air quality conditions have deteriorated badly over the years, school officials in districts 
like Bakersfield, had long flown colored flags to indicate air quality; green for good; yellow 
for moderate; orange, unhealthy for sensitive groups; and red, unhealthy for all 
population groups. By January 2014, however, poor air quality required officials to 
introduce a new flag color – purple-- indicating “very unhealthy” air for all people. When a 
purple alert was declared in early 2014, schools were forced to fly their red flags because 
they had no purple flags; until then, such flags had never been needed (Figure 2). The 
purple alert banned all outdoor activity for teachers and the district’s 29,000 students, 
save for basic movement between buildings and school buses. Physical education classes 
could not be held outdoors, and students and teachers were required to stay in 
classrooms all day (Mayer, 2014a).     
    
According to one Central Valley elementary school principal, the winter of 2013-2014 was 
the “first time ever we have been on an inside schedule when it is cold outside. Usually 
we see this kind of thing when it is hot. Not in January” (Lollis, 2014). Yet, such bad air 
quality is not restricted to the Central Valley. As California entered its third consecutive 
year of drought, weather patterns helped create some of the highest levels of soot in the 
San Francisco Bay Area. In January 2014, the Bay Area Quality Management District 
issued 11 consecutive “Spare the Air” days (Cuff, 2015). The air district issues the alerts 
when it anticipates unhealthy soot levels. It also bans most indoor and outdoor wood 
burning because it is predicted that smoke and PM 2.5 levels would violate federal public 
health standards intended to protect people with asthma or heightened sensitivity to air 
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pollution. That month, the air in the region exceeded federal PM 2.5 standards on 3 of 
those 11 days (Cuff, 2014).    
 
 
Figure 2 
A red flag flies over an elementary school in the Central Valley on January 7, 2014. A purple 
flag level air alert was issued, but the school, like many schools in the region, lacked a purple flag. 
Source: Hara (2014). 
 
 
A recent report by the California Air Pollution Control Officers’ Association (CAPCOA, 
2014) predicts that climate change and extreme weather, could set back decades of 
improvements in California’s air quality. As the drought continues and the number of 
extreme heat days from global warming increases, smog formation and wildfires that 
release harmful smoke into the air will only intensify. Scientists, moreover, have found 
that the meteorological conditions that have caused California’s drought are far more 
likely to occur in today’s warming world than in one without human-caused emissions of 
greenhouse gases (Diffenbaugh et al., 2015). The CAPCOA report concludes that climate 
change poses enough of a threat to clean air that state policymakers and local air districts 
will need to break down policy silos and collaborate on new approaches that jointly 
address global greenhouse emissions and other localized co-pollutants. This includes 
targeting black carbon (a component of PM 2.5), a short-lived, global-warming pollutant 
that also has local public health impacts (CAPCOA, 2014).  
 
As I neared the completion of my dissertation in the following winter of 2014-2015, the 
extreme drought persisted. Occurrences of poor air quality were on the increase in many 
of California’s most disadvantaged communities. Nevertheless, I still went out on my daily 
runs, although I learned to heed the red alert warnings and exercised indoors on such 
days. Writing this dissertation, consequently, has provided me the opportunity to analyze 
something that is so basic, we often take it for granted – the air we breathe. But, as I 
learned from this research, not all air is created equal, and some communities in 
  
4 
 
California are more vulnerable than others to the impacts of climate change and 
pollution. This research tells the story of how disadvantaged communities are engaging 
strategically in the policymaking process. Their efforts are ensuring California’s climate 
change policies not only tackle a global phenomenon but also address the needs of local 
communities that are already adversely impacted by air pollution.    
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CHAPTER 1:  
Overview of Equity and Health in California’s Warming Climate(s) 
 
 
This dissertation investigates the emerging epistemologies of climate change in California as 
articulated by social movements, experts, and subnational governments.1 As the eighth-largest 
economy in the world and the only state in the United States to implement a comprehensive 
program of regulatory and market-based mechanisms to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, California represents an important site of inquiry. The passage of Assembly 
Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) has made the state a global leader in 
climate change science and policy innovation.2  While no subnational government alone can 
halt climate change, California’s environmental policies have a long history of success and 
replication. Through an extensive analysis of the state’s climate policies and interviews with key 
stakeholders, this research project highlights the challenges California faces in influencing 
global climate policy while addressing the needs of local communities that are already 
adversely impacted by air pollution.  
 
As California undertakes a leadership role in climate governance, policy formulation is 
increasingly emerging as an expert-driven process that emphasizes global GHG reductions as 
the goal and geographically-neutral economic and technological fixes as the solution (Park, 
2009; Millard-Ball, 2012). In this process, climate change policies are not analyzed to determine 
how they can serve to either exacerbate or redress existing forms of environmental inequality 
in urban communities. Community-based strategies that integrate climate change interventions 
with population health outcomes are often excluded. Consequently, California’s climate 
interventions have been met with uncertainty and socio-political contestation, where global 
scientific fact is being separated from local knowledge, culture, and history (Pitt and Randolph, 
2009; Jasanoff, 2010; Wynne, 1992). Urban studies and public health scholars have rarely 
investigated how scientific expertise and climate governance is challenged amid the growing 
engagement of environmental justice3 advocates to produce contextually relevant strategies 
that integrates climate change interventions with population health outcomes.  
                                                           
1 A social movement is defined as “an action system, formed for a certain period of time and based on collective 
identity, of mobilized networks of groups and organizations which aim to bring about, prevent, or reverse social 
change by means of protest” (Garrelts and Dietz, 2014: Pg. 6). Social movements have been seen as more than 
single NGOs, citizen’s initiatives, or activists. They are complex, often decentralized networks that can produce a 
powerful dynamic, generate considerable political and media pressure to make a decisive contribution to social 
change (Garrelts and Dietz, 2014). 
2 This introduction does not cover a detailed primer on the causes, consequences, and mechanics of climate 
change; additional detail is included in the subsequent chapters. A large body of literature explores climate change 
in the natural sciences and social science disciplines. For additional information, see IPCC, 2014; Adger et al, 2006; 
and Miller and Edwards, 2001.    
3 Environmental justice is defined as the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of 
race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Environmental justice can be achieved when all individuals enjoys 
the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making 
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Resistance to climate change science and policy typically has been framed through the deficit 
model, which views lay people, such as environmental justice (EJ) groups, as having insufficient 
knowledge about scientific problems. Under this model, such groups and individuals must be 
educated in order to see the world more like professional experts (Corburn, 2007; Brown, 2009; 
Beck 2011b). To address the shortcomings in the literature and contest the view of lay publics 
as “technically illiterate,” this dissertation aims to provide a complex and nuanced 
interpretation of the phenomenon of climate change at its various sites of construction. In 
particular, this research asks how environmental justice advocates are engaging strategically in 
the policymaking process in order to legitimize or contest regulatory policies regarding climate 
change in the face of ongoing pollution, illness, and injustice. In answering this question, the 
dissertation centers on three multiscalar cases: (1) the public health and environmental justice 
aspects of municipal climate action plans; (2) the conflict over statewide carbon pricing and use 
of its revenue for investment in communities most impacted by air pollution; and (3) the social 
equity implications of international forest carbon-offset projects allowable under California’s 
market-based climate change law. These interrelated case studies provide critical insights into 
environmental inequities and the emerging epistemologies of climate change on multiple 
scales.  
 
The next sections of this chapter introduces the research objectives of the dissertation and the 
environmental justice strategies that are challenging a priori policy expertise to produce new 
local, place-based conceptualizations of climate change that underscore population health and 
community well-being. Section 2 describes the tension between two competing California 
climate policy approaches, “Carbon Fundamentalism” and “Climate Change from the Streets,” 
and argues how different epistemological frames take part in shaping conceptions of ‘nature’ 
and how it facilitates or hinders social inclusion and public health locally. Section 3 explores the 
multidisciplinary frameworks from the fields of urban studies, public health, and Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) to examine the multiple ways of knowing climate change as the 
phenomenon is configured through interrelated policy scales. In particular, it is argued that 
using a multidisciplinary approach highlights the socially and geographically uneven impacts of 
climate change throughout California, and the politics of knowledge production and expertise 
around climate change interventions. Section 4 describes the research questions and methods; 
it is followed by a brief summary of the multiscalar case study chapters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
2012). 
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Section 1.1: Tension between Carbon Fundamentalism and Climate Change from the Streets 
 
 
As public concern grows for the changing climate and impacts to the environment, 
governments and scientists are becoming more focused on its causes, global GHG emissions. As 
a result, the goal of climate policy is to reduce the seven GHG emissions identified by the Kyoto 
Protocol4 and California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) without regard to 
public health concerns. This is because scientific studies have shown, these seven GHG 
emissions5 have “no direct public health impacts” because they are global pollutants that mix 
uniformly in the atmosphere. They do not have localized effects like particulate matter (PM 2.5) 
and ground-level ozone (O3) (CARB, 2008).6 Evidence of observed climate change impacts, 
moreover, is reported as strongest and most comprehensive for natural systems (IPCCC, 2014).7  
 
Despite the fact that GHG and co-pollutants, such as PM and O3, (the key ingredients of smog) 
are emitted concurrently from processes such as fossil fuel burning in industry, motor vehicles 
and buildings, they are not addressed jointly in climate policies (Boyce and Pastor, 2013; Pastor 
and Boyce, 2012).8 Since GHG emissions are seen as not having localized impacts, the health co-
benefits9 of GHG reduction strategies are often not analyzed, quantified, or even identified by 
policymakers. It is asserted that climate policy is most cost-effective when it is focused solely on 
global GHG emissions. Under this approach, “the most environmentally and economically 
effective way to address co-pollutants is to revisit existing local pollution laws and perhaps 
make them more stringent” (Stavins, 2011). Consequently, climate change responses leave out 
critical populations and seldom address the human scale of climate change. Climate change is 
generally perceived as an environmental problem, rather than a people problem. It is framed as 
                                                           
4 The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, which commits its Parties by setting internationally binding GHG emission reduction targets. The Kyoto 
Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on December 11, 1997 and implemented on February 16, 2005 (UNFCCC, 
2014).  
5 The seven GHG emissions under AB 32 include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons,  
perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride. The Kyoto Protocol does not include nitrogen 
trifluoride (NF3). NF3 was not widely used in the 1990s when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated. Recent studies 
found that NF3 has a higher global warming potential than CO2, persists in the atmosphere longer, and is used in 
the manufacture of several consumer items, including photovoltaic solar panels, LCD television screens, and 
microprocessors (California Health and Safety Code, Section §38505(g)).  
6 Exposure to GHG emissions has human health impacts in concentrated form, such as their use in the workplace 
(WDHS, 2013). However outdoor exposure levels are considered to be de minimis; GHG emissions dilute as they 
mix uniformly in the atmosphere (CARB, 2008). 
7 For example, according to the IPCC (2014; Pg. 6) changing precipitation or melting snow and ice are altering 
hydrological systems in many, affecting water resources in terms of quantity and quality (medium confidence). 
Many terrestrial, freshwater, and marine species have shifted their geographic ranges, seasonal activities, 
migration patterns, abundances and species interactions in response to ongoing climate change (high confidence). 
8 Co-pollutants include PM, O3 , nitrogen oxides (NOX), sulphur oxides (SOx), volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and 
carbon monoxide (CO) (Boyce and Pastor, 2013).    
9 For purposes of this research, “co-benefit” means an ancillary benefit of a GHG mitigation or adaptation policy 
that is produced in addition to the benefit targeted by the policy (Pittel and Rubbelke, 2008; Li, 2002; Burtraw and 
Toma, 2000).   
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an abstract scientific problem affecting the “natural” world, rather than a problem with 
everyday impacts on local communities. 
 
In climate policy, the key greenhouse gas of concern is carbon dioxide (CO2); it is one of the 
most abundant anthropogenic gases that contributes to global warming and persists in the 
atmosphere for many years (UCS, 2012). To quantify and monitor CO2 and other GHGs, analysts 
convert the gas levels to a “CO2 equivalent” (CO2e). The CO2 equivalency is calculated by 
multiplying its mass by the “global warming potential” (GWP), which indicates the equivalent 
greenhouse effect of a pound of the gas as compared to a pound of CO2 (Table 1). References to 
GHG emission quantities in climate policy follow the international convention of using metric 
tons (2205 pounds) of CO2 or the “CO2 equivalent” when referring to non-CO2 gases (CARB, 
2014a).  
 
 
Table 1: Greenhouse Gas CO2   Equivalents 
GHG Global Warming Potential 
(20-years) 
Global Warming Potential 
(100-year) 
Carbon dioxide 1 1 
Nitrous oxide  264 265 
Nitrogen trifluoride 12,800 16,100 
Sulfur hexafluoride 17,500 23,600 
Perfluorocarbons 5,000-8000 7,000-10,000 
Methane 84 28 
Hydrofluorocarbons 100-11,000 100-12,000 
 
Source: CARB (2014) 
 
 
 
The strong adherence to CO2 as the main global greenhouse gas of concern and the perception 
of climate change as impacting mainly “natural systems” has been conceptualized as “Carbon 
Fundamentalism.” Allenby (2008), first introduced the term into the climate change lexicon 
with his view that the transference of social trends and behaviors into a simplistic equation of 
“CO2 equivalency” or “carbon footprint”10 marked a sign of a growing authoritarian governance 
structure and the moral valuation inherent in climate change solutions. He suggested that 
fundamentalism of any type encourages an authoritarian view of “nature” that rejects open 
dialogue and nuanced consideration of alternative policy solutions.  
 
 
 
                                                           
10 A carbon footprint is defined as “a measure of the total amount of [GHG] emissions of a defined population, 
system or activity, considering all relevant sources, sinks and storage within the spatial and temporal boundary of 
the population, system or activity of interest. Calculated as carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) using the relevant 
100-year global warming potential (GWP100)” (Wright et al, 2011).   
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The data driven exploratory processes of science are choked off by inculcation of belief systems 
that rely on archetypal and emotive strength. Importantly, the extreme language is directed not 
against those who deny anthropogenic climate change completely, but those who, while 
accepting the existence of the phenomenon, do not believe it is an existential and immediate 
crisis. The authority of science is relied on not for factual enlightenment but as ideological 
foundation for authoritarian policy prescriptions which might otherwise be difficult to 
implement (Allenby, 2008).  
 
 
Under carbon fundamentalism, “nature” is used to describe desired environmental conditions 
and goals of climate governance: “achieving carbon reduction targets,” “preventing dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” and “limiting the average global surface 
temperature increase of 2°C (3.6°F) over the pre-industrial average.” Scientific synonyms of 
nature include “biodiversity,” “ecological integrity,” and “natural systems.” As explained by Hull 
(2006), these references describe a singular nature. Under carbon fundamentalism, society is 
shielded from seeing the multiple natures that evoke alternative environmental futures and 
political action. Furthermore, carbon fundamentalism disregards local context and socio-
economic conditions influencing the phenomenon of climate change.   
 
In analyzing California’s climate governance, this dissertation has identified six key 
characteristics of carbon fundamentalism. The first, focuses on the GHG reduction potential of 
all climate policies and is measured in tons of CO2 equivalency. AB 32 established a 1990 GHG 
emission level to serve as the 2020 emission limit of 427 million metric tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (MMTCO2) GHG emissions (CARB, 2014a). Policymakers claim that Californians 
historically have supported such climate approaches to protect the “natural environment” and 
the high quality of life it provides (CARB, 2014a; Pg. 26). In implementing AB 32, state officials 
asserted that California was “sustained, in more ways than one, by the mountains, deserts, 
rivers, streams, forests, farmlands, rangelands, coastline, and temperate climate that form [the] 
natural environment” and define the state. These resources and their “natural beauty,” is 
argued, together facilitate California’s continued economic and cultural growth (CARB, 2014a; 
Pg. 26).  
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The second characteristic of carbon fundamentalism is that California’s climate policies are 
built on a strong foundation in science. It is contended that policy has been supported, and 
advanced, by California’s world-class research institutions, which have made the state 
perhaps the most studied region in the world when it comes to GHG emissions and climate 
policy (CARB, 2014a, Pg. 32). Working under a linear approach to expertise, California takes 
strides to ensure that ‘sound’ science compels policy action. The interaction between 
science and policy is viewed as a one-way process, in which scientific inquiry is conducted 
away from society, politics, and values (‘truth speaks to power’ – Figure 3). Under carbon 
fundamentalism, unbiased, dispassionate investigators assess facts about nature (Ezrahi, 
1990). This positivist perspective assumes that science informs policymakers of objective 
facts or projections, after which policymakers factor in social or political considerations. 
Hence, California ascribes to a strong scientific framing of the phenomenon that is 
developed by a detached community of experts. According to Beck (2011b), Haas (1992), 
and Jasanoff and Wynne (1998), the linear model in climate change science and policy 
assumes three principles:  
 
a) Certainty is the result of more and better research (the linearity of knowledge 
production); 
b) More and better research helps resolve political disagreements (science serves as 
a harmonizing element); 
c) By separating science from the vulgarities of politics; policy-making is evidence-
based and rational (Figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
The third characteristic of California’s carbon fundamentalism asserts that appropriate action 
on climate change requires a continuum of measures to capture the maximum technologically 
feasible and “cost-effectiveness” emission reductions opportunities wherever possible, on an 
ongoing basis. AB 32 defines cost-effective as the “cost per unit of reduced emissions of 
greenhouse gases adjusted for its global warming potential” (California Health and Safety Code, 
sections §38505(d); 38560; 38561). Fourth, as outlined in Figure 5a, under carbon 
fundamentalism, cost-effectiveness is principally achieved through market-based mechanisms 
that provide an environment where businesses and polluters that make “smart investments can 
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be rewarded for developing advanced technologies” (CARB, 2014a; Pg. 104). Furthermore, 
carbon fundamentalism claims that “targeted, performance-based standards and technology-
forcing rules can kick-start markets and drive technologies to higher volumes, and lower 
prices.” Ultimately, the goal of these climate measures is to develop market-winning solutions, 
rather than just direct regulatory compliance approaches (also known as command-and-control 
regulations). Strategic financial investments and policy support is intended to accelerate market 
transitions to cleaner technologies (CARB, 2014a; Pg. 104).  
 
 
 
 Figure 5a: Tension between Carbon Fundamentalism and Climate Change from the Streets 
 
 
 
 
 
The fifth characteristic of carbon fundamentalism focuses on the geographically-neutral scale of 
climate policy interventions. Under AB 32, policymakers narrowed climate measures to directly 
address GHG reductions across polluting sources, regardless of geography or scale. As GHG are 
global pollutants that mixed uniformly in the atmosphere, it is argued, specific locations for 
reducing GHG emissions do not matter, as long as California meet’s its 2020 reduction targets. 
State policymakers, moreover, view California as a member of the global community and 
envision its climate policies to be part of a larger domestic and international carbon regime. The 
state has strategically chosen to move away from a “parochial” scale – even if it would result in 
the direct reduction of other co-pollutants (like O3 and PM). California is scaling-up its efforts to 
the “global” to engage in a climate change policy arena on par with the world’s nation-states 
(Mazmaian et al., 2008).  
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Finally, the last characteristic under carbon fundamentalism in AB 32 is its main focus on 
mitigation (Figure 5a). California’s mitigation measures are intended to slow the rate at which 
human-caused GHG emissions are being emitted to avoid further disruptions to the Earth’s 
atmosphere, rather than focusing on adaptation measures. The goal of adaptation measures is 
to protect lives, health, property, and ecosystems from actual or anticipated climate change 
impacts, such as heat waves, droughts, and flooding. Hence, mitigation can be viewed as 
activities to protect “nature from society,” while adaptation involves ways of “protecting 
society from nature” (ICELI, 2009; Stehr et al., 2005; Pg. 1).  
 
Conversely, California environmental justice advocates reject a strong adherence to carbon 
fundamentalism. They argue that the epistemology of climate change as an abstract, global, 
and scientific issue precludes the lived experience of individuals in pollution-adjacent 
neighborhoods, and further complicates environmental inequalities in communities of color. 
Carbon fundamentalism separates climate change from political and socio-economic factors, 
and most importantly, from the human-local scale (Park, 2009; Hulme and Mahony, 2010). EJ 
advocates argue that such positivist approaches privileges experts as the bearers of knowledge 
about both the problem and the solutions. As described by Barugh and Glass (2010), this type 
of climate policy often ignores the negative environmental and social impacts of climate change 
on environmental justice communities:  
 
 
There is a risk with regard to climate change that as the scientific nature is emphasized as the realm 
of experts, and the solution posited by the state is reducing carbon emissions, communities are 
disempowered to examine the issue for themselves, and communities are left with expert state and 
corporation driven solutions such as market-based pollution trading and technological fixes (Pg. 3). 
 
 
 
Therefore, without proactive and contextual policies that emphasize the human-local scale to 
address equity concerns, EJ groups claim climate change will likely reinforce and increase 
current, as well as future health disparities in marginalized communities. Research has shown 
that population groups with low socioeconomic status (SES) are typically most vulnerable to 
climate change impacts, compared to wealthier groups, who are able to pay for protection 
against or recovery after such disasters (Curtis and Oven, 2011).11 The scope and scale of 
climate policies are relevant to public health because climate change-related risks are place-
specific and path-dependent. Location is an important determinant of hazardous exposure, and 
certain places will bear more risk than others (Hess et al., 2008). Understanding social 
vulnerability of communities is critical because climate change impacts such as risk of wildfires, 
drought, flooding, and extreme weather events have accompanying health impacts that are 
occurring sooner than projected (Pastor et al., 2009). Shonkoff et al. (2011) refers to such 
circumstances as the ‘Climate Gap,’ and further describing it as “the disproportionate and 
                                                           
11 Social vulnerability to climate change is often defined by the ability for a community to anticipate, cope, and 
resist, and recover from the impact of extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods, heat waves, air 
pollution, and infectious disease.  As such, it is important to understand disparities in the costs and benefits of 
climate change, the abilities of different groups to adapt to it, and the mitigation/adaptation strategies developed 
to address it in order to better inform regulatory and policy action in the future (Shonkoff et al., 2011). 
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unequal implications that climate change and climate mitigation hold for people of color and 
the poor” (Pg. 486).   
 
As a result, environmental justice advocates in California are pushing forward an alternative 
climate policy model, which this dissertation has conceptualized as “Climate Change from the 
Streets.”   As outlined in Figure 5a, Climate Change from the Streets (CCStreets) challenges the 
a priori policy practices of carbon fundamentalism by creating new methods and interventions 
that focus on how climate change responses can be embedded in social justice and public 
health, and intertwined with economic processes. The focus is not only on the degradation of 
‘nature’ but also the degradation of communities (Agyeman et al., 2003; Park, 2009; Morello-
Frosch et al., 2012). Through CCStreets, environmental justice groups approach climate change 
differently. They know and analyze the phenomenon through people’s histories, cultures, place, 
and local knowledge12 rather than solely through data gathered by experts and implemented by 
policy regimes (Park, 2009; Morello-Frosch, et al., 2012).  
 
CCStreets places a strong emphasis on the co-benefits potential of climate policies, arguing that 
efficient policy design seeks greater emissions reductions where health co-benefits are greatest 
and most needed. CCStreets also seeks a concerted effort toward adaptation planning in 
addition to mitigation measures (Figure 5a). Adaptation is pursued in the acknowledgment of 
the fact that even if governments succeed in the future in reducing GHG emissions, certain 
irreversible and significant impacts from climate change are already underway and are 
inevitable. As such, some population groups are more socially vulnerable and will need 
additional safeguards from the immediate and anticipated climate change impacts (Few, 
Brown, and Tompkins, 2007; Shonkoff et al., 2011 ). 
 
Advocates of the CCStreets model, consequently, are challenging experts over issues of truth 
and method in climate policy and demanding a greater role for themselves in decision-making 
processes that impact their lives (lles, 2007; Corburn, 2007). Environmental justice groups are 
not only debating the political use and control of policy and expertise, but also the process by 
which technical knowledge is produced by claiming to speak credibly as experts in their own 
right. By embracing the use of local knowledge, they reject the employment of “universal 
knowledge” in environmental policymaking, which standardizes and generalizes the 
achievement of science to make it replicable in all contexts, without regard to of place (Clark 
and Murdock, 1997). As the dissertation case studies will elucidate, EJ groups are employing 
local knowledge of the environment to identify community-based solutions to climate change 
at multiple scales.  
 
As conceptually illustrated in Figure 5b, CCStreets highlights the reciprocal and dialectical 
relationship between nature and society. The policy model institutes a socio-geographical 
                                                           
12 Local knowledge is often defined by the International development literature as:  a). information linked to a 
specific place, culture or identify group; b). dynamic and evolving knowledge; c). know-how belonging to groups of 
people who are intimate with the natural and human system within which they live; and, d). knowledge that has 
some qualities that distinguishes it from formal scientific knowledge (Corburn, 2003). 
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method to climate change interventions and human health. As a result, CCStreets 
acknowledges an understanding of how climate change is connected with other types of 
knowledge about the local environment, and enables different ways of knowing to play a valid 
part of framing a culture of climate change and its correspondingly policy responses (Brace and 
Geoghegan, 2010). In sum, as exemplified in Figure 5b, through CCStreets, we understand that 
a range of competing actors and institutions heterogeneously engineer the social and technical 
elements of climate change governance.   
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Section 1.2: Analyzing Climate Change through the Multidisciplinary Frameworks of Urban 
Planning, Science and Technology Studies, and Public Health  
 
 
Climate governance has been defined as “the ways in which public and civil society actors and 
institutions articulate climate goals, exercise influence and authority, and manage urban 
climate planning and implementation processes” (Anguelovski and Carmin, 2011; Pg.169). It is 
through these processes that societies define the phenomenon of climate change, in the form 
of rules and norms, values, and solutions. Under carbon fundamentalism, California follows a 
conventional view of climate governance, in which local action is seen as being directly 
influenced by global-scale policy and international agreements. As previously noted, the 
primary focus of AB 32, is global GHG emissions reductions. California provides little way of 
guidance or mandates for cities to analyze and incorporate health co-benefits in mitigation and 
adaptation measures.  
 
Throughout the world, there is growing evidence that local climate planning is neglecting issues 
of equity and human health (Bulkeley et al., 2013; Douglas et al., 2012; Finn et al., 2011; 
Hughes, 2013; Pearsall et al., 2010). Municipal climate action plans (CAPs)13 rarely analyze or 
consider the disproportionate impact climate change will have on low-income neighborhoods 
and communities of color in regards to heat waves, air pollution, public health, and 
environmental justice (Bulkeley et al., 2013; Skonkoff et al., 2009). Carmin et al. (2013) has 
found that many experts providing advice to cities; believe successful climate planning requires 
grounding initiatives (in particular, adaptation) in scientific assessments without regard to the 
socioeconomic conditions in which the phenomenon takes place. Carmin et al (2013) conducted 
focus groups with leading practitioners in 14 cities in North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa to 
understand what constitutes successful uses of science and management of scientific 
uncertainty in urban adaptation planning. This research concluded that scientific evidence plays 
a critical role in climate planning. Climate leaders use science “as a discursive and symbolic 
tool” to legitimize climate-related activities and provide practitioners with the means to set 
priorities and identify appropriate cost-effective planning measures (Pg. 229).  
 
The emphasis placed on scientific assessments as a foundation for climate planning is aligned 
with carbon fundamentalism or positivism, both of which are based on the assumption that 
scientific data and findings will guide policymakers to adopt the best course of action. Carmin’s 
(2013) study of leading local climate practitioners also identified three critical limitations to a 
strict positivist perspective in climate planning: (1) the perspective ignores the fact that 
scientific analyses and findings, are themselves the product of social and political processes. 
The knowledge base of stakeholders involved in the process, shape both the types of 
assessments conducted and findings that are produced; (2) though science is often viewed as 
                                                           
13 A climate action plan focuses primarily on reducing GHG emissions, including emissions resulting from both a 
local government’s operations and from the community as a whole. It typically includes an analysis/strategy to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions resulting from land use, energy use, transportation, solid waste disposal, 
buildings, lighting, and waste water treatment and water delivery (ICLEI, 2012). 
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producing unbiased and irrefutable results, the findings of assessments are often used as a 
basis for advancing political agendas, and when results diverge from the preferences of local 
policymakers, they may be compelled to change their options or challenge the methods or 
findings; and (3) “while many scholars and practitioners are focusing on how to design 
assessment processes that cities can adopt, as is the case with science in general, the 
estimation used in these and other types of urban climate assessments are inherently social 
and uncertain” (Pg. 223).   
 
Cartwright et al. (2012) similarly cautions that strict positivist approaches in urban climate 
planning does not always result in substantive or swift climate action. She argues that no 
linear relationship exists between more and better climate knowledge and improved action 
in cities. In many situations, the more city officials understand about climate change and its 
consequences, the more difficult decisions become (Cartwright et al., 2012). On one hand, 
climate-adaptation theory suggests that as uncertainty increases, a stronger emphasis on 
flexibility, iterative progress, reflection, and continual learning as information becomes 
available is required (Desai et al., 2008; Hallegatte et al., 2011).  Yet at the same time, local 
policymakers are being called upon to demonstrate proactivity in defining scientifically 
sound models of climate governance while weighing competing economic interests 
(Cartwright et al. 2012). 
 
Thus a tension between carefully engaging the science so as to create policy that will cope 
with uncertainty on the one hand, and the call for bold and transformative leadership on the 
other.  It is unsurprising, then, that some city-scale decision-makers find themselves uneasy 
about taking climate change decisions in a systematic and responsible manner. The fact that 
climate change is only one of the competing imperatives -- alongside critical issues…such as 
economic growth -- demanding the attention of city officials and politicians makes defining 
the right action even more contested (Cartwright et al. 2012; Pg. 3). 
 
 
Consequently, local governments often minimize normative judgments underlying climate risk 
assessments and plans under the platform of technical impartiality to promote rational 
planning decisions. According to Rosenthal et al. (2013), technical rationality has been adopted 
as the basis to guide many climate-planning decisions in major cities across the United States, a 
trend that has the potential to reinforce “existing patterns of privilege and exclusion” (Pg. 220). 
She asserts that a strong reliance on technocratic regulation has often resulted in the 
overconcentration of noxious uses in low-income neighborhoods and communities of color that 
have historically lacked the capacity to resist such facilities (Rosenthal et al., 2013; Northridge 
et al., 2003, Aygeman, 2001). These communities are often marginalized in public decision-
making processes and less likely to engage in technical analyses that are required in regulatory 
processes based on professional science (Young 2002; Corburn, 2005).14 
                                                           
14 In the United States, the field of urban and environmental planning has a long history of technocratic planning, 
in which risk assessment and cost-benefit methodologies are used to meet legal requirements under state and 
federals laws for environmental review of development projects and to ensure local economic development 
priorities (Burayidi, 2001; Umemoto, 2002; and Rosenthal et al., 2013). 
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As these examples illustrate, institutionalized expertise is emerging as a powerful instrument 
for creating boundaries between professional and lay expertise in climate policy, despite 
scientific and political uncertainity. The dominant epistemology of climate change discourages 
lay engagement and universalizes climate change without regard to local context.  However, 
the questions of who counts as an expert, whose knowledge is accepted, and who participates 
in advisory and negotiating bodies are critically important elements in the development of 
climate governance.  
 
Such boundaries are considered ineffective to maintain in addressing environmental challenges 
because these boundaries do not acknowledge how developments in knowledge and 
technological capacity are linked to human self-understanding and social relations. Nor do they 
reflect historical experience, social practices, or lay experimentation, which are not the same as 
knowledge acquired through lab experiments, formal climate models or methodically 
disciplined empirical observations. “To discover new facts about ‘nature’ [i.e. climate change] 
we change ourselves. To build on ‘natural’ facts without taking stock of associated social orders 
is risky business” (Jasanoff and Martello, 2004; Pg. 347).  In this respect, the diverse ways of 
knowing are viewed as a method to provide safeguards against the consequences of scientific 
reductionism in climate change policy. Such a reality is placing new demands on experts to 
collaborate on developing findings in new settings and at multiple scales. 
 
In California, environmental justice groups are challenging the positivist and detached expertise 
of climate policy. The CCStreets approach aligns with the findings found in the field of Science 
and Technology Studies (STS). STS examines the culturally contingent nature of techno-scientific 
practices, biases, and values that often conflict with community understandings and 
representation of local environmental conditions (Latour, 1987, Wynne, 1992; Bijker and Pinch, 
1987; Corburn, 2005). As this dissertation will show, the CCStreets approach is changing the 
prevailing perception of climate knowledge as being stable, rather than an ongoing cultural 
creation, made and remade through the daily practices of experts and civil society actors 
(Jasanoff, 2008).  
 
Using analytical frameworks from STS adds value to the analysis of climate policy because the 
field of urban planning has rarely documented the ability of EJ groups to challenge and 
transform the official knowledge practices in the regulatory institutions governing climate 
change (Corburn, 2005; 2007). STS scholars contend that local reconstitutions of climate change 
policies and scientific knowledge require examining both the structural and cultural aspects of 
the civic environments in which policymaking and decisions take place (Niemeir et al., 2012). 
This requires a broader understanding of the context in which lay people have constructed 
climate knowledge and technological expertise, and how it can vary within and across 
communities. Such an approach “highlights the importance of considering the intersection of 
race, class, and gender, the actions of environmental justice social movements globally and 
within communities” when developing climate policies (Niemeir et al., 2012; Pg. 14).        
Ottinger and Cohen (2011) argue that more research on approaches like CCStreets is needed to 
understand how the engagement of the environmental justice movement has opened up 
spaces for the transformation of techno-scientific practice. They view such approaches as 
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important sources of “ruptures” in technical practice (Pg. 3). Creating these ruptures is essential 
in environmental governance because certain types of evidence and knowledge are valued or 
discounted. Policymakers often do not mitigate the effects of pollution on a community until it 
is proven that pollution causes residents’ environmental health issues (Ottinger, 2010).15 The 
regulatory regimes rely on experts to set and define standards based on technical norms 
produced in labs and outside affected communities. As a result, the local knowledge that 
community groups bring to environmental problems is often disregarded or deemed irrelevant 
in the context of mainstream techno-scientific practice. Ezrahi (1990) states that by privileging 
scientific methods, experts and governments often retain legitimacy and power in science and 
environmental policy decisions because they are seen as objective and “technically disciplined,” 
which is in contrast to the undisciplined, emotional, and biased positions of lay citizens (Table 
2).   
 
As the CCStreets case studies will show, lay publics are increasingly debating with experts over 
issues of truth and method in science. They are also demanding a greater role in environmental 
health decision-making that impacts their lives (Illes, 2007). Lay publics are not only challenging 
the political use and control of science and expertise, by claiming to speak credibly as experts in 
their own right, they are also challenging process by which technical knowledge is produced. 
Corburn (2007) argues that conventional science policy fails “to engage how scientific 
knowledge and notions of expertise emerge in the first place become institutionalized, and 
tend to bound out of their cognitive domain other ways of knowing and doing” (Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge Production Question Local Knowledge Professional Knowledge* 
Who holds it? Members of community – often 
identify group/place specific 
Members of a profession, university, 
industry, government agency; 
sophisticated NGOs  
How is it acquired? What makes 
evidence credible? 
Experience; cultural tradition 
Evidence of one’s eyes, lived 
experience; not instrument dependent 
Experimental; epidemiologic 
Highly instrumentally mediated; 
statistical significance; legal standard 
Forums where it is tested? Public narratives; community stories; 
courts; media 
Peer review; courts; media 
   
Table 2: *Professional knowledge focuses on regulatory science, which consists of activities aimed at improving existing 
practices techniques and processes to further the task of policy development, including: knowledge production, knowledge 
synthesis; such as evaluation, screening and meta-analysis; prediction, such as predicting future risks or costs (Source: 
Corburn, 2005; 2007). 
 
 
 
By extending science to include local knowledge, we can move beyond science’s commitment 
to technical rationality and find opportunities to understand the technical insights that lay 
publics, like environmental justice advocates, can offer to environmental problem solving (Sze, 
2007).  The CCStreets approach in California builds off the practices developed from 
Community-Based Participatory Research (CBPR) is a popular method in the field of public 
                                                           
15 This is often an insurmountable hurdle given scientific standards for proof (Byrant, 1995).  
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health, in which professionals and lay citizens collaboratively define problems, collect data, 
interpret findings, and develop policy options (Minkler et al., 2011; Gonzalez et al., 2007).   
CBPR derives from Paolo Freire’s (1974) Participatory Action Research (PAR), which seeks to 
undo classic scientific analysis in which a subject observes an object or phenomena and instead 
focuses analyses on a community of subjects who reflect on themselves and their experience. 
In essence, CBPR seeks to build a community of grounded or indigenous experts.  According to 
Gonzalez et al. (2007), when conducting environmental health research in environmental 
justice communities, “epistemologically, critical reflection by community is needed to access a 
complex phenomenon, such as health and quality of life, which is wrought by the intersection 
of social, historical, and physical determinants and not amendable to pure [scientific] 
observation” (Pg. 79).  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Conceptual Diagram of Epidemiology and CBPR.  Source: Gonzalez et al. (2007) 
 
 
Extending scientific practices to include lay publics is useful for highly complex environmental 
issues because it enables the integration of diverse methods of evidence and multiple ways of 
knowing. In urban settings, where there is a situation of high uncertainty, CBPR provides a 
model that can uncover new hypotheses, rather than test predetermined ones, as found in 
positivist modes of research, such as epidemiology (Figure 6). In CBPR, the goal is not to prove 
supposition with a high degree of statistical confidence, but to provide a complex (or thick) 
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description of the urban condition that is faithful to the lived experience of residents (Gonzalez 
et al., 2007).    
 
Consequently, as environmental problems increasingly become more complex through the 
intricate interactions among biological, physical, and social systems, solutions based only in 
science become more difficult to reach, as in the case with climate change. Holistic solutions to 
climate change will need to depend on collaborations among scientists, policymakers, and 
diverse publics (Lemos and Morehouse, 2005).  Implementing effective environmental policy 
requires not only the combined efforts of many disciplines to understand environmental 
problems, but also active interaction with stakeholders, such as environmental justice 
advocates (Lemos and Morehouse, 2005). CCStreets is transforming techno-scientific practice in 
climate governance by creating new forms of environmental expertise and localizing health 
equity in climate change decisions. Through these ruptures, EJ groups are creating methods of 
knowing and defining climate change at multiple scales. 
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Section 1.3: The Multiscalar Civic Epistemologies of Climate Change 
 
 
Differences in the epistemologies of climate change can be witnessed in the various types of 
climate responses and expert knowledges produced across California. Some of these variants 
can be attributed in part, to the methods EJ groups are utilizing (such as CCStreets) to 
produce scientific and technical data to inform climate policy. These new forms of 
knowledge and governance can be understood as an articulation of civic epistemology: “the 
institutionalized practices by which members of a given society test and deploy knowledge 
claims used as a basis for making collective choices” (Jasanoff, 2005; Pg. 255). Originally 
conceived by STS scholar Shelia Jasanoff (2005; 2011), civic epistemology was developed as 
an analytical tool to understand the practices, methods, and institutions by which a society 
identifies new policy issues, generates knowledge relevant to their resolution, and puts that 
knowledge to use in policymaking. 
 
Through this concept, she explains the different ways in which citizens in Germany, Britain, 
and the United States “come to know things in common and to apply their knowledge to the 
conduct of politics” (Jasanoff 2005; Pg. 9) in relation to biotechnology and climate change.  
Throughout the CCStreets case studies, I use the concept of civic epistemology to examine 
the geographically specific and socio-cultural ways of knowledge production of climate 
change at multiple policy scales rather than simply at the nation-state level (Figure 7). Work 
on nation-state civic epistemologies has found that many key scientific definitions and policy 
responses are largely shaped by national contingencies, such as administrative and legal 
codes and styles, as well as culturally specific conceptions of risk, vulnerability, and impact 
(Grove-White, 2008; Jasanoff, 2005;2011; Iles, 2007; Miller, 2008).16   
 
For instance, scientific studies deemed reliable and legitimate in one country may be 
dismissed in another as inadequate for policy guidance, even as regulators in both countries 
are “influenced” by similar social, political, and economic variables. Jasanoff (2011) argues 
that acceptance of anthropogenic climate change as a guide for national policies and multi-
lateral agreements in Germany and Britain, and its rejection in the United States (which 
failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and failed to enact a national policy to curb GHG 
emissions) demonstrates the fact that informed citizens in one democratic society may 
reject as scientifically uncertain climate studies and projections that are deemed entirely 
acceptable in another (Jasanoff, 2010; 2011).  
 
                                                           
16 Civic epistemology also includes a range of knowledge production processes, including scientific peer review, 
public participation mechanisms, methods of reasoning, government statistics, standards of evidence, and norms 
of expertise that typify public debates and political institutions (Miller, 2008; Illes, 2007). 
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By focusing instead on “multiscalar” civic epistemologies, I argue the concept can elucidate 
the interrelated policy scales and knowledge production processes of climate change, which 
are quite different from those that solely occur at a national scale (Figure 7). Emphasizing 
multiscalar civic epistemologies assists in understanding how the construction of climate 
change can be influenced by local knowledge, culture, and history and can travel between 
scales. These variables are not explicitly acknowledged in Jasanoff’s concept of nation-state 
civic epistemology.  
 
The nation-state approach privileges knowledge production by elite global actors, without 
acknowledging that significant scientific and regulatory processes are also influenced by 
subnational and community-based actors. Nor does the approach analyze how race, gender, 
class, or power differentials shape civic epistemologies. As an analytical tool at multiple 
scales, civic epistemologies can examine the emerging relationships among experts, city 
planners, policymakers, and diverse publics for defining, measuring, and governing climate 
change and health. For example, research by Angotti and Sze (2009) has found that social 
justice activists in San Francisco and New York City have used the concept of ‘environmental 
justice’ as an analytic framework to understand community health and environmental 
problems and to advocate for solutions through community organizing and policy 
development:    
 
In both cases, we found that disparate health and environmental effects triggered community 
organizing, but we also discovered that environmental justice advocates consistently defined 
health as more than reducing disease rates. They developed their own plans and strategies that 
reimagined urban development and the built environment and advanced public health policies in 
broad, holistic terms (Pg. 21).  
 
A holistic analysis of climate change also requires methods to identify whether equitable 
distribution and effectiveness of policy responses has been realized between the 
interrelated scales -- global, regions, nation-states, and most importantly, in local 
communities most impacted by climate change (Barrett, 2013; Pg.216). Hence, a single scale 
analysis runs contrary to the subject of environmental justice and climate change with 
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numerous actors occupying and traveling across scales. Moreover, it allows for an 
examination of the multiple ways in which environmental justice advocates invoke 
geographic scale(s) to validate or contest the meaning and extent of an environmental 
problem, among themselves and to influence the policymaking process (Kurtz, 2003). The 
environmental justice movement, as a result, is situated between local scales at which the 
community protests unwanted pollution, and the more broad geographic scales where they 
are produced and can be resolved through the policymaking process (Towers, 2000).   
 
Subjecting climate knowledge to geographical or spatial inquiry helps to distinguish between 
the universalizing drive of scientific inquiry and what has been termed the instinct to make 
‘global kinds of knowledge.’ Universal knowledge, according to Hulme (2010) is comprised of 
claims that are to be true irrespective of scale and place, such as the understanding of 
radiative properties of carbon dioxide molecules in the atmosphere. Truth (universal 
knowledge) becomes, in Shapin's memorable phrase, “the view from nowhere” (Shapin, 
1985; Pg. 5). However, Hulme (2010) contends that globalized knowledge differs from 
universal knowledge. Globalized knowledge erases geographical and cultural difference and 
collapses scale to the global. “Rather than the view from nowhere, global kinds of 
knowledge claim to offer the view from everywhere” (Hulme, 2010; Pg. 559).  Therefore, he 
argues, it is necessary to focus on illuminating the globalizing tendencies of knowledge 
production of climate change, and the role geographical difference and spatial relations play 
in the governing of such knowledge production.   
 
Climate policy approaches that are insensitive to the uniqueness of ‘place’ and context result 
in singular, globalized interpretations and predictions of climate change. Globalized 
knowledge, hence, masquerades as universal truths that assert themselves as the irrefutable 
view from everywhere. Such claims result in the promotion of managerial instincts in climate 
governance and science, which seek to centralize political power and social control, thereby 
raising questions about who owns and controls the future and the global environment 
(Hulme, 2010; Scott, 1998; Anderson, 2010).  
 
Consequently, in the earlier work on nation-state civic epistemologies, the role that local 
knowledge and environmental social movements play in shaping public policy decisions is not 
analyzed. It does not investigate how subnational governments address complex environmental 
health problems or why environmental justice actors gravitate toward engagement with the 
fields of public health and planning and many other specialized fields to solve environmental 
problems. In applying a multiscalar framework of civic epistemology, one may discover that 
environmental justice actors are also influencing environmental policy by learning how to 
“become” city planners, health practitioners, and climate modelers, when they interact with 
highly specialized knowledge, practices, and regulatory institutions (Angotti and Sze, 2009).     
 
A multiscalar analysis of civic epistemology uncovers how the social and technical are 
heterogeneously engineered by a range of competing actors and institutions. Hence, the 
climate policymaking can be seen as a socio-technical process, which contains a set of 
contingencies that are the result of the co-evolution of problems and solutions. Through a 
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multiscalar concept of civic epistemology, I argue scientific knowledge and climate policy may 
on the whole remain relatively similar across expert communities globally; however, when 
scientific knowledge is used in different geographic scales and sociopolitical contexts, the 
democratic procedures of regulatory practices, public participation, and legitimating science 
differ greatly. Thus, multiscalar civic epistemologies can be interpreted as the multiple ways of 
knowing and public reasoning about policy problems intertwined with ways of organizing 
political order at various scales.   
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Section 1.4: Research Design and Questions 
 
 
 
By examining the multiple ways of knowing climate change as the phenomenon is constructed 
at various scales in California, this dissertation presents a timely analysis of how different 
epistemological frames take part in shaping conceptions of ‘nature-culture’ and how it 
facilitates or hinders social inclusion and equity in relation to climate change and health policy.   
To investigate these dynamics, I have chosen the following primary research question for the 
dissertation:  
  
How are environmental justice groups engaging in the climate policymaking process? 
 
This question seeks to examine how environmental justice actors are influencing the 
conceptualization of climate change at various scales and how more scientifically legitimate and 
socially just decision-making related to climate change is implemented. The dissertation aims to 
highlight new findings that go beyond the familiar approaches of carbon fundamentalism by 
calling critical attention to the cultural and experiential dimension of climate change policy, 
knowledge production, and local practice (Brace and Geoghegan, 2010). To support the primary 
research question, the multiscalar case studies examine the following three subsidiary research 
questions: 
 
1. How and why do governments incorporate public health and equity in climate 
change policies?  
 
2. Does local knowledge influence climate change policies? 
 
3. What role does scale play in the adoption of climate change policies?  
 
 
Multiscalar case studies were selected because such studies are need to investigate social 
phenomena that cannot be examined in a single-bounded site. Through a multiscalar 
framework, this research seeks to follow people, connections, associations, and relationships 
across space and time, because they are often substantially continuous but spatially non-
contiguous (Falzon, 2009, Pg. 2). Using this multiscalar approach, I examine environmental 
justice groups as they travel between geographies and policy scales to contest or legitimize 
climate polices. The three multiscalar cases include: (1) the public health and environmental 
justice aspects of municipal climate action plans; (2) the conflict over statewide carbon pricing 
and use of its revenue for investment in communities most impacted by air pollution; and (3) 
the social equity implications of international forest carbon-offset projects allowable under 
California’s market-based climate change law. These interrelated case studies provide critical 
insights into environmental inequities and the emerging epistemologies of climate change on 
multiple scales (Figure 8). In particular, the dissertation illustrates how environmental justice 
groups in California are influencing climate change policy formation and implementation within 
and between nation-states. 
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A multiscalar approach is supported by several decades of research in the fields of 
anthropology (Marcus, 1998; Krauss, 2009), human geography (Massey, 1999; Graham and 
Healy, 1999; Watts, 1999), and STS (Latour, 1987; 1996; Haraway, 1998; Jasanoff, 2005; 
Corburn, 2009a). Scholars in these fields have called into question the conventional conception 
of the field site as a bounded space containing a whole culture (Gupta and Fergus, 1997). In 
traditional anthropology, fieldwork frequently only took place in a village in a remote region 
(Burrell, 2009).17 Consequently, reflecting on neo-Marxist movements, such as world-systems 
theory, anthropologists Marcus and Fisher (1986) envisioned new configurations of the field 
site to tackle emerging social issues. They advocated for anthropologists to explore “how to 
represent the embedding of richly described local culture worlds in larger impersonal systems 
of political economy” (Marcus and Fisher, 1986, Pg. 77). This type of fieldwork examined how 
larger systems were registered and materialized at the local level. Macro-scale social changes in 
the structures and interconnections of late capitalism, they argued, decreased the scale and 
complexity of social processes, and therefore prompted such methodological questioning.  
Consequently, the bounding of culture within a small delimited space, such as a village was 
increasingly seen as less complete (Burrell, 2009).    
 
                                                          
17 Similarly, in traditional social science research (including urban studies), fieldwork is defined as “case study 
research, [that is] qualitative in approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple 
bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information (e.g., observations, interviews, audiovisual material, and documents), and reports a case description 
and case-based theme.” These cases are viewed as being distinct and often not interrelated (Creswell, 2007; Pg. 
73). 
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Marcus (1998), therefore, argued that multiscalar approaches were needed because they 
defined, as their objective, the study of social phenomena that cannot be examined in a single 
bounded site. He further argued that under this new conceptualization, the movement of 
objects, individuals, ideas, discourses, and the fieldworker, result in the discovery of insights 
and objects of inquiry that were not visible in studies that presumed culture was spatially fixed 
(Burrell, 2009). Under multiscalar research, fieldworkers define their objects of study 
(phenomena) through several different modes or techniques. These include, among others, 
“follow the people,” “follow the object,” “follow the metaphor,” “follow the 
biography/history,” and “follow the conflict” (Marcus, 1998). These field techniques underscore 
how movement is central to social practice and how coherent cultural processes can also occur 
across great distances (sites), linking up distinct actors (Burrell, 2009).      
 
Similarly, urban planning and public health scholars (Cummins et al., 2007; Corburn, 2009b) 
argue for theoretical research on urban health variation that incorporate multiscalar methods, 
or what they call a ‘relational view’ that explores the reciprocal relationships between people 
and places. A relational perspective on health and place encourages fieldworkers to imagine 
place in terms of the ideas on the right of Table 3, rather than those on the left.  
 
It is suggested that a “relational view” can act as an alternative to the conventional framings of 
place by emphasizing the “mutually reinforcing relationships between places, people, and 
meaning-making, on the one hand, and the political institutions and processes that shape these 
relationships, on the other” (Corburn, 2009; Pg. 15). Furthermore, a relational view places 
greater attention to the institutional processes that shape both environmental health policy 
approaches at various scales and locations (Cummins et al., 2007).       
 
Specifically in regards to climate change, Hulme (2007) has argued that multiscalar approaches 
are necessary because “we have universalized the idea of climate, detached it from its cultural 
settings and failed to read the ways in which the knowledge claims emerging from climate 
science change meaning as they travel” (Pg. 9). Hulme (2007), moreover, argues against reifying 
what climate means in the physical sense, as indicated by the claims of climate policy, but 
instead seeks research methods that transform the idea of what climate means in different 
places and scales, to different peoples, and at different times. In sum, a multiscalar case study 
of climate change seeks to “follow” the actors (climate experts, EJ advocates, policymakers, 
planners, etc.) and to enter the network where climate change is simultaneously constructed as 
a universal and localized as a particular. Multiscalar approaches demonstrate that the world of 
climate policy is not separated from the social world. Nor is the phenomenon of climate change 
configured within a single place or scale. It exists through a network of highly mobile actors, 
scientific metrics, and interrelated scales that are attached to diverse civic epistemologies. 
Through such networks, actors are transforming facts about “nature” into matters of concern 
(Krauss, 2009).  
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‘Conventional’ View of Place ‘Relational’ View of Place 
 
Spaces with geographical boundaries drawn at a 
specific scale 
 
Nodes in networks, multi-scale 
 
Separated by physical distance 
 
Separated by socio-relational distance 
 
 
Resident local communities  
 
Populations of individuals who are mobile daily and 
over their life course 
 
Services described in terms of fixed locations often 
providing for territorial jurisdictions, distance decay 
models describe varying utility in space 
 
‘Layers’ of assets available to populations via varying 
paths in time and space. Euclidean distance may not 
be relevant to utility 
 
Area definitions relatively static and fixed 
 
Area definitions relatively dynamic and fluid 
 
Characteristics at fixed time points, e.g. ‘deprived’ 
versus ‘affluent’ 
 
Dynamic characteristics e.g. ‘declining’ versus 
‘advancing’ 
 
 
Culturally neutral territorial divisions, infrastructure 
and services 
 
Territorial divisions, services and infrastructure 
imbued with social power relations and cultural 
meaning 
 
Contextual features described systematically and 
consistently by different individuals and groups 
 
 
Contextual features described variably by different 
individuals and groups. 
Table 3:  ‘Conventional’ and ‘Relational’ Understandings of Place.    Source: Cummins, et al. (2007, pg. 1827). 
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Section 1.4: Methods  
 
 
 
 
The dissertation is based on four years of fieldwork and analysis throughout California. The 
mixed-method analysis included more than 40 semi-structured interviews with environmental 
justice advocates, senior government officials, urban planners, climate experts, and other civil 
society actors embedded in multiscalar climate policymaking (Figure 9). Interviews were 
selected by assessing professional networks that I developed from more than a decade of work 
in the public and private sectors. This experience included working for the California State 
Legislature as a senior consultant to the Assembly Select Committee on Environmental Justice 
and serving as vice chair of Sacramento’s Planning Commission. In these positions, I conducted 
applied research and actively engaged in the policymaking process. Through my networks and 
experience, I was able to identify the key actors involved in climate policymaking. This provided 
me with access to and knowledge of actors at various scales and geographies in California, 
thereby greatly improving the rate of access and reducing the start-up time of fieldwork.18 
 
I also conducted participant observation across the three case studies, engaging in, and 
observing in excess of 30 community-based meetings, and local and state public 
hearings/meetings on climate policy and health equity. Additionally, I served as the instructor 
of record for two climate action planning studios at UC Berkeley. In these studios, the Oakland 
Climate Action Coalition, the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, and the California 
Natural Resources Agency acted as the studios’ policy clients, and; students developed policy 
recommendations for improving local climate action plans. Final presentations were held at the 
                                                          
18 Many of the participants interviewed remain actively involved in climate policy and planning in California. To 
address the sensitive issues explored in this research, in certain instances the interviewees were provided 
anonymity. In such circumstances, the only information provided is the type of organization the individual is 
affiliated with.  
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state Capitol to a panel of prominent environmental policymakers, and at community meetings 
in the San Francisco Bay Area. I also served as the head graduate student instructor for a UC 
Berkeley graduate-level course on environmental policy and regulation. Students in that course 
developed climate action plan recommendations for the city manager’s office of the city of 
Richmond, California. The students’ work product in the three courses, as well as my active 
engagement with key policymakers and EJ actors as the instructor, generated supplemental 
field data for the dissertation.  
 
The final method I utilized was content and spatial analysis. This included review of grey 
literature and archival research, dozens of California’s key statewide climate polices, and an 
analysis of 41 municipal climate action plans. Through spatial mapping techniques, I examined 
the role of scale and geography in the adoption of climate policies. In particular, I employed the 
California Environmental Protection Agency’s (Cal EPA) Environmental Health Screening 
(CalEnviroScreen) tool to identify geographically the communities with census tracts in the 
state with the highest cumulative environmental impact scores (see Chapter 2). Through 
content and spatial analysis techniques, I sought to identify evidence of the development of 
climate policies that substantively engaged non-governmental actors in regulatory institutions 
to establish explicit interconnections between climate change, environmental justice, and 
public health at multiple scales.  
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Section 1.5: Multiscalar Case Selection  
 
 
Central to this dissertation is the selection of cases as a method to examine knowledge 
production, equity, and policy outcomes of the phenomenon of climate change as it is 
constructed at various interrelated scales in California. As previously noted, the state of 
California was chosen because it has consistently been at the forefront of broader U.S. and 
global environmental action. The state’s environmental policies have a long history of success 
and replication. California adopted the nation’s first automobile tailpipe emissions standard in 
1966, four years before Congress took similar action. After the Middle-East oil embargo of 
1973, California again responded with strong household appliance energy efficiency standards 
signed into law by Governor Ronald Reagan the following year. California’s 2009 clean car 
standard served as a model for the agreement that President Barack Obama forged with 
automakers in 2011 to double U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards to 55 
miles per gallon by 2025 (Stone, 2012; EDF, 2012). California is a catalyst in the environmental 
arena in part because of its sheer size and impressive market power. The state’s stricter energy 
efficiency standards forced automakers and appliance manufacturers to rework their products 
to maintain access to the nation’s largest state economy.  
 
In another impressive first, the adoption of AB 32 in 2006 made California the first state in the 
U.S. to adopt a comprehensive program of regulatory and market-based mechanisms to 
achieve reductions in GHG emissions. As a result of its environmental innovation, California is 
often seen globally as a homogeneous entity that values environmentalism and climate action 
uniformly throughout the state (Stone, 2012; EDF, 2012). This conception, however, 
universalizes the idea of climate change within the state, detaching it from its cultural settings 
and failing to understand the methods in which knowledge production and outcomes emerging 
from climate change policy and science change meaning as they travel throughout California 
and are localized. Accordingly, the multiscalar case studies illustrate how civic epistemologies 
invoke, across diverse geographies and scales, variations in knowledge production, equity, and 
policy outcomes in climate governance.  
 
The three multiscalar case studies (see Figure 8), were specifically selected based on the initial 
semi-structured interviews, and content analysis I conducted. Through these methods, key 
climate actors and critical sites of contestation in the climate policymaking process were 
identified. The CalEnviroScreen spatial analysis, helped me identify census tracts with high 
cumulative environmental impact scores for further study. This information was supplemented 
by my direct professional experience and networks at the state and local levels working on 
environmental policy issues.   
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Section 1.6: Chapter Summaries   
 
 
The following chapters seek to understand the new experiments in climate change governance 
and illustrate how developments in climate knowledge and technological capacity are linked to 
human self-understanding and social orders. These chapters specifically examine how the 
phenomenon of climate change is configured throughout California, and is influenced by 
diverse civic epistemologies. Looking across the multiscalar case studies, four constitutive and 
interrelated dimensions of civic epistemologies in California can be identified. These are: (1) 
participation of actors in knowledge-making; (2) the methods of validating knowledge; (3) the 
focus of climate policy; and (4) the role of scale in climate policymaking. Table 4 elaborates on 
the four dimensions of civic epistemologies, offering examples from chapters two through six. 
While Table 4 attempts to capture some recurrent elements in the case studies, it does not 
suggest that these elements are fixed and uncontested over time, or evenly distributed across 
California (Jasanoff, 2005). Similar to other aspects of culture, the elements of civic 
epistemology are constituted and reconstituted continually to maintain their validity in climate 
governance. 
 
Chapter 2 presents a baseline survey of the public health and environmental justice aspects of 
climate action plans (CAPs) from 41 California cities. This chapter reveals that climate change 
presents a complex environmental health and justice challenge for the field of urban planning. 
Through interviews with urban planners and a content and spatial analysis of CAPs, this survey 
assesses how California cities with high levels of pollution and social vulnerability address 
climate change and public health. The findings show that CAPs in these cities rarely analyze 
whether GHG reduction strategies will also yield health co-benefits, such as a reduction in the 
co-pollutants of climate change (i.e., ozone, particulate matter, and nitrogen oxides). In many 
instances, the net co-benefits of health are not monetized, quantified or even identified by local 
governments. In California’s most impacted cities, climate planning activities and work on 
public health are happening in a parallel manner rather than through an integrated approach. 
Moreover, the analysis illustrates that carbon fundamentalism is the predominant mode of 
climate planning in California cities. The results suggest a need for increased opportunities for 
interagency coordination and staff training to conduct health analyses, free and easily-
accessible tools, methods for prioritizing funding streams, and the development of partnerships 
with community-based organizations to link climate planning and public health.  
 
Chapter 3 contrasts the results of Chapter 2 with the case study of Oakland. Chapter 3 argues 
that environmental justice groups in this city are transforming a priori climate policy 
approaches, producing new placed-based conceptualizations of climate change that underscore 
population health and community well-being. Oakland’s example provides empirical evidence 
of how EJ groups are instituting CCStreets approaches in climate governance. Through an in-
depth case study of the city of Oakland’s CAP, this chapter specifically examines how and why a 
city develops explicit linkages between climate change and population health. This chapter 
further argues that analyzing the methods in which CAPs are developed in practice can provide 
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a strategic understanding of the particular agendas, politics, and expertise influencing the 
development of climate policies and environmental justice outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
 Table 4.  The Four Dimensions of Civic Epistemologies in California 
 
 Chapter 2: 
Survey of Local 
Climate Action 
Plans 
Chapter 3: 
Urban 
Climate 
Change in 
Oakland 
Chapter 4: 
Statewide Carbon 
Pricing and Health 
Co-benefits 
Chapter 5: 
Climate 
Change 
Community 
Benefits 
Fund 
Chapter 6: 
International 
Forest 
Offsets and 
Black Carbon 
Who 
produces 
climate 
knowledge? 
Consultants, 
planners, 
academics, 
scientific advisors, 
and modelers.  
Expert and lay 
groups. 
Engagement of 
diverse civil 
society actors.   
State regulatory 
bodies, academics, 
mainstream 
environmentalists, 
public health 
experts, and 
consultants.  
EJ groups, 
academics, 
and public 
health 
experts.  
EJ groups, 
state 
regulatory 
bodies, 
consultants, 
and experts.  
How is 
knowledge 
validated? 
Strong reliance on 
peer-review, 
expert 
committees, risk 
assessments, and 
cost 
effectiveness. 
Highly 
collaborative. 
Expert-lay 
judgment; 
community-
based 
solutions.   
Highly contested; 
resolved through 
political negotiation 
and litigation. 
Reliance on peer-
review, expert 
committees, risk 
assessments, and 
cost effectiveness.  
Highly 
contested; 
resolved 
through 
political 
negotiation 
and 
community-
based 
research.  
Highly 
contested; 
partially 
resolved 
through 
political 
negotiation, 
and 
community-
based 
solutions.   
What is the 
focus of 
climate 
policy? 
Global climate 
metrics, 
ecological 
systems, and city-
wide 
infrastructure  
Neighborhood 
health co-
benefits, 
ecological 
systems, and 
citywide 
infrastructure. 
Tension between 
global and 
multiscalar climate 
metrics, health, and 
ecological benefits.   
Nexus of local 
health co-
benefits and 
global 
reductions of 
GHG 
emissions.  
Variable 
What is the 
role of scale? 
Global scale GHG 
reductions,   
adherence to 
Carbon 
Fundamentalism  
Multiscalar co-
benefits –  
focus on  
CCStreets 
approach.  
Highly contested Highly 
contested 
Highly 
contested 
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Chapters 4 and 5 argue that the legitimization of a local scale of climate change was highly 
contested in the State Capitol, as environmental justice advocates attempted to “rescale” 
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act to focus on direct benefits to disadvantaged 
communities. These chapters examine the debates and epistemologies over the impacts of 
climate change and the appropriate policy scale(s) to address the environmental problem. 
Chapter 4, specifically highlights how in the legislative halls of the Capitol and the state’s 
regulatory bureaucracy, a commitment to global kinds of knowledge or carbon fundamentalism 
influenced the definition of climate change. The pursuit of global GHG emissions reductions 
through market-based mechanisms often limited opportunities to realize public health co-
benefits at the neighborhood scale.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses particular attention on these debates through the lens of a four-year 
environmental justice campaign to enact “cap-and-dividend” legislation, better known as a 
Climate Change Community Benefits Fund (CBF). The adopted legislation required a dividend 
(or rebate) to be invested from a portion of the billions of dollars in cap-and-trade auction 
revenues in communities most impacted by air pollution. Through the passage of CBF 
legislation, several environmental justice groups are attempting to redress the limitations and 
inequities under a market-based system. The CBF allows for the scaling up of local knowledge 
and practices to fund new multi-scale approaches to climate policy (i.e., CCStreets). It validates 
community-based approaches that not only reduce global GHG emissions, but are also aimed at 
reducing the risk of asthma and respiratory diseases through transit-oriented development, 
renewable energy, and urban forestry projects. The passage of the CBF illustrates that 
opposition to cap-and-trade from EJ groups is not a rejection of the goals of AB 32, but a 
demand for climate solutions that are more equitable for all Californians. 
 
The final multiscalar case study presented in chapter 6, investigates the social equity 
implications of international carbon-offset projects allowable under California’s climate change 
law. These proposed projects compensate governments and landowners of the Global South 
(Chiapas, Mexico and Acre, Brazil) for preserving forests for their carbon sequestration 
capacities. This chapter argues that California’s planned global expansion of its market-based 
mechanisms is creating emerging alliances between indigenous groups in the Global South and 
California environmental justice advocates. The chapter further explores how forest-offset 
projects may restrict access to indigenous land, while allowing industries to continue to emit 
pollution in California’s low-income neighborhoods and communities of color. The chapter 
concludes with the other CCStreets approaches EJ groups are utilizing to mandate state 
policymakers and local air districts to work cooperatively on interventions that jointly address 
global GHG emissions and other localized co-pollutants. A co-pollutant of particular interest to 
environmental justice groups, is black carbon, a component of PM 2.5 and a short-lived, global-
warming pollutant that also has local public health impacts.  
 
In Chapter 7, the dissertation conclusion, I compare the multiscalar cases through the concept 
of civic epistemology. Through this comparison, I analyze the conditions and constraints that 
facilitate or impede the implementation of CCStreets approaches in climate policy. The last 
section of the chapter examines the overall research findings and their implication for climate 
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policy and planning practice. This is followed by the open-ended discussion of “what is the next 
generation of the trans-local environmental justice movement?” 
 
In sum, this research concludes that for environmental justice groups to discover and address 
new knowledge about ‘nature,’ society must also revise institutionalized practices in innovative 
ways (Jasanoff and Martello, 2004). By infusing the human-local scale in climate change 
interventions and research, publics can better understand how existing environmental 
conditions are established. As a result, we can facilitate the development of alternatives to 
those existing environmental conditions and imagine more democratic climate future(s) 
(McFarlane, 2011).  
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CHAPTER 2: 
Assessing Local Climate Action Plans for Public Health Co-benefits in 
Environmental Justice Communities 
 
 
 
While climate change is considered a global issue, its source, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
are increasingly seen as being produced and most readily controlled at the local level (Revi and 
Satterthwaite et al, 2014; Brown and Polsky et al, 2014). Municipal governments are uniquely 
positioned to create large reductions in GHG emissions because of their impact on local 
patterns of urban development, economic activity, transportation infrastructure and energy use 
(Anguelovski and Carmin, 2011; Rosenzweig, et al, 2010a). Cities around the world are now 
grappling with emerging scientific assessments when developing climate action plans (CAP)19 to 
mitigate and adapt to the impacts of the phenomenon. These plans will have significant 
benefits and consequences for urban populations as they are likely to reconfigure urban 
infrastructures, services and decisions-making processes (Hughes, 2013).  
 
Local plans for addressing climate change, however, have been largely analyzed in terms of 
their costs and potential for reducing the rate of increase in atmospheric concentrations of 
global GHG emissions. Less studied is whether efforts to mitigate GHG emissions will have a 
number of air quality co-benefits20. These co-benefits include a reduction in the co-pollutants of 
climate change (i.e. ozone, particulate matter, and nitrogen oxides)21 and corresponding 
improvement in population health in environmental justice communities.22 Co-benefits can 
serve as important decision criteria in analyses by policymakers and influence the 
implementation and timing of mitigation and adaptation measures (Jochem and Madlener, 
2003).  
 
Studies from around the world have found that the monetized human health benefits 
associated with air quality improvements can offset the cost of carbon policies, particularly in 
communities most impacted by pollution (Thomson et al., 2014; Nemet et al., 2010; Boyce et 
al., 2013). While health co-benefits have increasingly been utilized in several national and state-
                                                           
19 A climate action plan focuses primarily on reducing GHG emissions, including emissions resulting from both a 
local government’s operations and from the community as a whole. It typically includes an analysis/strategy to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions resulting from land use, energy use, transportation, solid waste disposal, 
buildings, lighting, and waste water treatment and water delivery (ICLEI, 2012). 
20 For purposes of this study, “co-benefit” means an ancillary benefit of a GHG mitigation or adaptation policy that 
is produced in addition to the benefit targeted by the policy (Pittel and Rubbelke, 2008; Li, 2002; Burtraw and 
Toma, 2000).   
21 Processes such as fossil fuel burning concurrently emit GHG and other co-pollutants (i.e. PM and 03). 
22 Environmental Justice is defined as the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of 
race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Environmental justice can be achieved when all individuals enjoys 
the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making 
process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
2012a). 
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level policies, they are rarely included in the assessment of local CAPs. In California, more 
guidance is needed to assist cities in incorporating health co-benefits in climate policies. The 
goal of this chapter is to determine whether and how CAPs developed by California cities with 
the highest rankings for cumulative environmental impact are considering the public health 
needs of socially vulnerable populations.23 The results of this study indicate that due to a lack of 
funding, free and easily-accessible tools, substantive community engagement, and interagency 
collaboration and staff training to conduct health analyses, in many instances, the net co-
benefits of health are not monetized, quantified or even identified by local governments.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
23 Social vulnerability to climate change is often defined by the ability for a community to anticipate, cope, resist, 
and recover from the impact of extreme climate events such as hurricanes, floods, heat waves, bad air quality 
days, and infectious disease.  As such, it is important to understand disparities in the costs and benefits of climate 
change, the abilities of different groups to adapt to it, and the mitigation and adaptation strategies developed to 
address it in order to better inform regulatory and policy action in the future (Shonkoff et al., 2009). 
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Section 2.1: California Climate Change Policy and Planning 
 
 
During the past decade, the state of California has enacted some of the nation’s strongest 
climate policies. Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32), the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, requires 
the state to reduce its GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and 80 percent of this baseline 
level by 2050. What distinguishes California’s climate change law from regulations passed by 
other subnational governments is that AB 32 requires that statewide measures to reduce GHG 
emissions must also consider how their implementation will impact communities that are 
already adversely affected by air pollution (California Health and Safety code sections §38565, 
38591). 
 
Motivated in part by increasing concerns over the risk of climate-related impacts and facilitated 
by the state’s existing framework of energy and air quality policies, these mandates are creating 
significant health co-benefits at the statewide scale. It is estimated by 2025 that two key 
components of AB 32 -- the Low Carbon Fuel Standard and the Cap-and-Trade program24 will 
result in 38,000 fewer asthma attacks and almost 75,000 fewer lost work days linked to air 
pollution (NRDC, 2008; CARB 2008; Franco et al, 2008). The multiple health co-benefit analyses 
advocates provided to policymakers and the public, has been cited as an important factor in the 
passage and successful implementation of the landmark legislation (Sze et al., 2009; London et 
al., 2013; EDF, 2014). The linkage to public health was also instrumental in the 2010 statewide 
campaign that defeated an oil-industry sponsored ballot referendum to repeal AB 32 (Lerza, 
2011).  
 
More recent health co-benefit studies indicate that AB 32 will decrease GHG emissions by 165 
metric tons, as well as smog and soot by more than 179,000 metric tons in the next 10 years. 
These reductions will result in a cost-savings of $8.3 billion in pollution-related health costs 
(American Lung Association and EDF, 2014). Co-benefits remains a fundamental factor in the 
continued voter support of California’s climate policies. In a 2013 statewide survey, 50 percent 
of Californians viewed climate change as a very serious threat to the state’s quality of life and 
future economy. Similarly, 52 percent also specified that cap-and-trade auction revenue should 
be used to improve environmental conditions in disadvantaged communities. Most 
interestingly, 65 percent of Californians indicated that the state should act immediately to 
reduce GHG emissions, rather than wait until the economy improves – up 9 points from 2012. 
(PPIC, 2013).   
 
As the eighth-largest economy25 in the world and the only state in the U.S. to adopt a 
comprehensive program of regulatory and market-based mechanisms to achieve reductions in 
                                                           
24 Cap-and-trade is a market-based mechanism that ‘caps’ the amount of emissions a power plant or industrial 
polluter can produce and requires these facilities to purchase credits (the trade) from the state to exceed the 
emissions cap. These credits purchased and sold at established auctions, enable facilities to continue to operate as 
they improve their equipment to reduce GHG emissions (CARB, 2008).  
25 Levy (2014). California Once Again the World’s 8th Largest Economy. Center for Continuing Study of the California 
Economy.  
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GHG emissions, California represents an important site of inquiry for analyzing climate 
planning. While the state has taken important strides in reducing GHG and co-pollutant 
emissions on a statewide scale, AB 32 does not require any action to be taken by local 
governments.26 Similarly, California’s other landmark climate law, Senate Bill 375 (SB 375), only 
encourages local governments to work collaboratively with Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations (MPOs) to develop regional plans to achieve GHG reduction targets through land-
use and transportation measures.27 Regions that meet the targets receive priority funding for 
state and federal transportation grants. This incentive-based legislation, however, neither 
requires individual cities to adopt CAPs nor penalizes regions that fail to meet their reduction 
targets. Additionally, unlike AB 32, SB 375 does not mandate that GHG reduction measures to 
be designed with the consideration of how their implementation will impact communities that 
are already adversely affected by air pollution.  
 
The state currently provides little guidance for cities to analyze and incorporate health co-
benefits in mitigation measures. As a result, many municipal CAPs across California simply 
assert that climate change will have adverse public health impacts but do not substantively link 
these health threats to the local community (California Department of Public Health, 2012). The 
governmental agency responsible for tracking municipalities’ progress in adopting climate 
action policies follows a similar approach. According to the 2012 Governor’s Office of Planning 
and Research (OPR) Annual Planning Survey, more than 170 jurisdictions have indicated they 
are taking the initial steps to address climate change. This is a dramatic increase from only 53 
respondents in 2008. Though the annual OPR survey provides the most comprehensive analysis 
of local governments engaged in climate planning, it does not provide any specificity of how 
they address the public health impacts of climate change or the needs of socially vulnerable 
communities.  
 
Likewise, the majority of academic research on CAPs focuses on measuring local climate efforts 
and evaluating the general efficacy of adopted plans (Boswell et al 2010, Wheeler 2008; Pitt, 
2010a; Pitt 2010b; Lubell et al, 2009; Jepson 2004, Saha and Paterson, 2008). Cumulatively, 
these studies argue that local socioeconomic and demographic variables (such as the fiscal 
health of cities, city size, and median household income) are important factors in implementing 
specific types of climate policies. Yet all these studies critically overlook the geographically and 
socially uneven impacts of climate change and the significance of including health co-benefits in 
CAPs. The California Department of Public Health (CDPH, 2012), accordingly, argues for 
developing an evidence base between the health impacts of climate change and the built 
environment. Research has shown that describing the local health consequences of climate 
change is compelling to the general public and may help broaden support for developing 
climate action polices (Myers et al., 2012; Maibach et al., 2010; 2011). Unlike the longer-term 
                                                           
26 AB 32 only encourages municipalities to reduce GHG emissions 15 percent below today’s levels by 2020 (CARB, 
2008).  
27 A metropolitan planning organization (MPO) is a federally mandated and funded transportation policy-making 
organization in the United States comprised of representatives from local government and governmental 
transportation authorities (23 U.S.C. sections §134–135). 
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effects of climate change (i.e., sea level rise, biodiversity loss), the adverse health effects of co-
pollutants can be seen locally and felt more immediately.  
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Section 2.2:  Local CAPs as an Opportunity to Promote Health Co-Benefits 
 
 
The chief objective of climate policy is to reduce GHG emissions that occur from the burning of 
fossil fuels. Benefits from the reduction of GHG emissions also yield opportunities for air quality 
“co-benefits” in the form of reduced emissions of nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide and particulate 
matter that are produced in fossil fuel combustion. These associated emissions are termed the 
“co-pollutants” of climate change (Boyce et al, 2013). Although it is not always framed this way 
in climate planning discourse, the reduction in co-pollutants can lead to substantial public 
health benefits (Nemet et al., 2010; Boyce et al., 2013; Kaswan, 2012).  
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has indicated that GHG mitigation can 
have health co-benefits from reduced air pollution, which can offset the costs of mitigation 
(Smith et al., 2014). A survey of 37 worldwide peer-reviewed studies, Nemet et al. (2010) found 
a mean co-benefit of $49 per ton of carbon of dioxide avoided. In a study of emissions 
reductions in the U.S., researchers estimated that the monetized human health benefits 
associated with air quality improvements have the potential to offset between 26 percent and 
1,050 percent of the cost of various carbon policies (Thompson et al., 2014). In other words, 
each dollar spent on air quality improvements can yield between 26 cents and $10.50 in savings 
associated with healthcare costs. Cumulatively, these studies recommend that policymakers 
should be able to directly compare the cost of climate change actions with the economic value 
of their benefits, in terms of avoided damage to human health and the environment. Health 
experts argue that if co-benefits vary across sources, then efficiency requires more emissions 
reductions where co-benefits are greater. Climate policy that ignores co-benefits are 
considered inefficient in two ways: first, it would choose suboptimal emissions reductions 
targets overall; second, it would fail to account for differences in abatement benefits across 
emission sources (Boyce et al., 2013; pg. 3). 
 
While there is increased interest in health co-benefits, urban areas face major challenges in 
successfully linking climate change with regional air quality policy. Throughout the United 
States, 232 counties have exceeded national standards for ozone and 118 counties have exceed 
national standards for particulate matter in 2011 (US EPA, 2012b; 2012c). A recent study also 
found that residents in Southern California face some of the nation’s highest risks of death from 
to air pollution. The study projected  between 130,000 and 360,000 premature adult deaths in 
coming years, based upon an examination of ozone and particulate matter levels in 2005 (Fann, 
et al, 2012). A similar 2010 study estimated that air pollution in the South Coast and San 
Joaquin Valley air basins was responsible for 30,000 hospital visits from 2005-2007. Statewide, 
it was estimated that air pollution caused an estimated $193 million in medical cost during the 
study period (Romley et al., 2010). Consequently, the consideration of health co-benefits in 
CAPs is important because improvements in the built environment aimed at reducing GHG 
emissions can also improve air quality and lower the incidence of respiratory and cardiovascular 
illnesses. As described in Figure 10, these illnesses include asthma and heart attacks, which are 
exacerbated from climate change-related events such as heat waves and bad air pollution days.  
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According to the Third California Climate Change Assessment (CCCA, 2012), increasing 
temperatures are expected to exacerbate air pollution and illnesses across California. Climate 
change is also expected to include injuries and displacement due to more severe storms and 
flooding; greater number of heat illnesses as extreme heat events increase in frequency; and 
changes in the distribution of infectious diseases (CCCA, 2012). It is anticipated that climate 
change will also cause reductions in the availability of clean water and trigger disruptions in 
global food supply due to drought and extreme weather events (BARHII, 2013; CCCA, 2012). 
The combination of global climate change and environmental injustice are negatively impacting 
the overall health of many communities across California (Shonkoff et al, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
Respiratory Health Effects of Climate Change 
Source: American Lung Association of California (2010) 
 
 
 
 
These impacts are expected to be particularly felt among populations most vulnerable to air 
pollution, including children, the elderly, individuals with respiratory diseases, and low-income 
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communities (CARB, 2009). Health disparities28 are even greater for people of color and low-
income populations because they often live in poorly planned and under resourced urban 
areas. Residents in these areas are less able to pay for protection against or recovery after 
climate-related disasters (Curtis and Oven, 2011). They also are more likely to live near sources 
of pollution (Szasz and Meuser, 1997; Agyeman et al., 2003: Ringquist, 2005; Corburn, 2005; 
Shonkoff, et al., 2009; Morello-Frosch et al., 2011). In California, research has found that people 
of color are disproportionately more likely to live near major GHG-emitting facilities, even when 
controlling for income. African Americans are twice as likely as their white counterparts to live 
within 2.5 miles of polluting facilities, and more likely to reside near facilities that pose greater 
co-pollutant burdens (Pastor, et al., 2009; Boyce and Pastor, 2013). 
 
Throughout the U.S., localities vary in terms of the adoption and comprehensiveness of CAPs 
(Hess, et al., 2008; Millard-Ball, 2012; Brown and Polsky et al, 2014). The pace and scope of 
adoption is relevant to public health because climate change related risks are place-specific and 
path-dependent. Location is a significant determinant of hazardous exposure, and certain 
places will bear more risk than others (Hess, et al. 2008). Climate change impacts in California, 
such as risk of wildfires, drought, flooding, and extreme weather events have accompanying 
health impacts that are occurring sooner than projected (Pastor, et al, 2009; CCCA, 2012). It is 
necessary to examine whether CAPs in California’s most disadvantaged communities include 
health co-benefits because the distribution of co-benefits raises important equity issues. 
Efficient policy design would seek greater emissions reductions where co-benefits are greatest 
and most needed (Boyce et al., 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
28 Health disparity is a type of difference in health that is closely linked with social or economic disadvantage. 
Health disparities negatively affect groups of people who have systematically experienced greater social or 
economic obstacles to health. These obstacles stem from characteristics historically linked to discrimination or 
exclusion such as race or ethnicity, religion, socioeconomic status, gender, mental health, sexual orientation, or 
geographic location. Other characteristics include cognitive, sensory, or physical disability (U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services, 2009). 
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Section 2.3: Methods: Climate Action Plan Selection 
 
 
Using the California Environmental Protection Agency’s (Cal EPA) Environmental Health 
Screening (CalEnviroScreen) tool, I first identified geographically the communities in the 
twentieth percentile of census tracts in the state with the highest cumulative impact scores29. 
CalEnviroScreen uses a science-based method to develop a statewide analysis of the 
communities most burdened by pollution from multiple sources and most vulnerable to its 
effects. In developing the new tool, Cal EPA (2014) asserts that although traditional risk 
assessments may account for the “heightened sensitivities of some groups, such as children and 
the elderly, it has not considered other community characteristics that have been shown to 
affect vulnerability to pollution, such as socioeconomic factors or underlying health status” (Pg. 
1).30 CalEnviroScreen provides a relative, rather than absolute measure of impact. As a place-
based tool, it offers information that can enable policymakers to focus their time, resources, 
and programs in areas that are most in need of assistance (Cal EPA, 2014). 
 
As depicted in Figure 11, the overall CalEnviroScreen score is calculated from the Pollution 
Burden and Population Characteristics groups of 19 indicators by multiplying the two scores. 
Each group has a maximum score of 10, and the maximum CalEnviroScreen Score is 100. A 
percentile for the overall score is calculated from the ordered values. Maps are then developed 
illustrating the percentiles for each of the state’s approximately 8,000 census tracts.  
                                                           
29 Cal EPA has a working definition of cumulative impacts adopted in 2005 as follows: “Cumulative impacts means 
exposures, public health or environmental effects from the combined emissions and discharges, in a geographic 
area, including environmental pollution from all sources, whether single or multi-media, routinely, accidentally, or 
otherwise released. Impacts will take into account sensitive populations and socioeconomic factors, where 
applicable and to the extent data are available.” Emissions in the definition include the co-pollutants of climate 
change. 
30 While CalEnviroScreen is a peer-reviewed, science-based tool developed by government experts, it represents a 
culmination of more than 7 years of collaboration with environmental justice groups and industry officials on the 
methods and indicators that were included in the final tool adopted by the state (Cal EPA, 2014). In particular, the 
tool was significantly influenced by screening models initially developed jointly by environmental justice groups 
and university researchers (CEJA, 2012).  
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Figure 11: Formula for Calculating CalEnviroScreen Score.  Source: Cal EPA, 2014.  
 
 
Through the CalEnviroScreen tool, I identified approximately 1,995 census tracts that placed in 
the top twentieth percentile of overall CalEnviroScreen scores.31 Within this grouping, 161 
incorporated cities were listed as having at least one high scoring census tract (see Map A). 
Many of these cities are located in the Central Valley, the San Francisco Bay Area, and the major 
metropolitan regions of Southern California. The highest-scoring neighborhoods sit next to busy 
seaports, rail yards, and freeways in places such as Long Beach, Oakland, Richmond, San 
Bernardino and San Jose. In these areas residents are particularly exposed to higher levels of air 
pollution from vehicle exhaust and industries. Also highly impacted by pollution are farming 
communities in the Central Valley and Oxnard. In these areas, residents near agricultural fields 
struggle with contaminated drinking water, poor air quality and pesticide exposure.32 
 
Based on this list, I accessed state and local-level government internet databases to determine 
whether the 161 cities had developed a CAP. When the databases did not indicate whether a 
CAP had been produced, I contacted the city’s planning department directly. As shown in Map 
B, this analysis revealed that while many communities within these cities are confronting 
multiple impacts, only 25 percent of cities (41) have adopted or have a CAP in draft form for 
                                                           
31 The 20 percentile was selected for this study because Cal EPA (2014) has indicated in draft guidance that this is 
the agency’s preferred threshold to identify “disadvantaged communities”. 
32 Under the California Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209), approved by voters in 1996, state agencies are 
prohibited from using racial/ethnic preferences in governmental programs and decisions. The CalEnviroScreen tool 
does not include ‘race/ethnicity’ as an indicator because the tool will be used to distribute state grants to 
disadvantaged communities. However, a separate analysis by Cal EPA concludes that more than 35 percent and 28 
percent of the state’s Hispanic/Latino and African Americans populations, respectively, resides in communities 
ranked in the top twentieth percentile of the state’s environmentally burdened communities. By comparison, only 
7 percent of the state’s total White population lives in similarly burden communities (Cal EPA, 2014).   
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public review. For example, despite topping the list with a census tract that is crisscrossed by 
freeways, where more than 3,000 people live with some of the state's highest levels of toxic air 
releases and asthma rates, the City of Fresno does not have an adopted CAP or one in 
preparation. Other cities with multiple high ranking census tracts and lacking CAPs are 
Bakersfield, El Monte, Ontario, Salinas, Riverside and Turlock.    
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Section 2.4 Climate Action Plan Evaluation 
 
 
Once the 41 cities were identified, I conducted a document analysis and plan evaluation of each 
city’s CAP.33 My approach builds upon the work of planning researchers Berke and Conroy 
(2000), Jepson (2004), Boswell et al (2010), Pitt, (2010a) and Wheeler (2008). These studies 
generally measured CAP quality by examining the extent to which a plan identifies clear goals 
and GHG reduction targets, and whether policies were developed in a method to ensure 
implementation and monitoring. My analysis complements this work by focusing on: 1) 
whether and how CAPs explicitly analyze health co-benefits through evaluative criteria; 2) 
identifying measures that are targeted towards disadvantaged communities and make specific 
references to environmental justice/social equity34 and; 3) the extent to which the cities engage 
environmental justice actors in the policymaking process (see Table 5).  
 
Initial data gathering was conducted between January 2014 and June 2014. In addition to 
analyzing CAPS, I conducted a review of policy literature, grey literature, relevant 
government/non-governmental websites and news articles to identify whether a city’s CAP and 
its supplemental initiatives explicitly addressed the criteria listed in the plan evaluation matrix 
(Table 5). This method provided for the identification of CAPS developed in collaboration with 
non-governmental actors. It is important to note, that while some cities have developed several 
actions related to climate change in the absence of a CAP (i.e. green building standards or 
renewable energy projects), such stand-alone policies are not included in this study.35 This 
research is focused on planning that attempts to take a comprehensive approach to climate 
change. This method is consistent with previous research that argues the presence of a CAP 
indicates systematic attention to the issue of climate change. It also serves as a potential 
framework for a city’s ongoing action in which needs are analyzed, options are developed, 
progress is evaluated, and the public is involved (Wheeler, 2008).   
 
As a key method in qualitative research, document analysis has the advantage of being “stable, 
unobtrusive, exact, and available over a long span of time” (Yin, 2003: pg. 86). The limitations of 
document analysis have also been noted, such as that results may be biased if the collection is 
incomplete. Document analysis may not fully capture the robust discussion that occurs during 
the drafting and adoption process, and is also likely to reflect the biases of the main authors 
(Yin, 2003). To compensate for these limitations, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 
twelve California climate planning practitioners from the public and private sectors to further 
inform the study’s findings.36  While outside the scope of a traditional document analysis, a 
                                                           
33 Including plan updates and supplemental CAP documents, such as adaptation plans and public health 
assessments.  
34 An open definition of environmental justice and social equity was adopted during the data collection process to 
identify CAP measures that explicitly addressed perceived social, economic, and environmental inequality.   
35 This study also excludes Energy Action Plans and Sustainability Plans.  
36 The participants interviewed remain actively involved in local climate action planning in California. To address 
the sensitive issues explored in this study, the interviewees were provided anonymity. The only information 
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copy of the study’s main findings was also provided to several interviewed participants, of 
which five provided written feedback.37  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
disclosed is whether the individual works in the public or private sector (i.e. public agency or private sector 
planner).  
37 In analyzing the results, this study acknowledges that the field of climate planning is a quickly evolving and highly 
iterative arena. As of writing of this chapter in the summer of 2014, additional public agencies may choose to 
initiate the CAP process or develop updates to existing plans as more resources become available.  
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Section 2.5: Results 
 
 
A. Health Co-Benefits of CAPs 
 
In reviewing the 41 California cities that were classified as having census tracts with high 
cumulative impact scores and CAPs, only 17 cities (41 percent) had plans that used evaluative 
criteria to explicitly analyze the health co-benefits of measures (Table 5). As illustrated in Figure 
12, nearly all these cities qualitatively analyzed health co-benefits through graphic icons and 
bullet points. The graphics simply describe that the measures were selected for their 
opportunity to improve local air quality, decrease obesity, improve public health and create a 
healthy living environment. This qualitative evaluation often lacked a methodology and 
evidence to support the purported health co-benefits. Health co-benefits were also listed 
qualitatively alongside quantitative matrices that analyzed the potential of CAP measures to 
reduce GHG emissions and create cost-savings (Figure 13). In the study, only 5 cities  
(Inglewood, Los Angeles, Oakland, San Diego and San Francisco) explicitly indicated health 
professionals from county public health departments and community-based health 
organizations collaborated in developing measures or were currently assisting in developing 
supplementary public health assessments of CAPs.  
 
The utility of analyzing health co-benefits is likely overshadowed by the main objective of 
municipal CAPs: the reduction and quantification of GHG emissions. While most GHG 
quantification models available have the capacity to also quantify co-pollutant reductions from 
CAP measures, they are often not included. A private sector planner stated that correlating co-
pollutant and GHG reduction data with public health outcomes is “too onerous for the climate 
analyst and makes the report too data intensive for the city council” (author interview, 2014). 
The planner further noted that conducting a full health co-benefit analysis was typically beyond 
the level of effort and cost requested by most cities.  
 
The strong emphasis of GHG reduction over health co-benefits may also be influenced by 
climate studies that indicate greenhouse gases have “no direct public health impacts” since they 
are global pollutants that mix uniformly in the atmosphere. GHG emissions do not have 
localized effects like particulate matter (PM) and ground-level ozone (O3) (CARB, 2008).38  
Several planners supported this insight. In particular, a public agency planner noted, “climate 
planning has largely been focused on the mitigating the primary immediate cause of climate 
change, GHG emissions.39 Public health, equity, and the co-benefits of reducing co-pollutants 
aren’t well understood by planners and decision-makers in general. Therefore, it’s rarely 
considered” (author interview, 2014).  Research further suggests that since GHG emissions are 
                                                           
38 Exposure to GHG emissions has human health impacts in concentrated form, such as their use in the workplace 
(WDHS, 2013). However outdoor exposure levels are considered to be de minimis; GHG emissions dilute as they 
mix uniformly in the atmosphere (CARB, 2008). 
39 As previously noted, processes such as fossil fuel burning concurrently emit GHG and other co-pollutants that 
have localized health impacts. However, in California, GHG and co-pollutants (i.e. PM and 03) are generally 
mitigated through separate policy programs.  
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invisible and because we breathe them without getting sick (unlike smog), many policymakers 
and laypersons have a difficult time making the links between GHG emissions, local air quality 
and public health (Moser and Dilling, 2007).   
 
The perceived lack of a connection to human health has also resulted in some experts stating 
that the main focus of climate policies should be the reduction of global GHG emissions in a 
cost-effective manner. For example, Harvard University economist, Robert Stavins who was 
commissioned by the state and business groups to conduct economic analyses for the 
implementation of AB 32, argues against expanding the scope of climate polices to include 
localized health co-benefits. He instead proposes that the most environmentally and cost-
effective method to address co-pollutants is to revisit existing pollution laws administered by 
regional air quality districts and perhaps make them stronger (Stavins, 2011; Schatzki and 
Stavins, 2009). A public sector planner confirmed that this perspective is prevalent in the field 
because air districts, rather than local planning agencies, are the lead agencies in combatting 
toxic and criteria air pollutants (author interview, 2014).  
 
The California Department of Public Health (CDPH) suggests that while some planners may 
understand the links between health and climate planning, they lack quantitative data and tools 
to justify the investment. Inclusion of such data can establish the economic benefits of 
integrating public health in climate action planning (CDPH, 2012). According to a public agency 
planner, in his city “staff does qualitatively stress the public health and other quality of life 
benefits resulting from CAP implementation. However, we have limited exposure and 
experience with public health data.” The planner attributes this as a result of the city-county 
“Public Health Divide,” in which public health services are typically coordinated at the county-
level with minimal city involvement (author interview, 2014).  
 
CDPH further acknowledges that many CAPs likely only focus on achieving GHG reduction 
targets due to a lack of capacity for collaborative planning across sectors and budget 
constraints from current environmental initiatives. The time and resource-intensive activities 
already involved in climate planning leaves little opportunity to explicitly demonstrate how 
planning strategies can reduce GHG emissions and also achieve health outcomes (CDPH, 2012). 
As a result of this single-issue approach, in many cities, the net co-benefits of health are not 
monetized, quantified, or identified by policymakers. The findings of this study illustrate that 
climate-planning activities and work on public health in many of California’s most impacted 
cities is happening in a parallel manner, rather than through an integrated approach. 
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Figure 12: City of Sacramento (2012) CAP Identified Health Co-Benefits for ’Mobility & Connectivity’ Measures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: City of Lodi (2014) CAP Matrix of Co-Benefits of ‘Low-income Weatherization’ Measures 
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While the majority of California CAPs have not broadened climate planning to include health 
outcomes, some cities with larger resources and staff expertise are leading the way through 
innovative collaborations. The cities of San Francisco, Los Angeles and Oakland are working 
alongside environmental justice and community health groups to engage their county health 
departments to develop strategies to 1) communicate the potential health benefits of reducing 
GHG emissions to the general public and policymakers; 2) identify and quantify local land-use, 
transportation, water, and energy policies that reduce GHG emissions and support the design of 
healthy and sustainable neighborhoods; 3) provide guidance on climate preparedness to 
government officials and community partners to reduce health risks and adaptability, and; 4) 
build the capacity of public health and city planning staff to monitor health impacts, integrate 
climate preparedness, and improve climate responses.       
 
The city and county of San Francisco – the state’s only consolidated local government has 
developed the most innovative cross-sector approach to climate planning and health.40 For 
example, its public health department, with a grant from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), completed a 30-page guidance document for “Assessing the Health Co-
benefits of San Francisco’s Climate Action Plan” (SFDPH, 2010). This report assesses the health 
co-benefits of the city’s CAP, and the potential negative health consequences of proposed 
actions. The report provides recommendations to inform future CAP updates to ensure the 
city’s climate change measures achieves emission reductions targets while improving the health 
of San Francisco’s residents. 
 
San Francisco is also the only city to develop a quantitative health study of its CAP. In 
collaboration with the U.S. EPA Region 9, the city developed a study for evaluating health co-
benefits that can be used by decision-makers to optimize GHG mitigation, air quality, and 
monetary benefits (U.S. EPA, 2012d). The study estimates that the CAP measures would result 
in significant economic benefits ($114 million) from improved health outcomes as a result of 
reductions not only in GHG emissions, but also ozone and PM2.5 concentrations (US EPA, 
2012d). The air quality benefit per ton of GHG reduced is also provided to demonstrate the 
relative air quality benefits of each CAP measure. For example, as shown in Figure 14, the 
[Energy] Residential Loan Program would result in $42.56 in reduced health costs saved for 
every ton of GHG emissions reduced (U.S. EPA, 2012d).  
 
                                                           
40 As noted above, in California the vast majority of public health departments are delegated to county 
governments, not cities.  
  
54 
 
 
Figure 14: GHG and Air Quality Monetary Benefit by San Francisco CAP Sector and Measure.  
Source: (U.S. EPA, 2012d).  
 
 
The evaluation of San Francisco’s CAP demonstrates quantitatively that GHG reduction 
measures can have multiple economic, social and environmental health benefits. The reports 
suggests that other municipalities can use this assessment process to develop and prioritize 
potential GHG reduction measures during the drafting of CAPs. However, the scalability of such 
health assessments in California is uncertain. The cost of adopting a conventional CAP can 
range between $100,000 and $450,000, depending on the comprehensiveness and technical 
complexity of the plan (author interviews, 2013; California SGC, 2013). Adding another level of 
quantitative assessment to a CAP may be cost-prohibitive for many cities without the aid of an 
external funding source or free guidance tools from the state. “GHG inventories are onerous 
enough,” said one private sector planner. “Completing an air quality and health cost-benefit 
analysis would add a year and at least $60,000 to the project, which I don’t think most 
municipalities can afford” (author interview, 2014). Nearly 60 percent of California cities 
analyzed in this study indicated that they only developed a CAP (which can take up to two years 
or longer) after securing state, federal, or philanthropic grants (Table 5).  
 
 
B. Measures that Address Climate Change from the Streets or Social Equity 
 
The CalEnviroScreen tool provides a new framework to help governments understand that 
some communities face a higher range of negative impacts than others. It also is intended to 
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help communities determine how policy analysis and development can holistically address 
these issues. In climate policy, such a holistic framing is often referred to as ‘contextual 
vulnerability,’ or what this dissertation refers to Climate Change from the Streets (CCStreets), 
which is based on a multidimensional view of climate-society interactions. Under this frame, 
both climate variability and change are considered to occur in the context of political, 
institutional, and economic and social structures, which interact dynamically with contextual 
conditions associated with a particular ‘exposure unit’ (O’Brien et al, 2007). 41  As described in 
Figure 15b, contextual conditions affect the exposure to climate variability and change, as well 
as proposed policy responses. From this perspective “reducing vulnerability involves altering 
the context in which climate change occurs, so that individuals and groups can better respond 
to changing conditions” (O’Brien et al, Pg. 76). A CCStreets approach stresses the need to 
develop mitigation and adaptation policy responses on the basis of equity (Adger et al, 2006).        
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Approaches to Local Climate Action Planning in California. 
Source: Adapted from O’Brien et al. (2007; pg. 75). 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 15a, ‘outcome vulnerability’ or what is referred to in this dissertation as 
Carbon Fundamentalism, in contrast, takes a linear framing of climate change. Vulnerability is 
the result of the projected impacts of climate change on a particular exposure unit, offset by 
mitigation and adaptation measures. This approach is typically used in climate planning, and 
impacts are measured through technical and sectoral measures without regard to the 
‘contextual conditions’ in which it occurs in society (O’Brien et al, 2007).  
 
                                                          
41 An exposure unit is an activity, group, region or resource exposed to significant climatic variations (O’Brien et al, 
2007).  
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In California, six cities (15 percent) of those surveyed, explicitly utilize a CCStreets approach in 
their CAP process (Table 5). While cities like Tracy, Monterey Park, Watsonville, and San Pablo 
briefly state that “contextual conditions” (i.e. air pollution, poverty and health status) have 
impacts on their residents, they do not identify disadvantaged communities. Nor do they 
indicate if any of the CAP measures are targeted to specific communities or are intended to 
alleviate the social and geographical unevenness of climate change impacts. According to a 
public agency planner, during most CAP processes “there is a perception of climate change as 
an environmental problem, rather than a people problem. It’s an abstract problem affecting the 
whole world rather than a problem that disproportionately affects disadvantaged 
communities” (author interview, 2014). As such, a carbon fundamentalism frame remains the 
dominant approach and presents a significant challenge for linking climate planning with health 
equity outcomes.42 
 
A few cities, however, have explicitly implemented a variety of CAP measures that employ a 
CCStreets approach. San Diego, Inglewood and Lodi have devoted entire sections of their CAP 
to qualitatively describe how climate mitigation measures are addressing social equity and 
vulnerability. San Diego’s chapter on “Social Equity and Job Creation” describes both the 
disproportionate effects of climate change on disadvantaged communities and the methods the 
city is undertaking to identify those communities. This includes the use of the CalEnviroScreen 
tool and the San Diego Council of Government’s Regional Transportation Plan (RTP) analysis of 
“Low-income and Minority Communities” to prioritize the city’s CAP programs and actions for 
disadvantaged populations. The chapter also argues that CAP policies can spur creation of well-
paying jobs in the renewable energy sector and encourages these local jobs should be targeted 
to disadvantaged communities as pathways out of poverty (San Diego, 2014). 
 
The city of Lodi has taken a similar but a more limited approach to CCSteets. Measures like the 
‘Low-income Weatherization’ program were designed to help the city work toward reducing 
barriers to participation of marginalized groups in order to ensure full implementation of the 
CAP (Lodi, 2014).  The city is focusing targeted outreach to the following population groups: 
low-income households, senior households, renter-occupied housing and non-native English 
speakers. Lodi officials intend to develop bilingual communication materials and social 
marketing events, aimed at Spanish-speaking residents, which compose the majority of non-
native English speakers. These bilingual initiatives seek to provide opportunities for immigrant 
residents to participate in low-income energy efficiency and weatherization projects and other 
CAP related programs (Lodi, 2014).    
 
Oakland, Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco have also worked collaboratively with 
county health departments, universities, and environmental justice groups to develop climate 
adaptation analyses focused on “contextual” impacts. The assessments utilize complex 
quantitative models and mapping tools to determine residents’ social vulnerability to climate 
                                                           
42 Health equity is achieved when every person has the opportunity to “attain his or her full health potential” and 
no one is “disadvantaged from achieving this potential because of social position or socially determined 
circumstances (Braverman, 2003; pg. 181).  
  
57 
 
change impacts and develop appropriate adaptation measures. 43  The plans were developed in 
contrast to conventional adaptation studies, such as regional sea-level rise models, that focus 
on threats to city-wide infrastructure and other vital city assets. Adaptation planning, however, 
is still considered an emerging field and due to resource constraints, many local governments 
are struggling with how to engage in the planning process (Anguelovski and Carmin, 2011). This 
study identified only 13 California cities (32 percent of those surveyed) that have employed 
varying approaches to adaptation planning (Table 5). The majority of cities have developed 
simple qualitative statements indicating that particular measures were intended to address 
adaptation, such as urban forestry, renewable energy projects and wetlands restoration.  
 
 
C. Community Engagement of Environmental Justice Actors in Climate Planning 
 
Localizing global climate change science is often faced with uncertainty, and many local 
governments are left with few polices and professional norms to guide their efforts. Thus, 
cities are creating new forms of climate expertise to fill these gaps by commissioning expert 
scientific advice to formulate policy goals and standards (Corburn, 2009). This includes 
working with the Cities and Climate Protection Program (CCP) developed by ICLEI – Local 
Governments for Sustainability44 or hiring private sector planners to establish GHG reduction 
targets, develop emissions inventories and mitigation strategies (Alber and Kern, 2008). 
Local governments have also attempted to manage technical gaps through the 
establishment of task forces populated by scientists and experts from universities. Local 
governments have stated they often pursue an expert task force approach because they are 
unable to gain robust engagement from lay publics in climate-related issues. They attribute 
the lack of public engagement generally to the absence of personal relevance many people 
associate with climate change, as well as the scientific complexity of the issue (Slocum, 2004; 
Few et al., 2007; Rosenthal et al, 2013; Carmin et al, 2013).  
 
In this study, 40 of 41 cities either established a hybrid taskforce populated with experts and 
residents familiar with aspects of environmental planning or created ad hoc committees 
consisting of city agency representatives (Table 5). Nearly all the cities hired private sector 
planners to assist in the technical aspects of developing a CAP. Community engagement was 
generally citied by all 41 cities as a key component of successful implementation of CAPs. 
However, community engagement in many instances only served as a method to solicit 
public comment after a draft report was completed. Community outreach and education 
efforts, it seemed, were conducted to achieve citizen buy-in, rather than providing open 
forums for gathering community concerns and recommendations. According to several 
planners, it is common for many cities to pursue standardized approaches that forge robust 
community engagement and opportunities to incorporate environmental justice goals.  
                                                           
43 These cities are taking a concerted effort toward adaptation planning in acknowledging that, regardless of the 
degree of success in reducing GHG emissions, certain irreversible and significant impacts from climate change are 
already under way and will be inevitable (Few, Brown, and Tompkins, 2007). 
44 Founded as the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives. 
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My sense is that most municipal agencies don’t have the resources or sophistication to 
conduct long-range planning efforts for climate action and sustainability using community-
based, holistic approaches…Public health and environmental justice are an after-thought 
most of the time, with economic development and standardized approaches to land use 
planning and natural resource management being the primary motivators for most long-
range planning efforts (private sector planner – author interview, 2014).  
 
 
Over 78 percent of cities (32) in this study (Table 5) indicated a key factor for developing a 
CAP was to support economic development through a streamlined environmental review 
process for development projects subject to review under the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA).45 Projects that demonstrate consistency with an adopted CAP have the 
ability to report that no additional significant environmental impacts would occur. If a city 
has not adopted a CAP, project developers are required to conduct a costly analysis of GHG 
emissions and potential impacts (OPR, 2011). The cities of Chino and Stockton cited that they 
explicitly developed a CAP as a result of a CEQA legal settlement agreement with the state 
attorney general and environmental groups over the potential GHG emissions impacts 
attributed to their updated general plans, the 20-30 year blueprint cities adopt for growth 
and development (Stockton 2014; Tasci, 2012). Other cities including Tracy, stated that 
adopting a CAP was a preemptive measure against potential CEQA lawsuits (Firpo, 2009).        
 
Consequently, only five cities (12 percent) explicitly stated that they developed tools or 
processes to engage disadvantaged communities in climate action planning. These five cities 
also developed CAPs that focused on ‘contextual vulnerability.’ The cities of Inglewood, Los 
Angeles, Oakland, San Diego and San Francisco explicitly mentioned the methods they 
conducted to identify and substantively engage environmental justice or community-based 
groups in the drafting of their CAPs and related updates. This included the establishment of 
multi-stakeholder policy forums and social events, with bilingual services to maximize 
participation. In several of these cities, community groups formed coalitions to 
collaboratively develop recommendations to address the needs of the communities they 
serve. In most instances, a representative from the coalition participated on a city taskforce 
or served as a key advisor throughout the CAP process. For example, in Oakland, after a 
three-year collaborative process with the Oakland Climate Action Coalition (OCAC), the city 
adopted a CAP based on a comprehensive community engagement process. Through this 
collaboration, the OCAC was able to research and produce 50 out of 150 measures adopted 
in the CAP (Fitzgerald, 2011 – author interview).  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
45 The California statute passed in 1970, shortly after the United States federal government passed the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), to institute a statewide policy of environmental protection. CEQA requires state 
and local agencies to follow a protocol of analysis and public disclosure of environmental impacts of proposed 
projects and adopt all feasible measures to mitigate those impacts (California Department of Justice, 2013). 
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Section 2.6: Conclusion 
 
 
According to the World Health Organization, climate change is one of the most serious public 
health issues of our time (Baum, 2009). Yet in California, the findings of this chapter indicate 
that climate planning activities and work on public health in the state’s most impacted cities 
is happening in a parallel manner, rather than through an integrated approach.46  The vast 
majority of municipal climate action plans (CAP) only focus on achieving GHG reduction 
targets. In this chapter, we understand that the predominant mode of local climate planning 
is carbon fundamentalism. Most cities have framed climate change as an “environmental” or 
scientific problem, without regard to the human and cultural dimension of the phenomenon. 
These CAPs could be easily judged as being modestly effective due to the failure to 
incorporate health co-benefits and safeguard the most vulnerable residents from climate 
change impacts. However, as one public agency planner insisted; “if CAPs do not have co-
benefits explicitly stated as goals, then they cannot be faulted as being only modestly 
effective.” The planner argues that climate planning is an emerging policy field, and 
practitioners need to be better informed as to why an exclusive focus on GHG reduction is 
ineffective (author interview, 2014).   
 
A broader climate policy agenda can help move CAPs in the direction of holistically 
addressing public health and social vulnerability. The challenge for the field, however, is the 
resources it takes to generate substantive pubic engagement programs and cross-
sector/multi-dimensional impact analyses. As astutely noted by a private sector planner; “in 
a perfect world, every local agency would have $500,000 to do a holistic-type CAP, but under 
existing frameworks, that is unlikely to happen” (author interview, 2014). California’s climate 
policies do not adequately provide local governments with the necessary tools or funds to 
conduct more extensive analyses of the health co-benefits of CAP measures. As such, public 
health is considered too indirect by many cities and the focus remains on cost-effective 
reductions of GHG emissions.  
 
In sum, this chapter has provided a baseline analysis of the public health and justice aspects of 
CAPs developed in California cities with high levels of pollution and social vulnerability. The 
findings show that such plans rarely analyze whether GHG reduction strategies will address 
health co-benefits or distribute them equitably. The results suggest a need for increased 
opportunities for interagency coordination and staff training to conduct health analyses, the 
development of free and streamlined tools, and methods for prioritizing funding streams. Most 
significantly, as this chapter illustrates, there is a strong need for cities to promote partnerships 
with residents and community-based groups to link climate planning with equity and health co-
benefits. 
 
                                                           
46 As previously noted, the field of municipal climate planning is a quickly evolving and highly iterative arena. As 
more resources become available, additional public agencies may choose to develop CAPs or initiate updates to 
existing CAPs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Changing the Climate from the Streets of Oakland:  
The Civic Epistemologies of Urban Climate Change  
 
 
 
While the previous chapter provided findings on the importance of substantively engaging 
environmental justice groups and public health professionals in climate planning, its scope is 
limited. More research is needed to empirically understand how cities are engaging civil society 
actors to establish interconnections between climate change, equity and public health. 
Environmental governance entails a variety of decision points that involve determining who 
makes particular policy choices, and what scientific criteria and knowledge is used in making 
those decisions. Through an in-depth case study of Oakland, California’s climate action plan 
(CAP), this chapter examines how and why a city develops explicit linkages between climate 
change and population health. Analyzing the methods in which CAPs are developed in practice 
can provide a strategic understanding of the particular agendas, politics and expertise that 
influence the development of climate policies and environmental justice outcomes.    
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Section 3.1:  Introduction 
 
Figure 16:  Source: OCAC, 2010  
 
 
Up until the last decade, climate change tended to be a ‘White,’ affluent issue about saving the 
rainforest and polar bears. It hasn’t had deep relevance for people trying every day to get by in 
the urban centers. Most of the messages of climate change are about eliminating global GHG 
emissions and not about people (Brian Beveridge, co-director of the West Oakland Environmental 
Indicators Project, – author interview).     
 
As described in the preceding chapter, strategies for addressing climate change have been 
largely analyzed in terms of their costs and potential for reducing the rate of increase in 
atmospheric concentrations of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Less studied is whether 
efforts to slow atmospheric GHG accumulations will have a number of local co-benefits. These 
include a reduction in the co-pollutants of climate change (i.e. ozone, particulate matter, and 
nitrogen oxides) and a corresponding improvement of population health in environmental 
justice communities. Despite the fact that GHG and co-pollutants are emitted concurrently, 
they are often not addressed jointly in global and local climate policy (Pastor and Boyce, 2012).  
 
There is growing evidence that local climate planning is neglecting issues of equity and human 
health (Bulkeley et al., 2013; Douglas et al, 2012; Finn et al, 2011; Hughes, 2013; Pearsall et al, 
2010). Incorporating public health and equity in climate action plans may be problematic for 
several reasons. First, the structural conditions that have created environmental health 
inequities are often concealed by focusing primarily on universal climate variables, such as the 
amount of GHG emissions emitted, mean temperature and regulatory technologies. These 
variables seek GHG reductions on a global scale, without targeting efforts and health co-
benefits to local communities already disproportionately suffering from poor air quality.   
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Second, the disconnect between climate planning and public health may be occurring because 
greenhouse gases are considered to have “no direct public health impacts” since they are global 
pollutants that mix uniformly in the atmosphere. They do not have localized health effects, as 
do particulate matter (PM) and ground-level ozone (O3) — the key ingredients of smog (CARB, 
2008). As noted in Chapter 1, since GHG emissions are invisible and because we breathe them 
without getting sick, many policymakers and laypersons have a difficult time making the links 
between GHG emissions, local air quality and public health (Moser and Dilling, 2007). This has 
resulted in climate policies focusing almost exclusively on reducing global GHG emissions 
without regard to the localized human health benefits (Jochem and Madlener, 2003).  
 
The construction of climate change as an abstract, scientific issue with no direct human health 
impacts reinforces popular representations of melting ice caps and displaced polar bears as 
disproportionately suffering from the impacts of a changing climate (Figure 16). Such 
representations have little relevance to how climate change exacerbates existing health 
inequities or the ‘lived experience’ of individuals in environmental justice communities. The 
disconnect between public health and climate change can leave these communities disengaged 
from the policymaking process in developing climate action plans (O’Neil and Nicholson-Cole, 
2009). Therefore, It is suggested that local climate planning should instead follow a ‘relational’ 
approach that: (1) acknowledges an understanding of how climate change is connected with 
other types of knowledge about the local environment; and, (2) enables different ways of 
knowing to play a valid part of framing a culture of climate change and its corresponding policy 
responses (Brace and Geoghegan, 2010).  
 
In an effort to rectify this disconnect, several environmental justice advocates are taking such 
an approach. They are creating new methods and policy interventions that focus on how 
climate change impacts local communities, and are embedded in social justice and public 
health. In this chapter, I draw on the case study of Oakland’s Energy and Climate Action Plan 
(ECAP) to illustrate the diverse ways environmental justice groups there are approaching 
climate change. They are analyzing climate change through people’s lived experience, 
relationship to community and local knowledge.47 This is in contrast to standardized 
approaches developed by experts and city planners (Park, 2009; Morello-Frosch et al., 2012). 
These new forms of knowledge and governance can be understood as an articulation of civic 
epistemology, “the institutionalized practices by which members of a given society test and 
deploy knowledge claims used as a basis for making collective choices” (Jasanoff, 2005; Pg. 
255). Examining the ECAP through the concept of civic epistemology, demonstrates how 
environmental justice groups are challenging a priori policy expertise to produce new local, 
place-based conceptualizations of climate change that underscore population health and 
community well-being. 
 
                                                           
47 Local knowledge is often defined by the international development literature as: a). information linked to a 
specific place, culture or identify group; b). dynamic and evolving knowledge; c). know-how belonging to groups of 
people who are intimate with the natural and human system within which they live; and, d). knowledge that has 
some qualities that distinguishes it from formal scientific knowledge (Corburn, 2003). 
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Section 3.2:  Configuring Oakland’s Climate(s) 
 
Figure 17 (OCAC, 2010) 
 
Climate change is the greatest public health challenge of this century…the Oakland Climate Action 
Coalition has done an amazing job in pushing the [City] Council and our communities to imagine 
and prepare for [it].   
-- Dana Ginn Paredes, Training Director for Asian Communities for Reproductive Justice  
(March 2, 2011, a day after the Oakland City Council passed one of the state’s highest municipal GHG reduction 
targets).  
 
 
With a population of nearly 400,000, almost two-thirds people of color, the city of Oakland has 
a long and rich history of civil rights and environmental activism. This activism is partly in 
response to a legacy of inequitable development practices that continue to cause 
environmental degradation in local communities. Toxic facility sitings, low socio-economic 
status (SES), economic activity from of one of the state’s largest seaports, and lack of a fair 
distribution of environmental goods has created a degraded built environment in many 
Oakland neighborhoods. In those neighborhoods, residents face an increased risk of exposure 
to pollution and public health impacts, such as asthma, heart disease, cancer, premature death, 
and neo-natal problems (CEC, 2012; Minkler et al. 2011).  
 
Local pollution sources within the city also contribute to a global environmental threat as well – 
the greenhouse gas emissions that fuel climate change. The California Environmental Protection 
Agency (Cal EPA) recently highlighted Oakland’s role in global-local environmental health 
degradation through its Environmental Health Screening Tool (CalEnviroScreen). As illustrated 
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in Figure 18, more than 50,000 Oakland residents live in neighborhoods listed in the top 20 
percent of California census tracts for cumulative environmental impact (Cal EPA, 2014).  
Neighborhoods in these high-scoring census tracts sit next to a major seaport, airport, rail 
yards, and congested freeways. In these areas, residents are exposed on a daily basis to higher 
levels of air pollution from vehicle exhaust and commercial operations. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: More than 50,000 Oakland residents live in neighborhoods listed in the top 20 percent of 
California census tracts for cumulative environmental impact. The top 20 percent census tracts are 
highlighted in dark orange.  
 
 
Motivated by these disproportionate environmental burdens, the city of Oakland and locally-
based, environmental justice groups sought ways to more explicitly link urban planning, public 
health and climate change. They developed a civic epistemology that partially displaced expert-
driven processes that typically characterize climate action plans across the United States. The 
previous chapter has shown that local governments generally develop standards and climate 
policy through the establishment of task forces populated by scientists and experts, which 
rarely address issues of public health and equity (Bulkeley et al, 2013; Douglas et al, 2012; 
Rosenthal, et al, 2013; Rosenzweig et al., 2010; Corburn, 2009). Conversely, in Oakland, 
following a three-year collaborative process with the Oakland Climate Action Coalition (OCAC), 
the city in December 2012 adopted one of the state’s highest city-scale GHG emissions 
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reduction targets.48  The city’s ECAP was largely driven by a diverse coalition of local and 
regional organizations who proactively focused on implementing an urban climate change 
regime that went beyond abstract notions of the environment. This process positioned 
environmental justice groups in the city to configure a holistic conceptualization of climate 
change that emphasized geographically and socially uneven impacts of climate change and 
promoted health equity.49    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
48 The Draft ECAP was approved by the City Council in March 2011. However, final adoption was taken in 
December 2012 after the required Environmental Impact Report (EIR) was completed.  
49 Health equity is achieved when every person has the opportunity to "attain his or her full health potential" and 
no one is "disadvantaged from achieving this potential because of social position or other socially determined 
circumstances" (Braverman, 2003; pg. 181). 
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Section 3.3:  Community-Based Climate Planning in Oakland 
 
 
The Oakland Climate Action Coalition was first conceived in the small cinder-block basement of 
the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights in early 2009, shortly after the city announced that it 
would develop an ECAP. The Ella Baker Center identifying a strategic opening, quickly organized 
a crowded meeting of more than 50 people from 30 community-based organizations to 
brainstorm on how to produce a comprehensive local climate action plan that addressed the 
needs of Oakland residents most impacted by air pollution and poverty (Emily Kirsch, 2011 – 
author interview).   
 
The Center began the strategic planning meeting by asking the following question: “What 
would a People’s Energy and Climate Action Plan look like in Oakland?” After several hours of 
dialogue and facilitated discussion, participants covered the small basement walls with neon 
pink, green, and yellow Post-It notes detailing their suggestions and ideas for Oakland’s climate 
action plan. Some of these suggestions included demands for locally produced renewable 
energy projects in disadvantaged communities, affordable housing as a GHG emissions 
reduction strategy, and increased public transit options to reduce co-pollutants and improve 
local air quality. Through this grassroots meeting, the Oakland Climate Action Coalition was 
officially established.   
 
 
Figure 19: Oakland Climate Action Coalition Membership 2009-2011.  
 
 
The Ella Baker Center for Human Rights, named for a longtime twentieth-century U.S. civil 
rights leader and participatory democracy advocate, went on to be the convener of the cross-
sector coalition of over 50 organizations that expanded to include labor unions, green 
businesses, and advocates for sustainable development, in addition to environmental justice 
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groups (see Figure 19 for full list). As the convener of OCAC, the Ella Baker Center provided staff 
to coordinate the coalition, led the drafting of the mission statement and goals, and facilitated 
steering committee and coalition meetings to ensure compliance with OCAC benchmarks.  
 
OCAC’s strength and success is largely due to the diversity of its members. They recruited 
coalition members throughout Oakland’s diverse neighborhoods. Together, they were a 
powerful force that provided multi-sector expertise on a host of issues, including: 
transportation and affordable housing, energy, urban agriculture, adaptation planning and 
community engagement. According to Emily Kirsch, founding OCAC coordinator and green jobs 
Organizer for the Ella Baker Center, the coalition’s diversity in expertise allowed them to work 
jointly with the city to move the ECAP beyond a priori strategies to a community-based plan.  
 
Having a diverse coalition with strong expertise is important in these types of policy initiatives.  So  
we knew [the Ella Baker Center] were not experts on climate change. When you talk about climate 
change, its food, water, transportation, housing, energy, health equity and everything you possibly 
can think of.  So we went around to our friends and allies to find out what sort of climate-related 
projects they were working on and the type of expertise they could bring to the coalition. Then we 
strategized how we could get included these projects in the ECAP and on the books as part of the 
city’s plans (Kirsch, 2011 – author interview).    
 
In developing the framework for the ECAP, the city initially followed traditional methods by 
seeking assistance from experts at the nongovernmental organization, ICLEI50 and the private 
consulting firm CirclePoint, Inc. These organizations helped gather input at public workshops, 
identify and evaluate potential GHG emissions reduction targets, and strategies to address GHG 
targets. Under this conventional process, approximately 200 people attended city-sponsored 
workshops, representing a variety of interests; including the OCAC, government agencies, 
utilities, businesses, and individual residents. However, what is uniquely different about 
Oakland’s ECAP is that the OCAC approached the city staff early in the process about being 
more directly involved in the development and defining of the ECAP. They specifically 
requested that the city not establish a formal expert taskforce but instead allow for alternative 
community-based approaches. Due to the diverse expertise of members in the coalition, which 
included politically influential and long-established community members, the OCAC persuaded 
city staff and the city council to let the coalition facilitate and fund a parallel, community-driven 
advisory process. This was in addition to the city-sponsored public workshops and mandatory 
public comment periods.  
The city did host their own workshops but they are pretty boring and held at 2pm in the afternoon.  
We attended and gave our input. That is because we get paid to attend.  But we wanted to hold 
workshops that were more accessible to the public and were fun and engaging… So we hosted a 
series of workshops in the flatlands of East and West Oakland, knowing that communities most 
                                                           
50 Most cities typically participate in the Cities and Climate Protection Program (CCP) developed by ICLEI – Local 
Governments for Sustainability, to establish targets for carbon emissions reductions, developing GHG emissions 
inventories, and mitigation strategies, including provisions for monitoring and evaluation (Alber and Kern, 2008). 
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impacted by climate change are often least represented in terms of decision making. We hosted 
workshops with coalition members that already had relationships in those communities (Kirsch, 
2011- author interview).    
 
Through this collaborative process, the coalition achieved a major accomplishment. They 
produced scientific rationale that convinced the city to pass one of the highest municipal 
greenhouse gas reduction targets in California: 36 percent reduction from 2005 levels by 2020 
and 85 percent reduction by 205051. While other California cities have also set GHG reducation 
goals, Oakland’s target levels are the first to comply with the reductions recommended by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes (Lemer, 2011 – author interview; CARB, 2008). 
These reductions are more than double the California Air Resources Board’s recommendation 
that local governments reduce GHG emissions 15 percent below today’s levels by 2020 (CARB, 
2008). Hence, by tapping their collective expertise, the OCAC proposed bold, science-based 
GHG reduction targets for the city. The coalition was strategic in this process because they 
knew that higher GHG reduction targets offered greater opportunities to insert community-
based measures representing their conceptualization of urban climate change. 
 
 
                                                           
51 On December 11, 2008, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) approved the Scoping Plan for implementing 
AB 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.  The plan outlines a combination of existing, strengthened, and 
new policies and programs to cut the state of California’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.  As part of the 
Scoping Plan, cities and counties are encouraged but not required to adopt targets to reduce GHG emissions by 15 
percent below today’s levels by 2020.  In the Scoping Plan, “today’s levels” are based on the statewide GHG 
inventory for 2005.  However, cities and counties are encouraged to set a minimum of at least 15 percent GHG 
reduction target for both municipal operations and the community as a whole based on the most current GHG 
inventory conducted. http://arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scopingplan.htm 
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In addition to setting one of the state’s highest GHG reduction benchmarks, the Oakland ECAP 
is also one of the first cities to explicitly develop evaluative criteria to incorporate co-benefits 
for traditionally disadvantaged communities (Figure 20). The plan includes specific measures to 
reduce air pollution in heavily impacted neighborhoods and provide equity in protection from 
the impacts of climate change. For example, the ECAP considered and analyzed whether the 
benefits of the plan outweighed the burdens that the measures may impose on disadvantaged 
communities. This includes ensuring that GHG emissions reduction measures like transit-
oriented development (TOD) prevented displacement of low-income residents by encouraging 
the use of tenant protections and preserving affordable housing options. In this context, 
providing an adequate supply of affordable housing near transit was put forth as a valid climate 
solution. This made Oakland the nation’s first city to explicitly link climate change policy with 
affordable housing.  
 
The OCAC argued that even though constructing TOD projects in existing high-density 
neighborhoods is an effective GHG mitigation measure, it also has the potential to displace low-
income people, seniors and renters as older housing stock is replaced with new market-rate 
units. The OCAC claimed that housing displacement from TOD projects, in actuality, could 
undercut GHG mitigation strategies if lower-income residents were forced to move to cheaper 
suburban locales with fewer transit options. As a result, many individuals may be forced to buy 
a car for access to work and community services, thereby increasing not only the region’s 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT) but its GHG emissions (OCAC Steering Committee Member, 2013 - 
author interview).  
 
The OCAC collaboration in the ECAP, moreover, represents a rupture in conventional practice in 
local climate action planning. Not only did it partially displace the scientific advisory commission 
process, it also validated the local knowledge of coalition members alongside established 
expert communities. Most municipalities engaged in the ICELI program often represent public 
participation as only a normative goal, rather than a substantive one, in formulating climate 
change risks and strategies. City officials claim they are unable to garner significant public 
interest because of the complexity of the science and long-term and uncertain nature of 
climate change (Few, Brown, and Tompkins, 2007). Many cities opt to establish an expert 
taskforce and hire environmental consultants to compensate for a lack of public participation. 
Therefore, the decision-making processes in urban climate change planning in many localities is 
embedded in relations of power and techno-scientific expertise.  
 
As described by a long serving member of the Oakland City Council, the OCAC’s involvement in 
developing the ECAP stands in sharp contrast to previous city environmental initiatives.  
 
I’ve been a Councilmember for 16 years and I’ve seen a lot of environmental plans. Oakland’s 
Energy and Climate Action Plan is unique because it lifts the voices of low-income communities and 
communities of color. -- Nancy Nadel, Oakland city council member (2012). 
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The OCAC’s parallel policy and community engagement process consequently, enabled the 
OCAC to research and produce 50 of the 150 ECAP measures (Fitzgerald, 2011 – author 
interview). This was primarily achieved through the establishment of six policy committees, 
which studied and provided justification via research and local community knowledge for GHG 
reduction measures and targets (Garzon, 2013 – author interview). Policy committees 
addressed issues involving transportation and land use; building and energy use; consumption 
and solid waste; food, water and urban agriculture/forestry; adaptation and resilience; and 
community engagement. Each committee had two co-chairs -- one from a policy-based 
organization, the other from a grassroots-based group -- to assure a balance of expertise in 
policy development and on-the-ground experience. Through this organizational structure, the 
committees convened several times a month to conduct research and develop policy (Garzon, 
2013; Kirsch, 2011 – author interviews).52  The OCAC, in developing climate policy and expertise 
for the ECAP was guided by the following key principles: 
 
1. Climate Justice and Equity 
2. Clean Up Air Pollution and Create Healthy Communities  
3. Create Local Green-Collar Jobs 
4. Community Local Knowledge  
5.  Climate Adaptation and Community Resilience  
6. Polluters Pay 
 
 
Garrett Fitzgerald, the city of Oakland’ Sustainability Coordinator and a collaborator with the 
OCAC in developing the ECAP, acknowledges the coalition’s key role in developing the 
innovative climate action plan (Fitzgerald, 2011 – author interview). “The OCAC made my job a 
lot easier by providing smart, specific recommendations for the plan and doing a lot of work to 
bring more of Oakland’s voices into the process. It’s rare to find community partners as 
dedicated and willing to collaborate with city staff as the OCAC” (Fitzgerald, 2012). In fact, even 
before city staff released their first draft of the ECAP, the OCAC had already developed and 
presented their own comprehensive ECAP to city officials based on the community workshops 
they hosted in Oakland’s low-income and immigrant neighborhoods. City staff incorporated the 
majority of the proposed policies into various ECAP drafts and the final plan that was adopted 
by the city council. By working collaboratively across sectors and organizations, the OCAC 
illustrated its ability to effectively focus climate action planning on measures that reduce GHG 
emissions and simultaneously provide direct benefits to local communities.53  
 
                                                           
52 Coalition members also participated in monthly General Coalition meetings. The OCAC Steering Committee was 
comprised of co-chairs of the OCAC’s policy committees. 
53 After the city released its first and second drafts, the OCAC submitted edits via track changes, which allowed the 
city to simply copy and paste their suggestions into the updated and final drafts (Kirsch, 2011 and Lemer, 2011 – 
interviews with author).  
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What drew these unlikely partners together is the goal of a just and equitable energy and climate 
plan for the city. Whether they were a green enterprise looking to grow their business in a green 
and sustainable way; or a labor union looking to ensure jobs in a new economy for their members; 
or an environmental group that has done the research to know the catastrophic effects of global 
warming– they all had a stake in making sure that the ECAP was done right for the City of Oakland 
(Kirsch, 2011). 
 
 
As Table 6 illustrates, the Oakland ECAP represents a unique case because it differs greatly from 
conventional climate action plans in six key areas: (1) it included local knowledge in the 
development of climate policy; (2) public participation was embedded in the regulatory science 
and policy processes; (3) climate Impacts focused on the human-scale; (4) CAP measures were 
chosen for their potential health co-benefits; (5) adaptation plans focused on socially 
vulnerable communities; and, (6) the CAP includes explicit references to social equity and 
environmental justice.    
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         TABLE 6: Climate Action Plan (CAP) Metrics in California 
 Conventional CAP Oakland ECAP 
Regulatory Science & Policy 
Processes 
Climate policy, protocols, models, 
methods and strategies primarily 
established via expert 
commissions, consultants, and 
university partnerships. 
Expert/Professional knowledge 
emphasized.  
Climate policy, protocols, models, 
methods, and strategies 
developed through a community-
based process (local knowledge). 
Lay-expert knowledge 
engagement 
Public Participation Generally normative goal achieved 
during mandatory public comment 
period or workshops after the 
protocols/methods of regulatory 
science and policy have been 
established.  
Occurred concurrently with the 
regulatory science and policy 
processes and public comment 
periods and workshops.  
 
Focus of Climate Impacts Ecological Systems and city-wide 
Infrastructure 
 
Human-scale, socially vulnerable 
neighborhoods/populations, 
ecological systems, and city-wide 
infrastructure 
Co-benefits of CAP Cost-savings, efficiency, economic 
development 
Public health, cost-savings, 
efficiency, local green jobs and 
energy 
Focus of Adaptation Typically normative goal only 
focused on city-wide infrastructure 
and ecological systems. No 
comprehensive neighborhood-
scale studies or risk models. 
Human health, socially 
vulnerable 
neighborhood/populations and 
city-wide infrastructure. 
Comprehensive neighborhood-
scale studies and risk models. 
Explicit references to Social Equity or 
Environmental Justice  
Rarely cited in documents Cited as a guiding principle 
Source: Author’s survey of 41 California CAPs in cities with census tracts ranked in the 20th percentile under Cal EPA’s 
CalEnviron Screen Tool and review of the literature on the development of CAPs (Buckley et. al, 2013; Millard-ball, 2012; 
Anguelovski and Carmin, 2011; Few, Brown, and Tompkins, 2007 
 
 
Oakland also stands out as an exceptional case because the OCAC is officially listed on the 
adopted ECAP as being a major contributor in the development of the plan. Rarely are 
environmental justice organizations listed on such government documents as official 
knowledge producers of climate policy. The work of the OCAC to develop, pass and implement 
the city’s ECAP makes Oakland a model for what urban communities across the country can do 
to localize urban climate change solutions.   
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Section 3.4:  Localizing Climate Change for Community Action  
 
 
Figure 21.   Source: OCAC (2009) 
 
 
Through a collaborative process with the city, the OCAC successfully advocated for ECAP 
measures that not only reduced GHG emissions, but also promoted health co-benefits. The 
OCAC was unique in its explicit efforts to organize low-income families and communities of 
color around defining how climate change was to be addressed in Oakland. The coalition 
actively attempted to change the conceptualization of climate change as a global, non-urban 
phenomenon that was primarily focused on impacts to polar bears and ecological systems. As 
illustrated in Figure 21, they sought to mobilize people to demand policies and programs, such 
as urban agriculture, alternative transportation and local green-collar jobs, which held greater 
relevancy to their communities (Brian Beveridge, 2013 – author interview).  
 
In order to transform the conceptualization of climate change in Oakland, the OCAC convened 
and funded 14 urban climate change workshops throughout the city. These workshops were 
mainly held in Oakland’s low-income and immigrant neighborhoods, and they engaged more 
than 1,500 city residents in developing various options and local solutions to climate change. 
Several of the workshops were conducted in multiple languages. For example, the nonprofits 
Movement Generation and the Asian Pacific Environmental Network (APEN) facilitated 
workshops in Spanish and Chinese that included many immigrant residents. The inclusive 
process led to widespread support and engagement for the plan by Oakland residents most 
impacted by pollution and poverty. This was a key factor in the adoption of the coalition’s 
recommendations and local expertise in the final plan (Kirsch, 2011; Lehmer, 2011; Fitzgerald, 
2011- author interviews). These OCAC events are a significant accomplishment in community 
engagement because, as previously noted, only 200 individuals attend the city-sponsored 
workshops.   
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The OCAC further localized climate knowledge through the development of a series of youth 
engagement programs. For example, the OCAC hosted a solar-powered concert featuring 
legendary hip-hop artists Pete Rock & CL Smooth to promote a Climate Adaptation Work Day at 
Laney Community College. More than 350 Oakland residents, many of them youth, helped 
install a garden and rainwater catchment system at the college.  An OCAC member 
organization, Forward Together, organized in East Oakland a youth workshop that brought 
together 80 high school students in role-playing activities on what climate solutions could look 
like in their homes, schools and neighborhoods. A Community Convergence for Climate Action 
Day was also held, featuring a theatrical performance on climate change by high school-aged 
girls, live hip-hop concerts, and a report-back from residents who attended OCAC’s climate 
workshops in East and West Oakland (Figure 21). The Community Convergence event was 
intended to demonstrate the high level of interest by local residents in the development of the 
ECAP, and to create a space for residents to participate in climate solutions that went beyond 
conventional GHG emission reduction strategies.     
 
Additionally, the OCAC facilitated workshops on disaster preparedness for low-income 
communities that focused on the impact of climate change through interactive games and 
learning initiatives. The games and initiatives included an activity workbook titled, ‘Are You a 
Climate Change Survivor?’  (Figures 22 and 23); board games with names like Climate Justice 
Human Bingo and Community Resilience Lifeboat, and fact sheets with activities designed to 
raise awareness about climate change impacts in Oakland neighborhoods. Through such 
collaborative projects, Oakland set the trend for a holistic approach to climate action planning. 
According to Brian Beveridge, co-executive director of the West Oakland Environmental 
Indicators Project and OCAC member, the interactive activities were developed to focus on 
creating spaces where diverse people could imagine solutions that protect residents as they 
face local climate impacts, such as heat waves, floods, wildfires, poor air quality and rising 
utility costs.   
 
We have developed climate action education tool kits and a series of fact sheets that grew out 
of our previous work on air quality, health and transportation. We held several community 
trainings to explore how to engage community residents on these issues. We started by 
bringing people together and talking about assets and vulnerability. Talking about things they 
want to protect.  It starts as a mapping exercise, we look at all the places we are strong before 
we look at our vulnerabilities….At the community level it is not technocratic. You can’t just say 
there is some technological fix for people because we are really not protecting hard assets; we 
are talking about people surviving as a community during a disaster (Beveridge, 2013 – author 
interview). 
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Figure 22: OCAC Climate Change Games and Fact Sheets (Pacific Institute and OCAC, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: OCAC Climate Change Games & Fact Sheets (Pacific Institute and OCAC, 2013) 
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In addition to community engagement events, the OCAC turned to electoral politics, specifically 
the 2010 mayoral and city council races. On March 30, 2010, the OCAC organized a 200 person 
rally at City Hall where Oakland city councilmembers and candidates listened to labor and 
community leaders’ recommendations on how the ECAP should be developed and adopted:  
 
I spoke at the [city hall] rally to show that labor leaders and community leaders are united for job-
creating climate solutions. By passing a strong ECAP, we can get our members off the bench and 
into jobs. -- Andreas Cluver, secretary-treasurer, Alameda County Building Trades Council (OCAC, 
2012).   
 
 
The OCAC also hosted a larger formal event, the Green Mayoral Forum on September 14, 2010. 
At the event, more than 200 local residents, a majority of them people of color, convened to 
listen to candidates describe how they would advocate for a community-based ECAP (Figure 
24). For example, Silvia Lopez, member of the organization Mujeres Unidas y Activos, asked 
mayoral candidates, what they “would do to ensure that low-income communities have the 
resources to grow their own food” and how the ECAP could support urban farms (OCAC, 2012).  
Hosting the Green Mayoral Forum and the rally at City Hall set a strong precedent that elected 
officials in the city needed to have an explicit policy agenda linking climate change with job 
creation and health equity (Garzon 2013; Beveridge, 2013; Kirsch, 2011 – author interviews).    
 
 
 
Figure 24: The OCAC (2012) hosts the Green Mayoral Forum at the Oakland Museum. 
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Section 3.5:  Participatory Research in Climate Adaptation Planning  
 
 
Climate action planning is typically focused on mitigation and how you reduce emissions. But the 
truth is, the impacts are already happening now and it is just going to get worse. So figuring out 
how communities and people can adapt, and be prepared for those changes, is important (Emily 
Kirsch, 2011 – author interview).  
 
 
The OCAC also developed a concerted effort toward adaptation planning in acknowledgment of 
the fact that even if the city succeeds in reducing GHG emissions in the future, certain 
irreversible and significant impacts from climate change are already underway and are 
inevitable (Few, Brown, and Tompkins, 2007).  The OCAC fought for the inclusion of 
neighborhood-scale adaptation planning in the ECAP to address the most harmful climate 
impacts to socially vulnerable communities in the near term. This is in contrast to conventional 
climate studies, such as regional sea-level rise models, which typically only focus on threats to 
city-wide infrastructure and other hard assets. However, as Brian Beveridge notes, due to 
limited city resources, time constraints, and, most importantly the lack of expertise at the city 
staff level, adaptation was initially only included as a normative goal in the ECAP.  
 
 
As originally drafted, the adaptation component of the ECAP was just a text paragraph and 
basically stated that, yes, this is an issue that the city should be looking at in the future. There was 
no action measures associated with it in the ECAP. I would say adaptation planning for socially 
vulnerable communities is a hard sell, especially when there are limited resources to plan and 
protect the entire city. We didn’t see anyone talking about what happens to communities like 
West Oakland if we can’t avert climate degradation. How do these neighborhoods adapt? So we, 
along with the Pacific Institute, started this whole discussion of adaptation, vulnerability, and 
resilience (Beveridge, 2013 – author interview).  
 
Ultimately, the OCAC, through grants from the California Energy Commission (CEC) and the San 
Francisco Foundation, developed their own adaptation planning data and models to 
supplement the ECAP. Through a Community-Based Participatory Research (CBPR)54 process, 
they identified geographic areas within Oakland with heightened risks to projected climate 
impacts. These adaptation models were developed to help guide policymakers and affected 
communities on where to focus climate adaptation efforts (CEC, 2012; Garzon, 2013 – author 
interview). 55 
                                                           
54 Community-based Participatory Research (CBPR) is an approach to the research process that integrates the 
technical expertise of researchers with the experiential knowledge of non-academically trained community 
partners who are directly affected by the issue being studied (Minkler and Wallerstein, 2008). 
55 The CEC and San Francisco Foundation grants were awarded in 2010, a year after the city started their ECAP 
process. As a result, the Oakland ECAP references the OCAC’s community-based adaptation study as a priority 
action that the city is supporting in the near future. The ECAP is updated every five years, and it is anticipated that 
the OCAC study will be incorporated and expanded in the next update (Garzon, 2013 – interview with author).  
  
78 
 
A program affiliated with an OCAC member, the Pacific Institute’s Community Strategies for 
Sustainability and Justice Program – administered the CBPR study on climate adaptation.  As an 
academically trained research organization, the Pacific Institute facilitated the Oakland 
Adaptation planning research meetings from May 2010 to November 2011, in collaboration 
with OCAC members at key points in the research decision-making process (Figure 25). These 
decisions included the types of climate impacts and vulnerability factors to be considered, the 
methods that should be used to map social vulnerability to local climate impacts, the 
interpretations of research results, and ways to share the results with key audiences (CEC, 
2012).  
 
 
 
Figure 25: Community Partner Engagement in Oakland Climate Adaptation Study. Source: CEC (2012).  
 
 
The methodology used by OCAC, included: (1) obtaining geographic data on the extent and 
severity of projected physical impacts of climate change to determine exposure to these 
impacts; (2) gathering of data on indicators of social vulnerability that relate to these impacts 
on an appropriate geographic scale; and (3) overlaying vulnerability and exposure layers to 
produce a composite of exposure and vulnerability.  The areas of overlap illustrated those areas 
with increased risks of being impacted by climate change as a result of exposure and social 
vulnerability (CEC, 2012; Garzon, 2013 – author interview).  According to Catalina Garzon, 
Pacific Institute’s the lead researcher on the project, the CBPR process offered a strong 
emphasis on valuing local context and creating a process to engage stakeholders in helping 
define priorities. It also identified types of data needed to develop policy and programmatic 
options to address those priorities (Figure 25).  
 
  
79 
 
We held a total of six joint sessions with OCAC members, called ‘research report-backs,’ at key 
decision points in the research process. We presented research and draft methods for best 
practices in the field for looking at community vulnerability in adaptation planning...We facilitated  
discussion about the implications for OCAC members’ work on local climate change – to understand 
what would be useful for their own work. Then we would present draft results from the mapping 
and climate models and asked OCAC members what adaptation measures can be best implemented 
locally to address climate impacts and social equity (Garzon, 2013 – author interview).    
 
Due in part to Oakland’s geography and built environment, the OCAC focused on developing 
detailed local impact models that analyzed the city and its neighborhoods as being vulnerable 
to a number of climate impacts, such as coastal flooding due to sea level rise, extreme heat, 
wildfires, and increases in particulate matter (PM) concentrations from warmer temperatures 
(Figures 26-28). Through these models, the OCAC argued that certain population groups and 
communities within Oakland might be more susceptible to a public health threat from exposure 
to a climate change impact. In particular, they asserted that the most socially vulnerable 
populations would be less likely to prepare for, respond to and recover from projected climate 
impacts (CEC, 2012; Cutter et al., 2009). As shown in Figure 26, nearly half of Oakland’s 
residents live in areas of high-medium social vulnerability to extreme heat, flooding, poor air 
quality, and wild fires. However, the areas of highest social vulnerability are concentrated in the 
flatlands near the Port of Oakland, major freeways, and the Oakland International Airport (CEC, 
2012). 
 
Once the research results were completed, the OCAC held a final community workshop on 
equity and resilience on November 11, 2011. Pacific Institute researchers presented 
background information on local climate change impacts and adaptation options for vulnerable 
communities in Oakland. Over 100 participants attended the workshop, which included 
speakers and discussions on how to build and sustain a movement for climate adaptation and 
resilience. At the workshop, participants brainstormed impacts of concern and potential policy 
solutions at breakout sessions (CEC, 2012; OCAC steering committee member, 2012 – author 
interview).  
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Figure 26: Social Vulnerability and Climate Change in Oakland.  Source: CEC (2012) 
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Figure 27: Modeled Particulate Matter Concentration (micrograms per cubic meter) in the Atmosphere 
around Oakland over the years 2000-2006 (above) and 2047-2053 (below).  Source: CEC (2012) 
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The OCAC utilized some of the newest approaches to social vulnerability and adaptation 
modeling techniques. These techniques identified climate impacts to population groups 
connected to particular places and communities. Such approaches define what counts as 
vulnerability based on what particular people value and view as worthy and in need of 
protection (Martello, 2008).  According to the social scientist and risk analyst, Al Irwin (1995) 
social vulnerability analysis requires an understanding of the ways in which specific residents 
and their communities view the world. “Judgments about risk and safety will reflect one’s 
position in the social structure – and also one’s degree of trust in the social institutions which 
currently decide about these questions on others’ behalf” (Irwin, Pg. 45). Therefore, social 
vulnerability entails not only an understanding of how people interact with their physical and 
biological surroundings, but also how they interact with each other and the institutions that 
make environmental policy decisions.  
 
Thus, the OCAC took a multidimensional view of climate-society interactions in their adaptation 
modeling. Under their approach, they considered both climate variability and the changes to 
occur in the context of political, institutional, economic, and social structures. These variables 
interact dynamically with contextual conditions associated with a particular exposure unit. As 
Figure 28: Distribution of Oakland Summertime (May-Oct 31) Daily Maximum Temperatures in the Historical 
Period (1971-2000) and for Future Periods under A2 Emissions Scenario. Source: CEC (2012). 
 
Evaluating the number of extreme heat events is necessary for developing emergency preparedness and 
response plans. According to Garzon (2013 – author interview), this information was difficult for community 
member to grasp conceptually. In order to convey the information contextually, under the A2 emissions 
scenario, the OCAC illustrated to residents that the distribution of daily maximum temperatures in Oakland 
for the period 2070-2099 closely resembles the distribution for Los Angeles for the baseline period of 1971-
2000, as shown in Figure 28.  Source: CEC (2012).  
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described in Chapter 2, a multidimensional view of climate-society interaction (CCStreets 
approach) is traditionally not addressed in adaptation research. Due to limited expertise and 
resources, many local governments are often unable to address social vulnerability directly in 
their climate planning process. As a result, climate impacts are simply addressed through 
technical and sectoral measures without regard to the contextual conditions in which it occurs 
in society.  
 
Engaging in new forms of social vulnerability analysis such as in the case of Oakland, allowed for 
negotiation among diverse civil society actors, granting local residents from EJ communities a 
voice in urban climate change planning (Martello, 2008).  The inclusion of these residents in the 
adaptation planning, is creating ‘ruptures’ in techno-scientific practice. As detailed a coalition 
member, the OCAC’s adaptation process helped serve as basis to engage community 
stakeholders in other regional projects to address climate impacts and health equity.  
 
 
Through the coalition’s advocacy and research to support adaptation planning processes, I think 
we succeeded in getting more focus on social equity in the ECAP. We got the city to commit to 
completing a comprehensive adaptation and social vulnerability plan based on our research…We 
are now focus on implementation – ensuring that adaptation planning is included in all land use 
projects and approvals, like the pending Oakland Army Base Redevelopment project and West 
Oakland Specific Land Use Plan. We are now working on convening an interagency working group 
at the regional level, including the Alameda County Public Health Department, Bay Air Quality 
Monitoring District, and Bay Conservation Development Commission to develop a strategy with 
local community stakeholders to address adaptation within these types of big development plans 
that are currently underway (Garzon, 2013 – author interview).    
    
OCAC’s participation in the adaptation process moreover, helped improve research design by 
refining research questions, methods and instruments for greater accuracy and relevance. The 
participation of the coalition in the data analysis and interpretation also enhanced the 
interpretive validity of the research findings relating to social vulnerability and climate 
adaptation (CEC, 2012).   
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Section 3.6:  Urban Civic Epistemologies and Oakland’s Transformative Climate  
 
Climate change can be reframed as related not simply to ‘the environment’ in the green or 
scientific sense, but in relation to a holistic view of ‘the environment’, which emphasizes the 
linked nature of humans and the environment. Rather than being something external to human 
society, the environment can be defined as the totality of what we live in, natural or constructed, 
spatial, social, and temporal (Barugh and Glass, 2010; Pg. 5). 
 
The direct engagement of OCAC in the development of the Oakland ECAP represents new 
transformations in how climate governance is established and defined at a local scale (Table 7). 
First, the ECAP focused on socially vulnerable communities that have the most to lose from the 
impact of climate change, and suggested not only mitigation but also adaptation plans for these 
areas.  Second, the coalition helped create a sustainable development model based on GHG 
reductions, health co-benefits, and affordable housing at transit-oriented developments.  Third, 
it brought together a diverse group of community interests that created a transformative space 
that contested a priori strategies. As one of OCAC’s key steering committee member describes, 
the coalition was instrumental in pushing policymakers and experts to work with community 
members to imagine and prepare for climate change.  
 
We pretty much wrote the plan for city, the way we wanted to see it. Then gave the plan to the 
city and said we did your homework for you. So when the first draft of the plan came out, the 
coalition got together and just combed through it line by line, section by section. So we provided 
constructive feedback via track changes to the city. So again if the city understood our feedback 
and were supportive of it, they could literally just cut and paste our recommendations into the 
plan. It made their lives a lot easier. Instead, I think what often happens from my experience from 
social justice work is that, we say something is just not equitable -- As opposed to saying what we 
want or what do we want this to actually look like. So I think it was a process for the coalition to 
understand that this was a chance to come up with our own solutions (OCAC Steering Committee 
Member, 2011 – author interview).  
 
 
Through the framework of civic epistemologies, the ECAP has become a site of innovation in 
both the production of knowledge and the ordering of political activity.  The coalition helped 
develop a new conceptual model of ‘nature’ and new relationships among experts, residents, 
and public officials for defining and measuring urban climate change.  More than just technical 
changes in how a locality measures and tracks climate change, the ECAP represents new 
experiments in environmental governance (Table 7). Such experiments, according to Miller 
(2005), “are important features of new emerging civic epistemologies in local, regional, and 
global settings…they are technologies through which people are co-producing new ways of 
knowing and ordering the world at these scales” (pg. 405).  
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Transformative ECAP Action 
Measures  
Outcomes 
1. One of the Highest GHG Reduction Goals in 
the State.   
The higher GHG reduction target the coalition 
demanded, the more community-based climate 
solutions it could insert.  
2. Community Knowledge and Expertise shaped 
the ECAP. 
The ECAP represents a new conceptual model of 
nature and society. This is changing relationships 
among experts, residents and the public for defining 
and addressing urban climate change.  
3. Social Equity in Urban Climate Action Plan a) Defines affordable housing at transit-oriented 
developments as a valid GHG mitigation 
policy.  
b) Requires the development of local adaptation 
plans in socially vulnerable communities.   
c) Defines “urban climate change” as a public 
health challenge. 
d) Encourages urban farms by growing food on 
idle, underutilized or vacant lots. 
 
4. Energy Democracy. Calls for the 
establishment of a Community Choice 
Aggregation (CCA) district to pool electric 
utility users to form a  co-op.  
 
a) Provides locally produced renewable energy 
options within the city. 
b) Provides alternatives to service provided by 
the investor-owned utility, Pacific Gas & 
Electric (PG&E). 
5. Holistic approach to urban climate action 
planning and community engagement.  
The inclusion of local knowledge in the ECAP 
represents an innovation in both the production of 
knowledge and the ordering of political activity. 
TABLE 7: Transformative Urban Climate Change in the Oakland ECAP. 
 
 
The government’s role as producer and consumer of statistical knowledge holds an important 
space in the development of civic epistemologies. This is the result of the disciplining and 
institutionalization of quantitative social sciences in policy contexts and decision making (Scott, 
1998).  In this process, quantitative statistics serve as a principal instrument of statecraft, “used 
both to imagine society, the economy, and the nation and to lend to the exercise of public 
policy a semblance of rationality, control, and accountability” (Miller, 2005; pg. 406).  The 
concept of urban climate change, accordingly has gained relevance in policy settings, partly 
through methods to quantify and measure it. In this process, there is often an exclusive focus 
on the rate of global GHG emissions produced and reduced within a locality, and the use of that 
data to guide public decisions. The inclusion of health co-benefits and the use of local 
knowledge in the development of Oakland’s ECAP, therefore, provides an example of how this 
occurrence took place against the institutionalized use of GHG accounting statistics in 
environmental governance (Miller, 2005). This contestation of quantitative knowledge, or what 
is often referred to as ‘carbon fundamentalism’ in local climate action planning, was evident in 
the early stages of the Oakland ECAP, according to Aaron Lemer, one of OCAC’s steering 
committee members. 
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The ECAP was seen as an environmental justice and local green economic development strategy 
for the community and coalition. From the city’s standpoint, initially it was a bit of struggle to 
frame it in this manner. At first, they held a carbon fundamentalism that often comes with 
climate work, where people get focused just on the GHG emissions and they lose sight of the 
broader community benefits…But working closely with talented city staff, we were able to 
reframe it to the city council as a plan that could address global GHG emissions and also public 
health and equity (Aaron Lemer, 2011 – author interview).  
 
Thus, the construction of urban climate change in Oakland is the result of extensive 
experimentation with public participation in expert advisory processes. These processes create 
new local civic epistemologies that require experts to collaborate in multiscalar approaches 
with diverse stakeholders in society, including interdisciplinary experts and lay publics. In these 
processes, quantification functions primarily as a technology of visibility (Miller, 2005).  This is 
in contrast to other methods of civic epistemologies in the United States, in which 
quantification serves a technology of trust and accountability or of control (Miller, 2005; Scott, 
1989).  In the case of the urban climate change in Oakland, through the ECAP, environmental 
justice communities helped transform the environment into an object that is comprehended, 
measured and governed locally.   
 
The concept of civic epistemology, moreover, highlights the contested roles and rights of 
residents in regard to the production of public knowledge. Governments often strive to define 
environmental issues and the terms in which residents are included in relevant policy decisions 
and debates. This process influences which knowledge claims are more likely to be considered 
valid and used in environmental governance processes (Illes, 2007). This chapter adds to the 
emerging theoretical analysis of civic epistemologies by focusing on the interaction among 
experts and environmental justice groups in developing strategies that integrate climate change 
interventions with population health at the local level. With the case of urban climate change, I 
have shown how various actors gather, evaluate, and use scientific and public health 
knowledge in different ways when determining what impacts from climate change pose risks 
and require policy intervention. These variants of civic epistemologies may change between 
local communities, thereby helping to illustrate “how different regulatory systems differ in their 
underlying suppositions and policymaking processes” (Illes, 2007; pg. 373). Expert commissions 
typically limit the scope of data that they will consider in their deliberation and may be less 
open to resident input. Environmental justice groups, conversely, may demand definitions of 
climate change risks to include human health impacts, rather than only focusing on threats to 
city infrastructure and ecological systems (Table 8).  
 
The construction of urban climate change, accordingly, depends on how knowledge is produced 
and the interaction between power and heterogeneous actors in society. By focusing on the 
civic epistemologies of urban climate change, we can see how local knowledge emerges as 
supplements, and in some cases, alternatives to techno-scientific instruments. It can serve as a 
means to overcome problems of introducing universal science and a priori policy into various 
“local” contexts (Martello, 2001). In this process we understand that “global solutions to 
environmental governance cannot realistically be contemplated without at the same time 
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finding opportunities for local self-expression” (Jasanoff and Martello, 2004; pg. 5). The 
phenomenon of urban climate change in Oakland, in essence, is creating a distinct social order 
that is changing epistemic cultures and democratic societies.  This process is forcing 
professional experts and policymakers to give up some control over how climate change is 
defined and addressed at the local level, and how research is formulated and conducted. 
Oakland’s climate change policies are entwined with attempts to reimagine what the city 
stands for, and how environmental rights and justice is produced. 
 
 
As lay people help scientists [or experts/policymakers] to fill out the picture of the citizen, these 
people may reject the very notion of vulnerability as the organizing concept because this term tends 
to connote victimization and reactive ways of responding to global change. Citizens, if permitted to 
exercise a voice in the scientific process, might favor instead a concept such as resilience, which, 
for some, holds more positive connotations and implies a more proactive form of agency (Martello, 
2008; Pg. 112).  
 
 
 
                      Table 8: Civic Epistemologies of Oakland’s Climate Change 
 
Oakland Urban Climate Change 
 
Spatial frame  
 
Multiscalar:  Local/Regional + State/Global 
 
 
Climate Goals 
Co-benefits Potential: Co-pollutants + GHG emissions 
 
Knowledge + 
Expertise 
Expert-lay judgment 
 
Institutional 
Governance 
 
 
Contextual Framing: Community-based organizations, 
government agencies, businesses 
 
Definition of 
Climate Change 
Urban environment, ecosystems, adaptation and GHG mitigation, 
co-pollutants, public health, equity, cost-effectiveness  
Source: Adapted from Miller (2005, pg. 414).  
 
 
 
The diversity of experts that emerge in response to the phenomenon of global climate change 
can be seen as having strong connections to particular places and communities. Through the 
use of local knowledge in climate projects, disadvantaged groups can earn some degree of 
voice, representation and agency (Martello, 2008). As shown in Oakland, environmental justice 
communities are featured centrally in the city’s urban climate change interventions. EJ 
communities have also attained valuable recognition, both in terms of what they know about 
the socio-ecological dynamics of their environments and how they put that knowledge to use in 
the policymaking process to benefit their communities. 
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Section 3.7: Conclusion: Urban Climate Change and Community Well-Being - A Non-Linear 
Model of Expertise 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29 
 
 
The case study of climate change governance in Oakland demonstrates a transformative story 
in which environmental justice groups are creating new forms of knowledge and linking them to 
public decisions. Oakland’s ECAP represents a shifting of power and authority in environmental 
governance that traditionally favors techno-scientific practice. This process is also changing 
relationships and identities. Government experts are being moved from their position of 
control over the definition and production of technical knowledge about nature (Figure 29). It is 
important to note that these types of approaches, however, have limitations and are not easily 
scalable in all regions. Climate planning and science, as presented in this chapter, is likely only 
effectively influenced by lay publics that expend a significant amount of social capital to 
organize local coalitions, develop knowledge frameworks, and strategize on changing the terms 
of political discourse of climate policy. For disorganized communities, the opportunities of 
persuading a city to implement a CAP that integrates GHG reductions measures with public 
health and social equity are not likely to manifest. 
 
Therefore, as an emerging analytical and policy domain, urban climate change policy represents 
a series of challenges for scientists, city planners, lay publics, and policymakers. The 
combination of uncertain science, local relevance, and heterogeneous policy contexts requires 
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new experiments in environmental governance mechanisms that acknowledge the difficulty in 
localizing global climate change, while maintaining technical legitimacy and social authority 
(Corburn, 2009). This chapter illustrates how new experiments in environmental governance 
and knowledge production are linked to human self-understanding and social relations. To 
discover and address new knowledge about nature, institutionalized practices need to be 
revised in innovative ways. Urban climate change in Oakland, moreover, highlights a novel 
approach in environmental governance that values and reflects historical experience, culture, 
social practices, and lay experiments, which are quite different from knowledge produced 
through laboratory experiments or disciplined empirical observations.  
 
Oakland’s climate change, in essence, is a representation of the natural world that gained 
validity not through detachments from local context, but through mutually sustaining 
interaction between the senses of the is and the ought: of how things are and how they should 
be (Jasanoff, 2010). Epistemic claims of environmental science are often most trusted when 
they utilize practices that confer techno-scientific practices, but also the cultural practices of 
democratic politics and values.  Conventional climate policies, on this basis, are problematic 
because it separates the epistemic from the normative, divorcing is from ought.  
 
Crudely put, it detaches global fact from local value, projecting a new totalizing image of 
the world as it is, without regard for the layered investments that societies have made in 
worlds as they wish them to be. It therefore destabilizes knowledge at the same time as 
it seeks to stabilize it. To know climate change as science wishes it to be known; societies 
must let go of their familiar, comfortable modes of living with nature (Jasanoff, 2010; pg. 
236).  
 
 
In closing, the construction of climate change in Oakland provides an exemplar of the 
emergence of local knowledge as a resource for achieving greenhouse gas emission reductions, 
health co-benefits and community well-being.  Through the framework of civic epistemology, 
we understand how the definition of ‘expert’ is transformed and expanded to allow lay publics 
to be included in expert communities in developing conceptions and strategies about urban 
climate change. This chapter has shown how environmental justice groups are generating new 
data inputs for the localization of climate change that go beyond a priori approaches to climate 
policy by calling critical attention to the cultural and experiential dimension of knowledge 
production and local practice. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Contentious Capitol Climates: Conflict over the Local Scale of  
Global GHG Emissions  
 
 
 
In the preceding chapter, the civic epistemology of climate change included a geographic 
scale of the local. For civil society actors, there was little conflict in situating the 
phenomenon of climate change and its impacts in the streets of Oakland. Environmental 
justice groups collaborated with the city government to develop multiple conceptualizations 
of climate change and its corresponding policy responses. At the state Capitol, though, the 
legitimization of a local scale of climate change was highly contested when environmental 
justice advocates attempted to ‘rescale’ California’s landmark Global Warming Solutions Act 
in a method that delivered direct benefits to disadvantaged communities.  
 
In the legislative halls of the Capitol and the state’s regulatory bureaucracy, a commitment 
to carbon fundamentalism influences the definition of climate change. The pursuit of global 
GHG emissions reductions through market-based mechanisms often limits opportunities to 
realize public health co-benefits at the neighborhood scale. This chapter examines the 
debates and civic epistemologies surrounding manifestations of the impacts of climate 
change and the appropriate policy scale(s) to address the environmental problem. I will 
further, illustrate how the various scales in which the phenomenon is addressed produces 
very diverse benefits, consequences, and trade-offs.    
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Section 4.1: Introduction 
 
 
 In 2006, California lawmakers passed climate change legislation that went far beyond any other 
state in the country. Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32) requires the 
state to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG)56 emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and 80 percent of 
this baseline level by 2050 (Kaswan, 2008; Hanermann, 2008). To achieve this, AB 32 
‘authorized’ the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to establish a market-based mechanism, 
such as a cap-and-trade system. Under this system, the amount of emissions a power plant or 
industrial polluter can produce is “capped,” these facilities then must purchase credits (the 
trade) from the state to exceed the emissions cap. Facilities that purchase credits at established 
cap-and-trade auctions established by the state may remain in operation as they improve their 
equipment to reduce GHG emissions. Under this market-based approach, AB 32 directed the 
proceeds from credit sales (estimated to be several billions dollars over the next decade) to go 
to programs to carry out the law’s purposes. Such activities include the reduction of global GHG 
emissions, promoting the green innovation economy and spurring job creation within the state 
(Hanermann, 2008). 
 
AB 32 is distinguishable from legislation passed by subnational governments in that the climate 
change law requires the state to “consider” the impact that implementation of GHG reduction 
measures will have on communities that are already adversely affected by air pollution 
(California Health and Safety Code, section §38565). This approach was adopted because 
California EJ advocates soundly rejected the idea that neoliberal practices57 alone can address 
environmental health inequities. During the drafting of AB 32, EJ advocates strategically fought 
to require the state to explore various options in addition to a cap-and-trade system for 
reducing GHG emissions and achieving public health goals. As a result, AB 32 included the 
following key environmental justice provisions: (1) an Environmental Justice Advisory 
Committee (EJAC) to advise CARB on the development of measures to reduce GHG emissions; 
(2) a requirement to hold public workshops in areas of California with the “most significant 
exposure to air pollutants, including, but not limited to communities with minority populations, 
communities with low-income populations, or both”; and, (3) a Community Empowerment 
Amendment designed to provide opportunities for disadvantaged communities to participate in 
and benefit from public and private investment in GHG reduction programs. (California Health 
and Safety Code, sections §38565; 38591).  
 
                                                           
56 As previously noted in chapter 1, AB 32 defines greenhouse gases to include the following gases: carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perflurocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, nitrogen trifluoride (California 
Health and Safety Code, section §38505(g)). While the measure regulates these seven gases, consistent with 
carbon fundamentalism, most regulators tend to focus on carbon dioxide since it is the most prevalent contributor 
to climate change. 
57 According to Liverman and Vilas (2006), neoliberalism is often defined as a political philosophy of free markets 
and less government. The mainstream argument in favor of neoliberalism “is framed in terms of the efficiency of 
the market in contrast to the inefficiencies and high costs of government interventions” (Pg. 329). 
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When AB 32 moved from the Legislature to the regulatory rule-making process at CARB, 
however, the fundamental questions of environmental justice were ultimately disregarded. 
These unexplored questions included concerns voiced by advocates that the state’s adoption of 
a ‘cap-and-trade’ system could create geographically uneven reductions in the co-pollutants of 
climate change (i.e., ozone, particulate matter, and nitrogen oxides), while limiting the 
opportunity for health co-benefits at the neighborhood scale. This tension between the law’s 
purported focus on environmental justice and the perceived uneven character of its cap-and-
trade mechanism eventually became a source of discord between EJ advocates, mainstream 
environmental organizations, and state agencies (Environmental Justice advocates, 2013 – 
author interviews; London, et al., 2013). This culminated in seven of the eleven state appointed 
members of the EJAC signing onto a lawsuit against the state, alleging violation of substantive 
aspects of the legislation, such as failing to study alternatives to a cap-and-trade program in AB 
32’s implementation plan. Through a court order, EJ advocates eventually forced CARB to 
conduct a study of alternatives, but it was a hollow victory. CARB’s compliance with the 
judgment amounted to merely producing the court-mandated analysis while maintaining that 
its selection of a cap-and-trade mechanism was the only valid and feasible policy direction, 
based on a thorough consideration of all available alternatives (CARB, 2011a).   
 
In this chapter, I argue that California’s implementation of AB 32 represents a form of what 
Jessop (2002) and Holifield (2004; 2007) characterize as a ‘neocommunitarian’ strategy for 
sustaining the project of neoliberalism. Instead of attempting to equitably redistribute 
environmental impacts, this strategy involves efforts to build trust in environmental justice 
communities through community engagement processes and the promise of incentives to 
encourage economic development in disadvantaged neighborhoods. As implemented by CARB, 
California’s approach to environmental justice and climate change emphasized advisory public 
participation mechanisms as a method to manage EJ communities that likely would oppose the 
adoption of a cap-and-trade system. This approach pledges that GHG emissions reduction 
strategies will not only improve public health but also stimulate new private and public 
investment in disadvantaged communities. Throughout this chapter, however, I show how the 
deployment of a neocommunitarian strategy was in direct conflict with the techno-scientific 
regulations and neoliberal mechanisms adopted by CARB. These mechanisms consistently 
scaled-up the phenomenon of climate change to the global. As a result, they obscured the local 
scale of environmental injustices and prevented direct investments and health co-benefits in 
disadvantaged communities. 
 
The California experience provides a strategic understanding of the divergent civic 
epistemologies state experts and EJ advocates held in regards to how the politics of scale, the 
market, and race underpin the appropriate interventions in which to tackle climate change. In 
the next section, I first provide a background on the role Democratic Latino legislators and EJ 
advocates played during the drafting of AB 32 in localizing climate change to focus on public 
health and job creation in the most polluted communities. Secondly, I analyze how the local 
scale of environmental justice and climate change were challenged when AB 32 moved from 
the Legislature to the state regulatory process, an arena that privileges global kinds of 
knowledge. 
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Section 4.2:   Latinos Legislating the Climate  
 
 
Climate change is a reality and it puts in danger our sustainability. It should be of special 
importance to Latinos because Latinos for the most part live in the inner cities and are exposed to 
many carbon-based [and toxic] gases from industry, which not only impact the environment but 
public health.  
-- California Speaker Fabian Núñez speaking to the National Latino Congreso shortly after California became 
the first state in the U.S. to adopt a comprehensive program of regulatory and market-based mechanisms to 
achieve reductions in GHG emissions (September 11, 2006).58  
 
 
The person behind the state’s landmark law to curb climate change does not fit the 
stereotypical image of a California environmentalist: a Brie-eating, Chardonnay-sipping, Prius 
driving surfer whose environmental priorities center on oceans and wildlife. Rather, in former 
California Assembly Speaker Fabian Núñez, we get a different view of environmentalism – a 
view that explicitly links climate change to a public health context. As a child growing up in the 
low-income Latino immigrant communities of San Diego, Núñez saw firsthand the impact that 
poor air quality could have on residents. Of particular note were the young children in such 
neighborhoods who suffer from disproportionately high rates of asthma and lead poisoning 
(Castro, 2013). So when Assembly Member Fran Pavley, a silver-haired environmental maven 
who hailed from a wealthy, predominately Anglo coastal district that included Malibu, 
approached Núñez about her Assembly Bill 32, he was personally eager to help (Núñez, 2006). 
In fact, Núñez’s agreement to take over as the principal co-author of the legislation, prevented 
the measure from continuing to languish in the state Legislature amid opposition from 
moderate Democrats. Chief among the opponents of AB 32 were members of the California 
Legislative Latino Caucus (Senior Capitol staff member, 2013 -author interview).  
 
California’s new demographic reality as a majority-minority state, made the Latino Legislative 
Caucus increasingly influential in passing important environmental legislation.59  As the caucus 
grew, many of its new members came from more politically moderate districts in the Central 
Valley and Orange County, in addition to traditional urban Latino population centers.60 New 
suburban and rural Latino seats in the Legislature in the mid-2000s were often from swing 
districts, where Democratic voter registration only led Republicans by a few percentage points. 
As a result, these legislators had to engage in a delicate balance between environmental 
stewardship and promoting economic development to remain in office (Senior Capitol staff 
member, 2013 – author interview; Adler, 2013; Bernstein, 2013). 
                                                           
58 Bowels (2006). Assembly Speaker Fabian Núñez puts Global Warming into a Public Health Context. The Press 
Enterprise.   
59 According to 2005 Census data, almost 44 percent of California’s population at the time AB 32 was passed, were 
non-Hispanic whites, with more than 35 percent Latino, 12 percent Asian, and nearly 7 percent African American. 
In 2006 the Latino Legislative Caucus represented 23 percent (28 members) of the state Legislature (State of 
California, Official California Legislative Information, 2006).  
60 In this chapter, the term “member” refers to both state Assembly Members and Senators.  
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Consequently, initial opposition to AB 32 hinged on its lack of relevancy to low-income 
communities of color and the potential for job creation. The legislation was sponsored by two 
mainstream national environmental organizations, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF). Many EJ advocates and members of the 
Latino Legislative Caucus viewed NRDC and EDF as “elitist” organizations. They were seen as 
promoting environmental legislation that often did not directly address inequities in 
communities of color or the potential consequences of environmental regulations on 
California’s low-income workers (Former Latino Legislative Caucus Assembly member, 2013 - 
author interview).61 In this sense, Democratic Latino legislators particularly from swing districts, 
were reluctant to take a political risk in supporting controversial legislation that had no 
relevance to the actual lived experiences of the environmental and economic impacts in 
communities of color. An environmental justice advocate, who routinely works on legislative 
issues in the Capitol, insightfully noted the dynamic at play between Latino legislators and 
environmentalists from mainstream groups like NRDC and EDF: 
 
With the changing demographics, if you look at it just from a political perspective, the number 
of districts that are being represented by people of color has doubled, tripled in the last ten 
years. But in terms of support for the environment, a lot of the representatives are wishy-
washy and on the fence and susceptible to being influenced by the oil industry or Chamber of 
Commerce….because they haven’t heard of what are the environmental benefits for their 
districts...Mainstream environmentalists don’t have any history in these districts, they are not 
relevant, they are greeted with skepticism. The California Chamber of Commerce is very 
persuasive because they frame [environmental] programs as job killers (Environmental Justice 
Advocate, 2013 - author interview). 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Graphic from the California Chamber of Commerce Job Killer Bill List website (2013).  
                                                           
61 This trend continues today. In the 2013 legislative session, key members of the Latino Legislative Caucus, 
including its co-chair, Senator Ricardo Lara were accused of derailing Senate Bill (SB) 405, which sought to ban 
plastic shopping bags statewide (Rosenhall, 2013; Perez and Gutierrez, 2013). During a lengthy floor debate, Lara, 
was the first Democrat to speak in opposition to the bill, stating it would result in the loss of 700 jobs at a plastic 
bag factory in his district. “These are hard-working immigrant families who are undereducated, monolingual, and 
are not going to have an opportunity to find another type of employment.” Backing up Lara’s argument, four more 
Latino Democratic legislators spoke against the legislation, including Senator Kevin De Leon, who stated “So I 
consider myself an environmentalist, but this is not an abstract concept to me. These are real jobs. These are real 
lives” (Senate Floor Session, SB 405 Vote - May 30, 2013. Source: California Channel archives).  
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While the Asian Pacific Islander and African American legislative caucuses had a presence in the 
Capitol at the time, their membership were much smaller. Furthermore, in a review of strategy 
documents of AB 32’s sponsors, NRDC only listed the Latino Legislative Caucus among the four 
influential legislative voting blocks to strategically lobby. The other voting groups included: (1) 
‘Business Democrats’ (which had significant overlap with Latino members); (2) ‘Moderate 
Republicans’; and, (3) ‘Strong Environmental Supporters’ (NRDC E2, 2006).  
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Section 4.3:   Ensuring the Local Relevance of Climate Change  
 
 
Keenly aware of the contentious political realities in the Capitol, Assembly Speaker Núñez 
sought to craft legislation that addressed the diverse needs of all Democratic members and 
specifically the Latino Legislative Caucus. He knew that focusing AB 32 on GHG emissions 
reductions and abstract notions of global environmental protection alone were not enough. 
During an election year, such an approach could place vulnerable swing district members at risk 
of voting for a bill that was perceived as a ‘job killer’ by powerful business interests (California 
Chamber of Commerce, 2006).62  Working with key environmental justice advocates and the 
Latino Legislative Caucus, Núñez helped rescale the debate of climate change to focus on two 
elements: (1) public health, particularly air pollution and respiratory diseases that are epidemic 
in California’s low-income communities of color; and, (2) the jobs and economic opportunity 
that would flow from an investment in a clean sustainable economy (Former Latino Legislative 
Caucus Assembly member, 2013 - author interview).  
 
These efforts were further supported by EDF’s hiring of a Latino lobbyist who had worked in the 
Capitol for various elected officials, to focus exclusively on legislators of color and outreach to 
EJ groups. The lobbyist, Rafael Aguilera, focused his efforts on key swing members in the 
Legislature, stressing the link between localized climate change, job creation, and public health 
(Aguilera, 2013 –author interview).63 In this work, Aguilera also helped address concerns of 
environmental justice groups when Núñez floated draft language that would have ‘mandated’ 
market-based mechanisms, such as cap-and-trade, to achieve the goals of AB 32. This 
amendment was put forward at the request of then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who 
threatened to veto the legislation if it did not mandate cap-and-trade.64 
 
The EJ groups strongly opposed market-based mechanisms and threatened to voice their 
concerns to sympathetic members of color who were already on the fence over supporting the 
controversial legislation. Jane Williams, director of the statewide EJ group, California 
Communities Against Toxics, argued that a cap-and-trade system could create geographically 
uneven reductions in GHG emissions and the co-pollutants of climate change. Moreover, it 
would limit the opportunity for health co-benefits at the neighborhood scale (Figure 31).65 
                                                           
62 Each year the California Chamber of Commerce releases a list of "job killer" bills to identify legislation that it 
believes will “decimate economic and job growth in California.” The Chamber tracks the bills throughout the 
legislative session and works to “educate legislators about the serious consequences these bills will have on the 
state.” In 2006, AB 32 was listed as Chamber’s number one priority bill to defeat in the legislature (California 
Chamber of Commerce, 2013).  
63 After the passage of AB 32, Rafael Aguilera went on to serve as a legislative director and chief of staff to several 
moderate Latino Assembly Members.  
64 Though the proposed amendment was never linked to any mainstream environmental group, EDF was also 
publically known as a staunch supporter of cap-and-trade (Environmental Justice Advocate, 2013 - author 
interview).  
65 California Communities Against Toxics, California Environmental Rights Alliance, California Environmental Justice 
Working Group (now renamed as the California Environmental Justice Alliance or CEJA) were the main 
organizations representing interests of EJ communities during  the drafting of AB 32. CEJA is comprised of the 
  
97 
 
Companies operating high-polluting facilities, for example, could buy pollution allowances66 
from another company that had not exceeded their cap and continue running the facility, which 
emit both carbon dioxide and other co-pollutants that contribute to localized air pollution 
(Martin, 2006). Firms with the most antiquated facilities generally emit the highest amount of 
emissions and are often located in low-income communities of color. Environmental justice 
advocates claimed that these companies were likely to purchase the most emissions allowances 
(Kaswan, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Cap-and-Trade Process. Source: Trumbull and the San Francisco Chronicle (2012). 
 
                                                           
following organizations: Asian Pacific Environmental Network (APEN), Center for Community Action and Health 
Justice (CCAEJ), Communities for a Better Environment (CBE), Environmental Health Coalition (EHC), People 
Organized to Demand Economic and Environmental Rights (PODER).   
66 AB 32 defines ‘allowance’ as “an authorization to emit, during a specified year, up to one ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent” (California Health and Safety Code §38505(a)).  
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To support this claim, EJ advocates pointed to a study of the Regional Clean Air Incentives 
Market (RECLAIM), an emissions trading program developed to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions 
in Southern California. The study indicated that the RECLAIM program may have increased 
nitrogen oxides emissions in Wilmington, a working class, Latino immigrant neighborhood of 
Los Angeles (Figure 32), while reducing emissions on a region-wide scale (Lejano and Hirose, 
2005). According to another study by Drury et al. (1999), one regulation under the RECLAIM 
program allowed licensed car scrappers to purchase and destroy older, high polluting vehicles 
in exchange for emissions credits from the South Coast Air Quality Monitoring District 
(SCAQMD) that could be sold to oil refineries. The study reported that four oil refineries 
purchased a majority of the emissions credits to avoid the cost of installing pollution reduction 
technologies in Wilmington. As a result of the trading scheme, local residents and workers were 
exposed to benzene (a human carcinogen), and other volatile organic compounds contained in 
the emissions. The authors of the study claimed that these emissions could have been 
mitigated at the time by readily available pollution reduction technologies (Drury et al., 1999). 
 
 
 
Figure 32: (a) NOx concentrations in 1996 Wilmington, California (with RECLAIM); (b) NOx concentrations in 1996 in 
Wilmington, California (without RECLAIM); (c) NOx gap map for 1996 in Wilmington, California.   
Source: Lejano and Hirose (2005; Pg. 372) 
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Based on these examples, EJ advocates argued that the state needed to develop a more 
effective policy approach for regulating emissions sources that contribute to both climate 
change and toxic air pollution. An exclusive focus on reducing GHG emissions, without regard to 
health co-benefits that can be achieved through the lowering of co-pollutants, would ensure 
that while air quality improves at the regional scale, the air in environmental justice 
communities could worsen (Morello-Frosch et al., 2009).  
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Section 4.4: Community Empowerment and Public Health in AB 32  
 
 
The registered opposition of EJ groups provided a potentially convenient excuse for wavering 
legislators to avoid supporting AB 32 (Senior Capitol staffer, 2013- author interview). To 
appease EJ groups and prevent the loss of key swing votes, Speaker Núñez dropped the draft 
provision that would have mandated California to adopt a cap-and-trade mechanism, despite 
the governor’s veto threat. Eventually, the Democratic Legislature and Republican governor 
agreed on a statewide emissions cap for 2020; however, they could not reach agreement in the 
statue as to what that entailed. As a result, they collectively evaded the issue, delegating to 
CARB key decisions over implementing the state’s GHG emissions reduction strategies. One 
such decision left to CARB was whether the board would allow either market-based 
mechanisms or command-and-control regulations, which EJ groups preferred (EJ advocates, 
2013 –author interviews; Rabe, 2007).67  
 
Moreover, the strong influence of EJ advocates, yield key environmental justice provisions in 
the bill’s final version. These provisions required CARB to the extent feasible, to “consider” 
cumulative emissions impacts in communities adversely affected by air pollution, and design 
any market-based mechanism to maximize co-benefits in the state and prevent increases in the 
emissions of toxic air pollutants (California Health and Safety Code, section §38570) (Table 9). 
The lobbying efforts by EJ advocates are significant because scientists consider, greenhouse 
gases to be global pollutants that mix uniformly in the atmosphere and therefore have “no 
direct public health impacts.” They do not have localized effects like sulfur dioxide or lead 
(CARB, 2008).68 As a result, most climate policy strategies worldwide focus almost exclusively 
on the potential to reduce the rate of increase in atmospheric concentrations of global GHG 
emissions. They are adopted without regard to the localized human health benefits that can be 
achieved through policies that reduce GHG emissions from sources that also emit toxic air 
pollutants (Jochem and Madlener, 2003). Furthermore, EJ advocates, through their Latino 
legislative allies, helped ensure that issues of equity were not excluded when regulators were 
considering which mitigation and reduction mechanisms to adopt.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
67 Command-and-control regulation refers to environmental policy that relies on direct government regulation 
(permission, prohibition, standard setting, and enforcement) as opposed to financial incentives, that is, economic 
instruments of cost internalization (OECD, 2001).  
68 Exposure to GHG emissions has human health impacts in concentrated form, such as their use in the workplace 
(WDHS, 2013). However, outdoor exposure levels are considered to be de minimis; GHG emissions dilute as they 
mix uniformly in the atmosphere (CARB, 2008). 
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Environmental Justice Concepts Corresponding AB 32 Legislative Language  
Use of Market-based Mechanisms Authorizes but does not mandate CARB to adopt market-based 
mechanisms to comply with AB 32 regulations. Requires the state 
to consider various options in addition to a cap-and-trade 
system.  
 
Public Health Connection Prior to the inclusion of any market-based mechanism, CARB 
must  
(1) Consider the potential for direct, indirect and cumulative 
emission impacts from these mechanisms, including 
localized impacts in communities that are already 
adversely impacted by air pollution. 
(2) Design any market-based compliance mechanism to 
prevent any increase in the emissions of toxic air 
contaminants or criteria air pollutants. 
(3) Maximize additional environmental, health and economic 
benefits for California, as appropriate. 
 
EJ and Public Participation  (1) Requires the institutionalization of an Environmental 
Justice Advisory Committee (EJAC) to advise CARB on the 
implementation of the AB 32 Scoping Plan.  
(2) Requires public workshops to be held in regions that 
have the most significant exposure to air pollutants. 
Community Empowerment 
Amendment  
Requires opportunities for disadvantaged communities to 
participate and benefit from public and private investment from 
the GHG reduction programs established by the Scoping Plan.  
Table 9: Environmental Justice and AB 32. Source: California Health and Safety Code, sections §38570 and 38591.  
 
 
With the principle of equity driving their efforts, the environmental justice advocates secured 
two additional provisions in AB 32 (Table 9). The first provision required the institutionalization 
of an Environmental Justice Advisory Committee (EJAC) to advise CARB on the implementation 
of the Scoping Plan (the proposed framework for achieving the AB 32’s GHG reduction targets). 
While the inclusion of an environmental justice advisory committee is not unique to 
environmental governance, its codification as one of two committees specifically mandated in 
the bill is symbolically significant, as well as the composition of the EJAC itself (Sze et al., 
2009).69 The committee is required to include representatives from California communities with 
significant exposure to air pollution, particular attention paid to minority and low-income 
communities (California Health and Safety Code, section §38591).  
 
 
 
                                                           
69 AB 32 also mandates CARB to create the Economic and Technology Advancement Advisory Committee (ETAAC) 
and instructs ETAAC to advise on activities that will facilitate investment in and implementation of technological 
research and development opportunities under California’s Climate Change program (California Health and Safety 
Code, section §38590). 
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                            The Community Empowerment Amendment in AB 32 
 
The state board shall ensure that the greenhouse gas emission reduction rules, regulations, 
programs, mechanism, and incentives under its jurisdiction, where applicable and to the 
extent feasible, direct public and private investment toward the most disadvantaged 
communities in California and provide an opportunity for small business, schools, affordable 
housing associations, and other community institutions to participate in and benefit from 
statewide efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (California Health and Safety Code, 
section §38591). 
 
 
AB 32 also included a provision in section §38591 known as the “Community Empowerment 
Amendment”. This provision is intended to require the state to allow disadvantaged 
communities to directly participate in and benefit from the AB 32 GHG reductions plan. It 
further mandates that CARB should seek to direct public and private investment, such as green 
jobs and renewable energy projects to the state’s most disadvantaged communities. The 
amendment was conceived as a method to mitigate gaps in environmental and economic well-
being in disadvantaged communities, relative to statewide efforts to reduce global GHG 
emissions (Boyce, 2009). While this EJ supported provision sought to stimulate private and 
public investment in disadvantaged communities, Democratic legislators had to contend with 
how exactly AB 32 could reduce GHG emissions and promote technological innovation for 
California’s economy as a whole. As such, this pressure increasingly created a conflict between 
“community empowerment” and “neoliberal” approaches to investment.   
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Section 4.5: Carbon Markets & Neoliberal Latino Lawmakers 
 
 
While appeasing EJ groups, Assembly Speaker Núñez and the sponsors of AB 32 also had figh 
opponents’ allegations that climate change legislation was a “job killer.” Traditional business 
groups, such as the California Chamber of Commerce and Farm Bureau Federation vocally 
opposed the legislation in a key election year. The Chamber began a multi-million dollar 
campaign that included radio advertising and targeted mail in competitive legislative districts to 
torpedo support for AB 32 as the 2006 legislative session came to a close. Opponents argued 
that AB 32 would force companies out of California to avoid regulations, or compel many 
businesses to curtail production to meet them. Similarly, they warned that AB 32 would force 
electricity utilities to increase prices as they sought cleaner energy sources (Martin, 2006; 
California Chamber of Commerce, 2006).   
 
To counter these claims and insulate vulnerable Democratic caucus members, Assembly 
Speaker Núñez, mounted a counter campaign with the aid of EDF and NRDC. They sought to 
convince cautious legislators that AB 32 would spur innovation and could uplift California’s 
economy, mimicking the state’s early adopter success in the biomedical and high-technology 
industries. To bolster these claims, they enlisted the support of several influential venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs, who argued that new climate change regulations could create a 
boom in industries such as solar power and biofuels, possibly powering the state’s economy for 
decades. AB 32 proponents also circulated a University of California, Berkeley economic study 
that estimated reducing GHG emissions in the state could create 17,000 new jobs and add $60 
billion (Table 10) to the gross state product by 2020 (Roland-Holst, 2006).70  Governor 
Schwarzenegger supplemented these efforts by creating a special task force, the Climate Action 
Team (CAT), which was charged with identifying methods to reduce GHG emissions. This task 
force found that a cap-and-trade program could add more than 80,000 new jobs over the next 
several decades (Martin, 2006). Eventually, these efforts not only helped convince members to 
vote in favor of the legislation but to also sign on as co-authors. Of the 28 members of the 
Latino Legislative Caucus, 21 signed on as co-authors of AB 32; all but two members of the 
caucus ultimately voted for the legislation (State of California, Official Legislative Information).71  
 
                                                           
70 Separately, University of California economists organized a letter to the legislature and Gov. Arnold 
Schwarzenegger urging state leaders to accelerate climate action. It called emissions caps a "particularly potent 
strategy" and warned that "the most expensive things we can do is nothing." The letter was signed by 60 Ph.D. 
economists from across California - including three Nobel laureates (UC Berkeley News, 2006). 
71 Assembly Member Nicole Parra, from the Central Valley, was the only Latino Legislative Caucus member to vote 
against the bill. From her first election in 2002, and her subsequent two elections in 2004 and 2006, her seat was 
consistently ranked as the most vulnerable Democratic seat in the state Assembly. Parra won the 2002 election 
over Republican businessman Dean Gardner by 266 votes. Los Angeles state Senator Gil Cedillo was absent when 
AB 32 was scheduled for a vote (State of California, Official Legislative Information, 2006; Senior Capitol staffer, 
2013 - author interview).  
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Table 10: Macroeconomic Impacts of 8 CAT Policies Plus a 2020 GHG CAP72 
Annual Impact 8 CAT policies + Cap 8 CAT policies + Cap 
w/Innovation Incentives 
Gross State Product (2006 dollars) +$60 Billion  
(+2.4%) 
+$74 Billion 
(+3.1%) 
Employment (thousands) 
   % change from 2020 baseline 
+17  
(+.08%) 
+89 
(+0.44%) 
Source: Roland-Holst, 2006; Pg. 3  
 
 
Interestingly, the campaign to link AB 32 to green innovation and economic development was 
successful enough to virtually eclipse other arguments in support of the legislation for health 
co-benefits and direct investment in disadvantaged communities. For example, during the final 
vote for AB 32, the vast majority of Assembly Members speaking in favor of the legislation 
mainly commented on the potential for protecting the environment while creating thousands 
of new jobs in California (Assembly Floor Debate, August 30, 2006; California Channel archives). 
Assembly Speaker Núñez’s closing statements before the final vote best captured these 
sentiments.73  
 
Necessity is the mother of invention. And if you don’t create the demand [AB 32 GHG 
reduction regulations] in the market for new technologies, you are never going to get 
it…Today we do have an opportunity to be bold. To look into the future with not fear or 
trepidation but to look into the future with the courage that California has always had when 
it comes to innovation. When it comes to new technology, when it comes to taking the right 
risks that in the end have made this state the sixth largest economy in the world…This is 
going to be good for California. It’s going to create over 17,000 jobs in less than six years. 
With over $6 billion in investments, and it’s the right thing to do.     
-- Assembly Floor Session, AB 32 Concurrence Vote, August 30, 2006.  Source: California Channel 
archives.  
 
 
Despite the lack of a mandated a cap-and-trade program, AB 32’s linkage to economic 
development created a notion among legislators that a market-based mechanism was the only 
way to create the demand for the tens of thousands of jobs the legislation promised. Many 
legislators effectively engaged in a promotion of neoliberal discourse or what is also known as 
‘market environmentalism.’ The term “market environmentalism” refers to a mode of resource 
management that proponents contend promises “a virtuous fusion of economic growth, 
efficiency and environmental conservation” via market means (Bakker, 2005, Pg. 543).  
                                                           
72 In April 2006, the California Environmental Protection Agency’s Climate Action Team (CAT) released a set of GHG 
mitigation policies recommended to the California executive and legislature for implementation to meet the 2020 
and 2050 emission targets. These recommendations included a cap-and-trade system (CAT, 2006).   
73 AB 32 passed the Assembly on a 46 to 31 vote, with only one member of the Republican Caucus, Assembly 
Member Shirley Horton supporting it. Horton won reelection in 2006 and was termed out of office in 2008. A 
Democrat now represents her moderate San Diego district. Only 41 votes were needed to pass AB 32 and send it 
to the governor for signature (State of California, Official Legislative Information).  
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A basic assumption under neoliberalism is that environmental degradation is caused by the 
failure of unregulated markets to assign adequate property rights and values to natural 
resources (Bailey, 2007; Pg. 532). Neoliberal policies assume that the environment is best 
managed when resources rights are “definable, defendable, and divestible” (Lieverman and 
Vilas, 2006; Pg. 329). This mode of reasoning has made a cap-and-trade system seem so 
appealing to many policymakers and mainstream environmentalists. It focuses on the supply 
side of the pollution equation, with governments allocating emissions allowances to polluters. 
As a result, firms receive unfettered opportunity to trade allowances and to concentrate 
abatement where it can be achieved most ‘cheaply.’ “This price signal is also claimed to 
stimulate innovation” as firms compete to benefit from the sale of new technologies (Bailey, 
2007; Pg. 532).       
 
While neoliberalism is often perceived as a “powerful ideological and political project in global 
governance,” it is not hegemonic in any way (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004; Pg. 275). Instead, 
as with the case of climate change in California, it can be viewed as a result of several 
competing processes, such as the commodification and marketization of nature, and 
institutionalization of environmental justice goals (Albrecht, 2013). Commodification and 
marketization both reference processes in which “phenomena that were previously shielded 
from market exchange” (Castree, 2008, Pg. 142), such as GHG emissions are given values so 
that “invaluable and complex ecosystems are reduced to commodities through pricing” 
(Heynen and Robbins, 2005; Pg. 6). Combining these concepts with issues of justice, however, 
takes a “special kind of neoliberalism to make room for the concerns of the U.S. grassroots 
environmental justice movement” (Holifield, 2007; Pg. 203).  
 
For example, the linking of neoliberalism with environmental justice was first identified by 
Holifield’s (2007) study of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Superfund 
hazardous waste site remediation program. He contends that the EPA’s approach to 
environmental justice incorporated a ‘neocommunitarian’ strategy for sustaining 
neoliberalism.74 Instead of attempting to redistribute environmental impacts more equitably, 
this strategy involved efforts to build trust in environmental justice communities through 
community engagement processes and the promise of incentives to encourage economic 
development in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Jessop, 2002). Neocommunitarian strategy is 
characterized as underscoring:  
 
The neocommunitarian strategy focuses on less competitive economic spaces (such as inner 
cities, deindustrializing cities, or cities at the bottom of urban hierarchies) with the greatest 
risk of losing from the zero-sum competition for external resources…It aims to redress the 
imbalance between private affluence and public poverty, to create local demand, to re-skill the 
long-term unemployed and reintegrate them into an expanded labor market, to address some 
of the problems of urban regeneration (e.g., in social housing, insulation, and energy-saving), 
to provide a different kind of spatiotemporal fix for small and medium-sized enterprises to 
                                                           
74 See Liverman 2004; Bakker 2005; and Castree 2006 for greater elaboration on the consequences of increased 
private-sector involvement for environmental governance, social equity, and the valuation of nonhuman natures.  
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regenerate trust within the community, and to promote empowerment (Jessop, 2002; Pg. 
463). 
 
 
According to Holifield (2007), the U.S. EPA’s environmental justice strategy was developed in 
response to President Bill Clinton’s 1994 Executive Order 12898 - “Federal Actions to Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-income Populations.” Under this 
executive order, federal agencies “replaced the aggressive neoliberalism of the Reagan era with 
what might be called a ‘kindler gentler’ neoliberal policies” (Holifield, 2007; pg. 203). Thus, 
Clinton’s neocommunitarian approach, contrasts with the concept of “roll-back” neoliberalism, 
which emphasizes gutting government regulations and dismantling institutions rooted in the 
Keynesian welfare state (Peck and Tickell, 2002). 
 
Holifield (2004; 2007) describes the U.S. EPA’s deployment of a neocommunitarian strategy as a 
method to make the idea of environmental justice, often cited in EJ activist discourse as a 
challenge to market-driven environmental policy, compatible with the process of 
neoliberalization. Though the strategy did not incorporate the more “radical demands” of the 
environmental justice movement (see “Principles of Environmental Justice,” 1991), he asserts it 
directly addressed numerous EJ themes, such as community empowerment, citizen 
involvement, and economic self-sufficiency. For example, although the U.S. EPA did not accept 
demands for full democratic participation in environmental decision-making, the agency made 
“public participation” central to its environmental justice policy. It implemented public 
participation as a form of improved public relations, making the agency’s decisions more 
“accessible” and allowing the public to submit recommendations through “carefully managed 
community involvement” (2007; Pg. 204). Secondly, the U.S. EPA treated environmental 
injustices as an opportunity to create private-sector jobs and to stimulate new investment in 
neglected communities. The agency established grant programs for EJ communities, created 
job-training programs for cleaning up hazardous waste, and provided incentives to redevelop 
brownfield sites (Holifield, 2004; 2007). The EPA’s incorporation of environmental justice under 
a neocommunitarian strategy provided subtle ways to bring EJ communities within the fold of 
the project of neoliberalism -- by working to earn their trust in EPA decision-making, and in 
offering people new opportunities to develop their economic and political self-sufficiency 
(Holifield, 2004).   
 
This example is relevant to California’s drafting of AB 32, in that it also required a ‘special kind 
of neoliberalism’ to make room for the concerns of environmental justice. The goal to manage 
GHG emissions reduction strategies to include local benefits to disadvantaged communities had 
to be juxtaposed within a strategy that prioritized market-based mechanisms critical to 
sustaining a innovative statewide economy. The engagement with a neocommunitarian 
strategy was most evident in Speaker Núñez’s closing remarks before the passage of AB 32 and 
his speech one week later at the National Latino Congreso (a major summit of Latino elected 
officials and community leaders). For example, in his Assembly floor speech in support of AB 32 
on August 30, 2006, Núñez explicitly endorsed a cap-and-trade program. He asserted the 
virtues of neoliberal approaches and spoke as if it were a forgone conclusion that a market-
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based mechanism was the best method for attracting innovation and private investment to 
California. 
 
 
Members this is a bi-partisan bill…that has good corporate citizens supporting it, including 
Pacific Gas & Electric, which has a third of the utility customers in the state of California. They 
have found a way to support this bill because they know that they are already investing in 
those new technologies. They are already investing in those innovations that will ultimately 
put more equity in their pocket when this market mechanism kicks in and we develop a cap-
and-trade system. 
   -- Assembly Floor Session, AB 32 Concurrence Vote, August 30, 2006.  Source: California Channel archives.  
 
 
Compare these statements with his speech on September 8, 2006 to hundreds of Latino elected 
leaders and community members at the National Latino Congreso. While never specifically 
mentioning a cap-and-trade program, Núñez gave a powerful speech in which he linked AB 32 
with economic development and the health of those exposed to air pollution. Most 
importantly, consistent with Holifield’s interpretation of neocommunitarianism, Núñez (2006) 
framed AB 32 as an opportunity to promote community empowerment and job creation in 
Latino communities: 
 
 
I’m excited to tell you leaders from all over the country what we’re doing here in California to 
slow climate change. Because I know our success means you can do it too. And that not only 
means better health for our planet, it also means more jobs and opportunities in our 
communities as we develop the green technologies to combat climate change…One of my 
hopes for AB 32, with the broad support that has come out behind this bill, is that we are 
witnessing if not the birth, the maturity of a coalition between Latino leaders and communities 
and environmental advocates and communities that will impact policy for years to come.  
 
 
In the next section, I examine how the neocommunitarian strategy placed environmental 
justice groups on an uneven playing field when AB 32 moved from the Legislature to the 
regulatory implementation process at CARB (an agency over which the governor has some 
direct oversight authority).75 As AB 32 went through the regulatory phase, it seemed that the 
governor, and most importantly, CARB, the state agency charged with implementing the law, 
had already determined that a cap-and-trade program was the best approach to achieve 
California’s ambitious GHG reduction goals. In this process, the local scale of climate change, 
public health, and community empowerment were significantly challenged.     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
75 While the California Air Resources Board (CARB) is generally considered an independent body, the Governor 
proposes its annual budget, appoints members to its board and selects its chair (subject to state Senate 
confirmation), and hires and fires executive staff.  
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Section 4.6: The Fait Accompli in CARB’s Scoping Plan 
 
 
The man behind AB 32 was genuinely motivated by his lived experienced growing up in some of 
the most polluted neighborhoods in Southern California. However, as the principal author of 
California’s ambitious climate change law and as the leader of the state Assembly, Fabian 
Núñez had to engage in a delicate balance between environmental stewardship, ensuring public 
health benefits in EJ communities, and promoting economic development statewide. Without 
his pragmatic approach to policymaking, it was likely the measure would have failed amidst a 
looming national economic recession and the state’s structural budget deficits (in the tens of 
billions of dollars) that had plagued California for years. For example, when Assembly Member 
Fran Pavley originally introduced AB 32, the measure received no significant political traction 
for nearly two years until Núñez took over as its principal author.  
 
With a background in union and community organizing, Núñez held close the principles of 
community empowerment, equity, and reinvestment in low-income communities. As such, he 
strongly believed that AB 32 could effectively ‘roll-out’ market environmentalism while ‘making 
room for environmental justice.’ Unfortunately, these normative goals were not entirely upheld 
in AB 32 when the measure went through the regulatory rule-making process at CARB. As 
previously noted, throughout the legislative drafting of AB 32, Governor Schwarzenegger 
publicly supported the economic benefits of a cap-and-trade system without regard to its 
implications to environmental justice communities. At one point, he even threatened to veto 
the measure if it did not mandate the implementation of cap-and-trade. Unable to reconcile 
these differences, but eager to claim credit for global climate leadership, the Legislature and 
the governor eventually enacted AB 32 without settling their differences (Senior Capitol staff 
member, 2013 – author interview; Rabe, 2007). Instead, the legislation delegated key decisions 
on implementing GHG emissions reduction strategies to CARB.  
 
Perhaps, then, it was not much of a surprise that the provisions EJ groups supported in AB 32 
were severely undercut less than three weeks after Schwarzenegger signed the measure into 
law. Despite the inclusion of language in AB 32 that only authorized CARB to ‘consider’ a cap-
and-trade program among other options, Schwarzenegger quickly transformed the discussion 
into a foregone conclusion with Executive Order S-20-06. This order declared that emissions 
trading schemes provided the most cost-effective76 method for reducing California’s GHG 
emissions and required state officials to assemble such a program. 
 
The executive order specifically instructed CARB to develop a comprehensive, market-based 
compliance program, while the California Environmental Protection Agency was directed to 
establish a Market Advisory Committee (MAC) to advise CARB on the program’s formulation 
(Schwarzenegger, 2006). Speaker Núñez quickly criticized the executive order, calling it an 
attempt to give the executive branch more power than authorized under AB 32. Furthermore, 
                                                           
76 AB 32 defines ‘cost-effective’ as the “cost per unit of reduced emissions of greenhouse gases adjusted for its 
global warming potential” (California Health and Safety Code, section §38505(d)). 
  
109 
 
Núñez said, the governor’s emphasis on a market-based approach ignored other aspects of the 
law, including the environmental justice provisions. “You can’t rewrite a law through executive 
order. This is totally inconsistent with the intent of the law and with the way that it is written” 
(Martin, 2006).77 Núñez further claimed the governor was reinterpreting the legislation based 
on draft proposals the Legislature had previously rejected.  
 
Many environmental justice representatives perceived Schwarzenegger’s executive order as a 
betrayal. To them, it also underscored notions that the inclusion of EJ elements in AB 32 may 
have been intended as mere “tokenism” to prevent them from opposing the measure (Rafael 
Aguilera, 2013 – author interview). So when CARB convened the Environmental Justice Advisory 
Committee (EJAC) to advise on implementation of the Scoping Plan a lack of trust was evident 
and an apparent conflict ensued over cap-and-trade, according to a CARB representative. 
“[T]here was a view from the EJAC that it had expressed all along that cap-and-trade was just a 
non-starter, and obviously the Air Board has been seriously considering cap and trade the 
whole time…and I think folks in the EJAC did not like that” (quoted in London et al., 2013).  
 
Based on CARB’s actions, the agency appeared to view community empowerment and public 
participation as a means to preoccupy and pacify aggrieved communities without addressing 
the fundamental, structural causes of environmental injustice. For example, during the course 
of 16 formal committee meetings between March 2007 and April 2009, CARB and the EJAC 
fought bitterly over the development of the Scoping Plan and its effect on low-income 
communities of color. Throughout this multi-year process, the EJAC complained they did not 
receive adequate state support, research, and funding similar to levels of the Marcket Advisory 
Committee (MAC) or other scientific and economic committees advising CARB on AB 32 
implementation (EJ advocates, 2012 – author interviews; Lerza, 2011). 
 
Similarly, the public workshops held in low-income communities of color pursuant to AB 32, 
were administered with scant resources or agency support. No public records or 
documentation were kept for the workshops, and little is known about what exactly transpired 
at these workshops, aside from the official presentations given by CARB staff. Records of the 
community’s response to these presentations were never kept (Sze et al., 2009). While the EJAC 
issued advisory reports to CARB, many EJAC deliberations were not recorded. Most 
significantly, the committee meetings and the public workshops were not translated into 
Spanish or other commonly spoken languages in environmental justice communities. One EJAC 
member described CARB’s public participation process as disturbing, “There’s no transcript; 
there’s no nothing. So it sort of goes towards there’s no real record of what we talked about 
but for notes on it, which is somewhat disturbing” (quoted in Sze et al., 2009; Pg. 182). 
Likewise, EJAC members who advocated for the implementation of the Community 
Empowerment Amendment claimed that it received virtually no support from CARB staff in 
                                                           
77 Schwarzenegger’s enthusiastic support for cap-and-trade even resulted in the firing of CARB chief, Robert 
Sawyer in 2007, citing disagreements over how to address climate change. Shortly thereafter, the board’s 
executive officer, Catherine Witherspoon, resigned, alleging excessive micromanagement of CARB from the 
governor’s office (Rabe, 2007).    
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developing mechanisms to turn its language into concrete policy actions (EJ advocates, 2012 – 
author interviews).   
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Section 4.7: Are all Market-Based Mechanisms Created Equally? 
 
 
Due to a lack of support from CARB and its method of “managing” public participation, the EJAC 
supplemented state support with funding from a small number of foundations. This enabled 
members to produce hundreds of pages of policy recommendations for the Scoping Plan. These 
recommendations proposed immediate and direct GHG reduction measures, but did not 
include cap-and-trade (EJ advocates, 2012 – author interviews; Lerza, 2011). The EJAC 
encouraged California to address greenhouse gas reductions through standards and 
regulations, incentives, and a carbon tax (EJAC, 2008). The committee argued these three 
elements worked together by reinforcing each other to form the foundation for a 
comprehensive plan.   
 
The EJAC proposed measures, such as energy conservation, the production of renewable 
energy, and quantifiable carbon reduction targets for local governments and the agricultural 
industry (EJAC, 2008).78 In many of their recommendations, members of the EJAC essentially 
advocated traditional ‘command-and-control’ mechanisms that relied on direct government 
regulation or intervention. The ‘command’ in this approach requires the setting of quality 
standards/targets for emissions by a government authority that regulated entities (i.e., 
polluters) must follow. The ‘control’ part represents the manner in which it must be achieved 
(i.e., installation of pollution-control technologies) to avoid negative sanctions that may result 
from non-compliance (OECD, 2001; Baldwin et al., 2011).  
 
The EJAC claimed CARB was completely avoiding emissions standard-based rule-making. They 
stated the agency resisted adopting such rules despite their use in the U.S. EPA’s acid rain 
program – generally the program cap-and-trade proponents most frequently identify as 
successful. The EJAC cited Title IV of the U.S. Clean Air Act of 1990, which “requires 110 power 
plants to reduce their emissions to a level equivalent to the product of an emission rate of 2.5 
lbs. of SO2/mmBtu an average of their 1985-1987 fuel” (EJAC, 2008). According to the EJAC, the 
U.S. EPA also required all the facilities to install ‘Continuous Emissions Monitors’ to verify 
emissions levels and ensure compliance – yet CARB had not proposed such monitoring. The 
EJAC claimed that without underlying emissions standards and monitoring, establishing correct 
allocation levels would be impossible. As such, pollution credits could be over-allocated. Over-
allocation, they argued would “strip away the incentive for businesses to reduce emissions 
because emissions credits remain cheaper than the cost for changing emissions levels” (EJAC, 
2008). Moreover, the complex nature and sources of GHG emissions, led committee members 
to view as less straight-forward as the acid rain program. The program, they claimed, was only 
limited to a relatively small number of pollution sources. The path to compliance, moreover, 
                                                           
78 The Scoping Plan only encourages but does not mandate municipalities to set GHG reduction targets (CARB, 
2008). The EJAC further asserted “local and regional land use authorities have not been provided [via the Scoping 
Plan] with adequate standards, guidance, or incentives to ensure that local and regional development decisions 
will contribute to AB 32 greenhouse gas reduction targets” (EJAC, 2008).  
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was clearer: switch to low-sulfur coal, install scrubbers (or similar technologies) and/or 
implement energy efficiency mechanisms (EJAC, 2008).  
 
The lack of strong emissions standards linked to cap-and-trade system led the EJAC to advocate 
for a ‘carbon tax’ as their principal recommendation for the draft Scoping Plan. The carbon tax, 
supported by many EJ activists, is itself a market-based mechanism; however, it is structured 
and regulated closely by the state. According to London et al. (2013), they recognized that in 
“the neoliberal political climate (personified by famously business-friendly Governor 
Schwarzenegger) a carbon tax was as close as they could come to an alignment with their 
values” (Pg. 795). Hence, the EJ activists’ support for a carbon tax was pragmatic, not 
ideological. 
 
A carbon tax is a tax per ton of CO2 and typically calls for the tax to start low and rise over time 
(RFF, 2012). The EJAC claimed that a tax on carbon reflected the “real” social costs of such 
emissions. It accounts for the damages that are expected to arise from climate change, 
including harms to agricultural productivity and human health, coastal inundation, and other 
changes. The EJAC argued that a carbon tax would produce the most equitable carbon 
reductions in all neighborhoods by creating immediate incentives (i.e. risk of government 
sanctions for non-compliance) for emitters to invest in new clean technology for polluting 
facilities (Aguilera, 2013 – author interview). A carbon tax, they claimed would be more 
transparent and visible, and harder to evade. The tax revenue would be subject to public 
disclosure to determine which entities were actually complying with the regulation (Table 11). 
In contrast, under cap-and-trade, the specific entities trading and selling pollution permits are 
not subject to the state’s public disclosure laws (Andrews, et al., 2010).79 Polluting entities 
argue that public records disclosure of the selling and trading of allowances may affect the 
competitive positions of participants in an emissions trading program (WCI, 2013). 
 
The EJAC also argued that under a cap-and-trade system, low-income communities of color, 
where polluting facilities are most often sited, would still bear the brunt of impacts if industries 
were allowed to trade for the rights to continue polluting there. They viewed cap-and-trade 
mechanisms as inequitable because they neither impose an adequate cost on polluting entities, 
nor place direct responsibility on the entities to reduce pollution. Members of the EJAC joined a 
coalition of statewide EJ groups to issue a declaration against cap-and-trade and in support of a 
carbon tax (EJ Matters, 2008). The declaration stated that pollution already disproportionately 
affected their communities and they would “fight at every turn” against regulations creating a 
carbon-trading system that would only exacerbate those trends. “[C]arbon trading is 
undemocratic because it allows entrenched polluters, market designers, and commodity 
traders to determine whether and where to reduce greenhouse gases and co-pollutant 
                                                           
79 Under California’s cap-and-trade program, GHG emissions data submitted to CARB is public information, but 
reporting entities (i.e., polluters) can request that material be classified as confidential based on the entity’s belief 
that the information is either a trade secret or otherwise exempt from public disclosure under the California Public 
Records Act (CARB, 2011a).  
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emissions without allowing impacted communities or governments to participate in those 
decisions” (EJ Matters, 2008).  
 
 
 
 Carbon Tax Cap-and-Trade 
Price-setting 
Mechanism 
Legislature sets carbon 
price per ton of CO2 
emitted (i.e. $30/ton 
C02). 
 
State Agency creates 
declining number of GHG 
emissions allowances 
(i.e. 500 millon tons 
available in 2013; 400 
million tons available in 
2014).  
What Influences 
Price? 
State would need to 
raise tax via legislation. 
 
Carbon price is driven by 
scarcity of allowances 
and compliance costs for 
regulated entities.  
Important 
Distinctions  
Requires 2/3 approval of 
the Legislature, which is 
politically challenging. 
 
*Emphasis on 
‘command-and-control’ 
policies. 
*Tax revenue could be 
spent on a discretionary 
basis. 
Option (1). Some or all of 
allowances are 
auctioned.  
Option (2). All 
allowances are given 
away for free. *Revenue 
must be spent to further 
reduce GHG emissions 
statewide. 
 
*Emphasis on free-
markets, innovation, 
market incentives and 
flexibility for polluters.  
 
Table 11: Major Differences between Carbon Pricing Mechanisms under  
Scoping Plan Consideration. 
 
 
At the same time the EJAC was denouncing a cap-and-trade system, it was ignoring the 
potential problems the Canadian province of British Columbia (BC) experienced with the 
implementation of a carbon tax. In 2008, a study by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives 
(CCPA) showed the BC carbon tax regime was progressive only for the first year, providing the 
largest benefits to the top 20 percent of households through personal and corporate income 
tax cuts. However, as the carbon tax increased, it was projected to become regressive for low-
income households, meaning low-income families would pay a greater share of their income 
than their higher-income counterparts (CCPA, 2008). A follow-up study by CCPA and the BC 
Sierra Club in 2011 found four critical flaws with the adoption of BC’s carbon tax: (1) the carbon 
tax was too low to significantly reduce emissions; (2) tax cuts and credits reduced provincial 
revenues by greater amounts than the carbon tax generated, making the tax “revenue 
negative”; (3) taxpayers paid an additional tax to offset the “revenue negative” carbon pricing 
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program; and, (4) even after tax cuts and credits, the carbon tax had a disproportionate impact 
on low-income households, mostly benefiting the highest-income households that are also the 
biggest emitters of pollution (CCPA and BC Sierra Club, 2011; pg. 4-5). Despite these published 
accounts of BC’s problems with a carbon tax, the EJAC continued to strongly support the 
mechanism.  
 
In California, mainstream environmental groups such as EDF and NRDC, understanding the 
limitation of both carbon pricing mechanisms, strongly supported a version of a cap-and-trade 
system. The system they favored would limit the amount of carbon allowances that CARB could 
issue for free, with a remainder of the allowances sold at auction (Table 11). These groups 
advocated for allowing the market to determine the price instead of allowing politics and 
policymakers to set the price too low, as was the case in British Columbia. Under this approach, 
auction proceeds would be used for projects like renewable energy, green jobs training 
programs, and programs to help low-income consumers adjust to higher energy costs. 
Mainstream environmental groups claimed that well-designed market compliance mechanisms 
could meet AB 32 reduction goals and address environmental justice concerns (Sheppard, 
2008).  
 
Similarly, CARB administrators and members of the MAC and the Economic and Technology 
Advancement Advisory Committee (ETAAC) perceived the ‘command-and-control’ approaches 
favored by the EJAC as stifling competition. They stated that a carbon tax would limit 
opportunities to spur innovation in the green economy due to inflexible and complicated rules 
(Table 11). It was also viewed that such an approach would be administratively cost-prohibitive. 
A carbon tax, moreover, would not ensure any particular level of emissions reductions as 
required under the ‘cap’ portion of a cap-and-trade mechanism (MAC, 2007). Under this 
neoliberal perspective, emissions trading systems (ETS) allow the firm to avoid significant 
government regulation; while under a carbon tax, the firm is subject to government regulation 
through administration of the tax. Andrews et al. (2010), have argued that “in an ETS the 
freedom of the firm and concomitant property rights assigned to carbon permits are intact, 
with climate change being managed by a speculative market for emissions permits so that 
property rights are sacrosanct” (Pg. 614). According to neoliberalism a carbon tax is not just an 
example of government action but a form of government intervention” (Pg. 614). In sum, the 
proponents held that a deregulated market would result in the most cost-effective approach to 
GHG emissions reductions. By removing regulatory interventions, such as carbon taxes or 
precise standards for polluters, proponents argued the market would seek out the most 
efficient means of achieving the same emission reduction goals (Wysham, 2008; Pg. 28).        
 
In essence, the debate over the appropriate carbon pricing mechanism to implement centered 
on the appropriate scale and scope of issues the mechanism should cover. Throughout the 
Scoping Plan process, CARB subscribed to a civic epistemology that sought to limit the scale of 
mitigation policies to only address GHG reduction across facilities at a statewide/global scale. 
They argued that the “cap” part of the cap-and-trade system was inherently equal – everyone 
can benefit from the cap in GHG emissions, no matter where you live. Conversely, the EJAC held 
that the “trade” part was not equal because those reductions and consequent reductions in co-
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pollutants, would not be evenly distributed geographically (Pastor et al., 2013). The EJAC 
rationalized that while overall emissions might decline, the burden for overly polluted 
communities could potentially worsen, or improve at rates lower than the statewide average. 
As a result, they asserted the localized health benefits from the reduction of co-pollutants 
would not materialize (EJAC, 2008; Pastor, et al, 2013).  
 
As explained by Hecht (2011), the EJAC’s opposition was also based on their concern regarding 
the decreased opportunity for community input into local land-use and other regulatory 
decisions under a cap-and-trade system. In such a system, it was argued low-income 
communities would be precluded from participating in the trading and purchasing of 
allowances that could impact the spatial distribution of reductions in GHG emissions and co-
pollutants.  
 
 
[B]y their nature, trading programs leave little to no opportunity for community input.  This may 
be the EJ community’s most fundamental objection to trading programs.  Command-and-control 
regulation [direct state regulation] typically provides opportunities for community input on a 
case-by-case basis. Local communities can influence the regulatory process by participating in 
permitting proceedings and variance proceedings, by commenting on proposed rules, and by 
undertaking or intervening in direct administrative or court enforcement actions or urging 
regulators to pursue these actions.  By contrast, once a trading program is in place, the regulated 
parties, entities that control and regulate the pool of available offsets, and investors and traders 
will form the system that dictates the regulatory outcome on a local level by controlling available 
carbon emission allowances (Hecht, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequently, these concerns partly came to fruition when Western Climate Initiative Inc. 
(WCI), the corporation created by CARB to manage California’s cap-and-trade auctions was 
incorporated in the state of Delaware. As an entity outside of California, it is not subject to 
many of California’s state open meetings or public disclosure laws (Grimes, 2012).  
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Section 4.8:  The EJAC’s Lack of Scientific Data and Rigor  
 
 
The EJAC’s expansive scope and scale of climate change was sharply criticized by CARB officials 
as beyond the intent of AB 32. They claimed the EJAC’s climate strategy had the potential to 
derail the central goal of the legislation -- the reduction of ‘global’ GHG emissions. The EJAC’s 
strategy was rejected by proponents of cap-and-trade as being more grounded in emotion than 
science. For example, at a 2006 conference panel on developing cap-and-trade programs, Dan 
Skopec, then undersecretary for the California Environmental Protection Agency, stated that: 
 
 
[A] lot of people use the issue of global warming to tackle the problems that they’ve been 
working on for the last 10, 15, 20, 30 years, and I think that these problems are not necessarily 
related to global warming. I think that’s a folly that we will have to be careful about. The 
challenge of global warming is so great it is going to be a major adjustment to our economy…The 
challenge is so great that it should be the sole focus of this effort. Using the umbrella of global 
warming to satisfy other agendas is really going to distract from the solution and create 
inefficiency. So as we go forward, I hope that we can all focus this effort on the problem of 
reducing greenhouse gases and not try to solve everyone else’s unsolvable problems in other 
areas (ELN, 2007; Pg. 42).80 
 
 
Another CARB representative, however, took a slightly more nuanced interpretation of the 
EJAC’s climate strategy:   
 
 
“I think the problem is the environmental justice community really sees AB 32 as a vehicle for 
doing a lot of things…It’s not the greenhouse gas emissions, it’s all the other stuff they want: 
which, I don’t blame them, I would want them too. I’d want see all the refineries shut down in 
my community…[So] if you talk about transitioning to a lower fossil fuel economy, then you’d 
think that they would be supportive of greenhouse gas emission reductions and it theoretically 
doesn’t matter where those emissions reductions come from in the state as long as we’re getting 
reductions but…they want to see reductions in their communities and they’re concerned that 
AB 32 doesn’t really focus on localized reductions (quoted in London et al, 2013; Pg. 794).     
 
 
While the EJAC strongly criticized CARB for not developing robust analyses of potential impacts 
of the draft Scoping Pla on vulnerable communities (EJAC, 2008), they did not provide any 
primary scientific data to support their claims. As previously noted, environmental justice 
groups only presented secondary data from Lejano and Hirose (2005) and Drury et al. (1999) 
that studied the health impacts of a nitrogen oxide emissions trading systems in the working 
                                                           
80 Dan Skopec is currently the vice president of regulatory and legislative Affairs (i.e. chief lobbyist) for San Diego 
Gas & Electric (SDG&E) and Southern California Gas Co. (SoCalGas), Sempra Energy’s California regulated utilities. 
These entities are considered some of the largest emitters of GHG in the state and are regulated under AB 32. 
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class, Latino immigrant community of Wilmington. However, the EJAC produced no original 
data to analyze public health scenarios under an AB 32 cap-and-trade program.   
 
  Source: NRDC, 2008 
 
 
Both cap-and-trade proponents and mainstream environmentalists soundly dismissed such 
secondary studies. For example, NRDC produced its own study showing that under CARB’s 
Scoping Plan, air pollution and health risks would be greatly reduced on a statewide basis, 
including in communities of color (Table 12). According to the study, measures under 
consideration for implementation under AB 32 could prevent more than 700 premature deaths 
and thousands of other negative health impacts annually, saving $3.2 billion to $5 billion in 
health costs by the year 2020 (NRDC, 2008; Pg. 3). 
 
Furthermore, CARB’s public health analyses and accompanying technical appendices also 
undermined the EJAC’s arguments. CARB’s analyses found that implementation of a cap-and-
trade system under AB 32 would provide additional support to existing state efforts devoted to 
protecting and improving public health. These health analyses rested on the assertion of  GHG 
emissions as global pollutants that have no direct, local effects on public. As such, a California 
company could utilize a large amount of allowances without disproportionately jeopardizing 
the health and welfare of neighboring communities. In these analyses, CARB did specifically 
acknowledge that manufacturing and electricity generation from capped sources also emit co-
pollutants that posed adverse health effects on exposed populations. However, in their model 
evaluation of Wilmington, under a cap-and-trade program “the [co-pollutants] emission 
impacts were extremely small” (CARB, 2008; Pg. A-13). 
Table 12:  
Public Health Benefits of Global Warming Pollution Reduction Measures  
in California in 2020 (NRDC Study) 
Avoided Health Impacts in the Year 2020 Climate 
Action 
Team 
Measures  
Additional 
Early 
Action and 
Proposed 
Measures 
Potential 
Additional 
Measures 
 
 
Total 
Value  
(in millions of 
dollars) 
Premature Death 
 
330 250 140 710 $3,200 -5,000 
Hospitalization (respiratory) 
 
70 50 30 140 $2.7 -4.2 
Hospitalization (cardiovascular) 
 
120 94 50 270 $6.0 -9.5 
Asthma and other Lower Respiratory Symptoms 
 
8,300 6,400 3,500 18,000 $0.2 -0.3 
Acute Bronchitis 
 
690 540 290 1,500 $0.3 – 0.5 
 
Work Loss Days 
 
 
50,000 
 
39,000 
 
21,000 
 
110,000 
 
$12 - 18 
Minor Restricted Activity Days 290,000 
 
220,000 120,000 630,000 $18 - 29 
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Table 13 
Estimated 2020 Emissions Reduction Co-Benefits  
“After” Scoping Plan for Wilmington Area (CARB Study), 
Tons per Day 
Category NOx PM 2.5 Predominant Fuel 
Electricity    
    Renewable Portfolio 0.076 0.002 Natural Gas 
    Efficiency & Million Solar 
    Roofs    
0.058 0.001 Natural Gas 
    Combined Heat & Power N/A N/A Mixed 
Residential/Commercial Fuel 0.048 0.0054 Natural Gas 
On-Road Gasoline N/A 0.022 Gasoline 
On-Road Diesel 0.11 0.005  Diesel 
Goods Movement 1.5 0.05 Diesel 
Industrial    
    Refineries * 0.04 Mixed 
    Oil & Gas 0.006 minor Mixed 
    Boilers & IC Engines 0.042 0.009 Mixed 
Subtotal of calculated 
reductions 
1.8 0.12  
TOTAL Non-RECLAIM 
Reductions 
1.7 0.12  
 Source: CARB, 2008 
 
 
The Scoping Plan Appendix H Public Health Analysis of Wilmington (2008) also found that most 
emission reductions benefits would most likely fall outside the community. “[C]o-benefit 
emission reductions in the study area would produce regional health benefits. A relatively small 
portion of these benefits would occur in the study area…” (Table 13). Based on CARB’s 
methodology, it was estimated that approximately 24 premature deaths in the region would be 
avoided through emission reductions in Wilmington, as a result of the Scoping Plan. Similarly, 
the California Department of Public Health, in its analysis of the Scoping Plan found that though 
“statewide impacts are largely negligible, some communities will likely benefit more than 
others, and a few communities may be negatively impacted” (2010; Pg. 95).81    
 
 
 
 
                                                           
81 The Department of Public Health also noted that due to limitations in local health data and an inadequate ability 
to model local economic and environmental impacts result from implementation of the cap-and-trade program, “a 
precise community-by-community analysis of prospective local health impacts is out of the scope this work [health 
analysis]”(2010; Pg. 89).   
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Table 14 
Percent of Emissions Reductions Between 2008 and 2020:  
Richmond Area (CARB Study) 
 NOx PM 2.5 ROG 
BASELINE 
Emissions Reductions 
from Existing Controls & 
No Emission Reductions 
at Cap-and-Trade 
Industrial & Electricity 
Generation Facilities  
 
 
 
28% 
 
 
 
 
-1% 
 
 
 
16% 
SCENARIO 1 
Emissions Reductions 
from Existing Controls & 
Emission Reductions at all 
Cap-and-Trade Industrial 
& Electricity Generation 
Facilities 
 
 
 
30% 
 
 
 
0% 
 
 
 
16% 
SCENARIO 2 
Emission Reductions from 
Existing Controls & 
Emission Increases at all 
Cap-and-Trade Industrial 
& Electricity Generation 
Facilities 
 
 
27% 
 
 
-2% 
 
 
14% 
SCENARIO 3 
Emission Reductions from 
Existing Controls & 
Addition of New Facility 
 
28% 
 
-2% 
 
16% 
Source: CARB 2008 
 
 
CARB also conducted a co-pollutant emissions assessment for the Northern California city of 
Richmond (Table 14). Richmond is located among a nexus of major transportation corridors, 
large refineries, and other industrial and electricity generation facilities. The concentrated 
emissions from these sources contribute to air quality problems in the local community, and in 
downwind areas. As with Wilmington, Richmond has a number of facilities that would be 
subject to cap-and-trade regulation. In their analysis, CARB staff did not find a situation where 
emissions increases were clearly attributable to implementation of cap-and-trade. For example, 
the Scenario 2 model (Table 14) evaluated the potential general impact of an emissions 
increase of 4 percent at every cap-and-trade industrial and electricity generation facility in the 
Richmond region. This hypothetical upper-bound increase in emissions produced slight 
reductions in the overall benefits of the ongoing control program. Resulting in a drop of 2 
percent in Reactive Organic Gases (ROG) benefits, a 1 percent reduction in nitrogen oxide (NOx) 
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benefits, and an additional 1 percent increase in PM 2.5 emissions.  In this scenario, CARB 
claimed that cumulative emissions of NOx and ROG in the Richmond area would still be lower in 
2020, compared to the 2008 baseline year (CARB, 2008).82    
 
The EJAC soundly dismissed the CARB public health analyses as lacking a rigorous methodology 
and failing to undergo a scientific peer-review process. They again reverted to citing existing 
studies documenting the disproportionate impact under the RECLAIM emissions trading 
program in Wilmington (EJAC, 2008). Consequently, as a method to finally debunk those 
studies, cap-and-trade proponents cited a widely circulated 2011 peer-reviewed study by 
Indiana University professor Evan Ringquist. Ringquist (2011) analyzed 14 years of activity for 
the largest emissions trading market (comprising more than 2,000 emitters) under the sulfur 
dioxide allowance-trading program (ATP) created by amendments to the federal Clean Air Act. 
His study concluded that the ATP did not produce the unintended consequence of 
concentrating SO2 emissions in African American and Latino communities.  
 
Ringquist further claimed that emissions trading, even under different scenarios did not 
produce racial or ethnic environmental inequities (Figure 33). “The ATP pollution market, it 
seems, may play a role in remedying existing environmental inequities. These results are robust 
across different dependent variables, different definitions of affected community, and different 
model specifications.” Through his various quantitative modeling of the program, he strongly 
asserts there is “scant evidence that markets for sulfur dioxide concentrate pollution in poor 
communities” (Pg. 321). The study, however, did reveal that the benefits were not fairly 
distributed, either: more pollution existed in communities with “large percentages of adults 
without a high school diploma” (Pg. 322). Ringquist dismissed this finding as irrelevant for 
public policy, since people with low educational levels are not a protected class under the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and its associated regulations. Nevertheless, policymakers held this study was 
credible in proving that cap-and-trade programs did not impact public health in environmental 
justice communities. 
 
                                                           
82 CARB also conducted co-pollutants emissions studies from cap-and-trade scenarios in the Central Valley 
Community of Bakersfield/Oildale, the Ore Grande community in the High Mojave Desert, and the community of 
Wilmington. Under these assessments, CARB also did not find situations where emissions increases were clearly 
attributable to implementation of a cap-and-trade program (CARB, 2008).  
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   Figure 33.   Source: Ringquist, 2011 (Pg. 320) 
 
 
By appropriating scientific methods in the development of the Scoping Plan, CARB and 
mainstream environmentalists retained legitimacy and power in the decision-making 
process because they were seen as objective and “technically disciplined.” This view 
directly contrasted to the view of EJ advocates as undisciplined individuals and groups 
offering biased positions (Ezrahi, 1990; Pg. 69). Throughout the multi-year Scoping Plan 
process, members of the EJAC could not produce rigorous research and scientific data to 
validate their anecdotal information on climate change impacts to socially vulnerable 
communities. While many universities and nonprofits have partnered with EJ groups in the 
last 20 years to develop public health and scientific analyses to influence public policy, 
these types of partnerships were not evident in California during the Scoping Plan process.   
 
In the policymaking process, credibility is essential in the validation of climate knowledge. 
To translate their on-the-ground experience in disadvantaged communities, EJ advocates 
are expected to produce rigorous research and scientific data to prove claims, test new 
approaches, and bring new policy approaches to scale. However, according to Daniel Faber 
(2001), who has studied the EJ movement for decades, such expectations are often difficult 
to achieve because environmental justice groups face limited financial and technical 
resources. The environmental justice movement, he argues, is perhaps the most 
underfunded social movement in the United States.  
 
While a few of the largest organizations in the movement have seen their budgets grow in 
recent years, most EJ groups continue to face greater resource constraints than other 
nonprofits and mainstream environmental groups. The vast majority of EJ groups have 
fewer than five paid staff; many still function primarily as volunteer organizations (Park, 
2009). Unlike the Sierra Club, EJ groups lack a dues-paying membership to offset the cost of 
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technical experts who aids in advocacy campaigns. Moreover, this technical capacity 
asymmetry was further exacerbated by the fact that the EJAC did not receive significant 
state support, research, and funding similar to levels of the MAC or other scientific and 
economic committees advising CARB on AB 32 implementation. According to an EJAC letter 
to CARB chair Mary Nichols, there was “no request for proposals or other efforts to seek 
outside expertise on how best to understand, research, and answer the constellation of 
questions” presented by the implementation of AB 32. As a result, they claimed, CARB 
could not fully evaluate the total costs and impacts of the Scoping Plan on the environment 
and public health (EJAC, 2008).   
 
In addition to the lack of state funding and EJ staffing, the pressure for immediate policy 
action intensified the power differentials already at hand within the Scoping Plan process. 
As pointed out by the EJAC chair, Angela Johnson Mezaros, “one of the issues that makes 
this climate work really different than some of the other issues I’ve worked on, is this 
frame of immediacy. It’s really dynamic, fast-moving, high-paced policy-making which 
makes it another level of challenge for organizations that are small, underfunded, and 
otherwise under-resourced, without access to decision-makers and information that is 
useful and relevant” (Park, 2009). In sum, the AB 32 Scoping Plan process highlights the 
difficulties EJ groups encountered in building up their scientific capacity to influence state-
level climate policy. The development of climate policy moves quickly in California; the 
problem is further complicated by policy responses geared towards global objectives, not 
local action or public health goals. 
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Section 4.9: Divergent Civic Epistemologies and the Politics of Scales in AB 32 
 
 
Bolstered by what many viewed as scientifically and economically sound evidence, on 
December 12, 2008 CARB officially approved a Scoping Plan that focused only on reducing GHG 
emissions at the statewide scale. CARB argued cap-and-trade was the mechanism best aligned 
with the legislative intent of AB 32. Rather than mandating a specific technology or a direct 
carbon tax, CARB contended that the flexibility afforded by emissions trading markets helped 
identify where and how emissions reductions could be achieved in the most cost-effective 
manner (CARB, 2008; Farber, 2013). Invoking a neoliberal discourse, CARB stated that cap-and-
trade rewarded commercial innovation. Under the system, a company that exceeded its goal in 
reducing GHG emissions earned credits it could sell to others in the market. Through this 
process, CARB asserted the market could find the best solutions and stimulate the development 
of new technology (and jobs). This in turn, could enable greater emissions reductions at lower 
costs (CARB, 2008; Doerr, 2006).  
 
However, another factor likely influenced CARB’s preference for cap-and-trade (though never 
explicitly stated) was that a direct carbon tax, as favored by EJ advocates, was politically 
untenable for the Legislature and governor. A tax in California requires a two-thirds 
supermajority vote of the state Legislature or passage of a state ballot measure. Under cap-
and-trade, a “fee” (emissions allowances sold at auction) is set administratively each quarter by 
CARB, allowing elected officials to avoid voting for a tax.83 Political dynamics in the Capitol at 
the time, which continue today with the addition of more politically moderate members, makes 
the passage of a direct tax on industry difficult (Senior capitol staff member, 2013 – author 
interview). For example, before the commencement of the first trading auction in November 
2012, Assembly Member Henry Perea, chair of the Legislative Moderate Caucus (and member 
of the Latino Legislative Caucus) requested that the nonpartisan Legislative Analyst Office (LAO) 
research the feasibility for CARB to issues GHG allowances for free rather than through an 
auction. He further inquired about the steps needed for the Legislature to block the auction 
from proceeding (Perea, 2012).84 Similarly in 2014, Perea introduced AB 69 which sought to 
delay for three years a cap-and-trade rule requiring the energy industry to purchase allowance 
                                                           
83 The distinction between a “fee” and “tax” in AB 32 was challenged in a lawsuit filed by the California Chamber of 
Commerce. The Chamber argued that the auctioning rules for emission allowances exceeded CARB’s scope of 
authority under AB 32 and violated California’s Proposition 13, which requires a supermajority vote of the 
Legislature to increase state taxes for purposes of raising revenues. AB 32 passed by a simple majority vote. The 
Chamber further argued that CARB is required to provide free emission allowances (rather than selling them at 
auction) to comply with the proposition. The California Superior Court of Sacramento County in November 2013 
ruled that the auctions did not violate Proposition 13 because they are not a tax but revenues generated by sales 
of valuable commodities (emissions allowances). The Chamber appealed the decision in February 2014 (Walters, 
2014).     
84 Similarly, in 2010 Assembly Member Felipe Fuentes, a member of the Latino Legislative Caucus, introduced 
Assembly Bill 2529 which would have created administrative roadblocks to implementing a cap-and-trade auction. 
The measure passed out the Assembly with a majority of Latino Legislative Caucus members voting in favor of the 
legislation or abstaining. AB 2529 eventually stalled in the Senate Committee on Business, Professions and 
Economic Development (California Legislative Info, 2010).  
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permits for transportation fuels. In a letter to CARB chair Mary Nichols, 16 moderate Democrats 
(most of them also members of the Latino Caucus) stated the legislation was necessary to 
prevent gas price increases that would hurt low-income Californians. This legislation was 
eventually held in the Senate without receiving a policy committee hearing (State of California, 
Legislative Info, 2014).    
 
The political realities in California, consequently, have led to the continued retrenchment of 
direct state regulation and the preference for market-based public policy (Martinez-Alier et al, 
1998; Harrison, 2001; Pastor et al, 2013). In this process, California is seen as an important site 
of contestation over the adoption of neoliberal approaches in environmental governance. 
Discussions and disagreements over the administration of climate change place private and 
public-sector interests supporting market-based systems at odds with EJ groups seeking 
stronger state intervention in the regulation of pollution and health (London et al, 2013). As 
shown in Table 15, this conflict demonstrates the competition between two fundamentally 
different civic epistemologies in addressing climate change. The first centers on the goal of 
greenhouse emissions reductions at the global scale used by state regulators; the second, 
meanwhile embraces the goal of localized emissions reductions and health co-benefits 
advocated by environmental justice advocates. Environmental justice advocates, for example, 
argued that the public reasoning by CARB to support a cap-and-trade system did not factor in 
the racialized impacts on low-income neighborhoods and communities of color. They further 
opposed CARB’s approach to climate change, perceiving it as doing nothing to address existing 
environmental inequities experienced by residents in disadvantaged communities.   
 
 
It is market-based decisions, within a framework of structural racism in planning and zoning 
decisions, which has created the disparate impact of pollution that exists today; relying on that 
same mechanism as the ‘solution’ will only deepen the disparate impact (EJAC members, 
Johnson-Meszaros and Williams 2008 letter to CARB Chair Mary Nichols). 
 
In sum, these tensions between civic epistemologies occur not merely because of the actual use 
of a particular market-based mechanism (as we have seen with the problems of British 
Columbia’s carbon tax), but due to the application and implementation that approach 
represents for the politics of race, place, and scale. 
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Table 15 
Divergent Civic Epistemologies of California Climate Change 
 
 CARB EJAC 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism and GHG 
Reduction Measures  
Focus on markets and cost-
effectiveness via a cap-and-trade 
system. Emphasis on the free 
market to provide flexibility for 
polluters and incentivize/reward 
their GHG emissions reductions.  
Focus on direct state 
intervention via a carbon tax 
(polluter pays).  Emphasis on 
traditional ‘command-and-
control’ regulatory methods that 
impose specific, inflexible 
emissions limitations with which 
all affected sources must 
comply.  
Geographic Scale of GHG Emissions 
Reductions 
Goal of overall statewide/global 
GHG emissions reductions, 
regardless of place or context.  
Emissions reductions are uniformly 
equal throughout the state.  
Goal to require (localized) 
emissions reductions where they 
occur most. Emphasis on 
reducing GHG emissions in 
“disadvantaged” communities.  
Reduction of Co-pollutants AB 32 requires statewide GHG 
emissions reductions only. To the 
extent feasible the reduction of co-
pollutant emissions shall be 
“considered”.  
GHG emissions reductions 
measures should coincide with a 
reduction of the co-pollutants of 
climate change.  
Science of Climate Change  
 
Regulatory science established by 
CARB. Peer-Review process often 
utilized. Local knowledge excluded.  
Inclusion of local knowledge and 
community-based climate 
mitigation projects. 
Co-benefits  Market efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, and statewide job 
creation and emissions reduction. 
Emphasis on statewide health co-
benefits.  
Localized public health benefits, 
cost-savings, and local green 
jobs. Benefits focused on socially 
vulnerable populations 
Public Health Impact GHG emissions do not represent a 
public health threat. Exposure to 
co-pollutants under cap-and-trade 
is largely negligible.  
Cap-and-trade creates toxics hot 
spots.  The co-pollutants 
associated with GHG emissions 
are a public health threat to EJ 
communities. 
Public Participation   Emitters have flexibility to 
participate in a cap-and-trade 
program. The general public 
provides comments during CARB 
quarterly updates. The EJAC 
provides comments during the 
Scoping Plan and its scheduled 
updates. WCI not subject to open 
meeting or state disclosure laws. 
Cap-and-trade precludes 
communities from directly 
influencing California’s Climate 
Change law. EJAC is only 
“advisory” and is not fully 
funded.  Input can be 
disregarded by CARB. Preference 
for direct public participation in 
regulatory proceedings.   
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According to Jonas (1994), this contestation over scale is best understood as a relational 
process and, a struggle among different actors to reframe a particular issue to their own 
advantage. He contends that scale is used by domineering organizations (such as the state) to 
control the subjugated by confining them to a manageable scale. This concurs with Scott’s 
(1998) analysis in “Seeing Like a State,” where he examines the methods modern states use to 
impose order to chaos, to make societies more legible, and thereby simplify state functions of 
taxation and conscription. His examination of the state’s ordering of nature in the agriculture 
and forestry industries, moreover, shows how the state homogenizes the heterogeneous 
aspects of the world in order to obtain a level of control over it. Scott’s analysis of state 
simplification coincides with CARB’s public statements indicating that AB 32 is intentionally 
focused solely on GHG emissions at the global scale. “We have a whole array of programs that 
deal with a variety of different kinds of contaminants…and we don’t want people to somehow 
get into a mind-set where they think that AB 32 is the tool they have to use to deal with those” 
(CARB spokesman Dave Clegern, 2013).  
 
Exacting a level of state control over issues of risk and pollution, however, is often at odds with 
the ‘scales of everyday experience’ that EJ advocates engage in, both in California and 
internationally. Their experienced-based knowledge is derived from their continual exposure to 
pollutants and other socio-economic inequities in their communities. Kurtz (2010) argues that, 
in formal administrative proceedings activists experiential knowledge is challenged by state and 
corporate actors exerting spatially “abstract” and expert knowledge built around statistical 
significance and enumeration units. This creates a significant tension between ‘particular’ 
versus ‘abstract’ forms of knowledge production in environmental governance. 
 
 
Closely intertwined with knowledge production, a tension between the particular and the 
abstract pervades EJ as a political concept and fulcrum of possibility. Stated broadly, EJ activists 
and scholars studying EJ activism work in different ways to make the particular legible with 
reference to the abstract and the abstract accessible with reference to the particular (Kurtz, 
2010; Pg. 102).    
 
 
As a result of these circumstances, Jonas (1994) states, “subordinated groups attempt to 
liberate themselves from these imposed scale constraints by harnessing power and instruments 
at other scales” (Pg. 258). By refusing to address climate change policy only at a global scale, 
environmental justice groups are challenging the notion of scale as ontologically pre-given. 
They are exposing “the ways in which the social construction of scale shapes and is shaped by 
political and economic processes” (Kurtz, 2003; Pg. 888). In this approach, scale is argued to be 
both an empirical and epistemological tool for understanding and representing the world. Scale 
is not understood as natural; instead it is seen as both socially produced (via social processes 
and social struggle) and socially producing, exerting coercion and hegemony in a Gramscian 
sense (Williams, 1999; Sze et al.,  2010).      
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The environmental justice movement, hence, is situated between local scales at which the 
community protests unwanted pollution, and the more broad geographic scales where they are 
produced and can be resolved (Towers, 2000). Appeals for environmental justice are a strategic 
response to the opportunities and constraints of regulatory procedures that are present within 
a particular spatial and political context (Brenner, 1997). In Kurtz’s (2003) analysis of a 
controversial industrial facility-siting proposal, she highlights the various methods in which EJ 
activists strategically utilize geographic scales. Kurtz concludes that “[t]he very concept of 
environmental injustice precipitates a politics of scale, as the locally experienced problem of 
burdensome pollution can hardly be resolved at the local scale, whether by capital or the state, 
when it originates in political and economic relationships that extend well beyond the scale of 
the locality” (Pg. 891). Similarly, in Towers (2000) research on environmental health policy, he 
develops a conceptual framework that illustrates the interplay between “scales of meaning,” 
the scale at which a problem is experienced and framed in political discourse; and “scales of 
regulation,” which defines the phenomena administered by decision-making bodies. 
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Section 4.10: Implementing Carbon Markets and Defending Lawsuits 
 
 
The significant differences in scales of meaning and scales of regulation ultimately led seven of 
the 11 EJAC members to abandon the advisory process and join a lawsuit on June 11, 2009 
against CARB over the implementation of AB 32. The lawsuit was filed by the Center on Race, 
Poverty, and the Environment (CRPE) and Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) on 
behalf of 13 plaintiffs, collectively referred to as the Association of Irritated Residents (AIR).85 In 
the lawsuit, AIR litigants claimed CARB’s Scoping Plan violated substantive aspects of AB 32. 
This included failing to study alternatives to a cap-and-trade program and not adhering to the 
legislative provisions of AB 32 to safeguard the public health of environmental justice 
communities in the implementation of GHG reduction strategies.  
 
At the trial court on March 18, 2011, Judge Ernest Goldsmith summarily dismissed the 
environmental justice and public health concerns. He opined that CARB’s interpretation of AB 
32 and public health impacts was not “arbitrary and capricious.” The judge indicated that the 
state agency had legislative authority to interpret the climate change law and acted “within its 
discretion, right or wrong…to choose cap-and-trade as the primary methodology” (Goldsmith, 
2011).86  Judge Goldsmith, however, in his ruling principally focused on whether CARB properly 
analyzed feasible alternatives, such as a direct carbon tax for implementing AB 32 in the 
environmental review process. He determined that CARB sought to “create a fait accompli by 
premature establishment of a cap-and-trade program before alternatives can be exposed to 
public comment and properly evaluated” (Goldsmith, 2011). In analyzing the Scoping Plan, the 
judge further held the state agency improperly began implementing the plan before the 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) process was complete and, as a result, undermined 
the public participation process required by CEQA.  
 
 
Most notably, the scoping plan fails to provide meaningful information or discussion about the 
carbon fee (or carbon tax) alternative in the scant two paragraphs devoted to this important 
alternative. The brief fifteen line reference to the carbon fee alternative consists almost entirely 
of bare conclusions justifying the cap and trade decision. Informative analysis is absent. [C]ARB 
fails to describe what a carbon fee program consists of, how fees or taxes are established, 
criteria for setting the amounts, what the California, United States and worldwide experience 
has been, how it is administered and by who, what are the alternatives for use of the revenue 
and what sectors of the economy it should be considered for, or not, and why (Goldsmith, 2011).  
 
 
 
                                                           
85 Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources Board et al., No CPF-09-509562.  
86 CARB acts in a quasi-legislative capacity in interpreting and effectuating legislation. Accordingly, the court 
applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of review affording great deference to the agency in its interpretation 
of AB 32’s substantive mandates (Goldsmith, 2011).  
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Judge Goldsmith ordered CARB to revise the Functional Equivalent Document (the FED was 
developed by the agency to evaluate the Scoping Plan’s environmental impacts). He further 
instructed CARB to halt implementation of the Scoping Plan until it was in compliance with 
CEQA and a public comment period was reopened for the revised FED.  
 
While the court denied EDF’s request to intervene on behalf of the state in the AIR lawsuit,87 
other mainstream environmental groups, such as NRDC, remained neutral on the lawsuit, 
despite their strong support of a cap-and-trade mechanism (Egelko, 2011; O’Conner, 2011). 
Nevertheless, expert proponents of cap-and-trade, such as Robert Stavins, a Harvard University 
professor of business and government, publicly derided the environmental justice lawsuit 
against CARB as “misguided” because AB 32 would not only reduce California’s overall GHG 
emissions, but also lower the state’s overall emissions of co-pollutants. He asserted that if 
current laws regulating co-pollutants were thought to be insufficient, then the best response by 
environmental justice groups was not to “scuttle a statewide system that can achieve AB 32’s 
ambitious targets at minimum cost. Rather, the most environmentally and economically 
effective way to address such pollution is to revisit exiting local pollution laws and perhaps 
make them more stringent” (Stavins, 2011). EJ groups dismissed these assertions as ignoring 
the lax enforcement of local air quality laws, countering that existing air pollution laws were 
inadequate for safeguarding low-income communities of color. In particular, they noted that 
local and state agencies typically only evaluate a specific pollution source in a vacuum, without 
considering the scientific reality that other pollution sources and environmental stressors in an 
area can combine to create a new, elevated and unsafe health risks, also known as cumulative 
impacts (Pastor et al., 2011).       
 
Figure 34 
  
                                                           
87 Though the court did not allow EDF to join the case as a directly affected party to the lawsuit, EDF was allowed 
to submit a “friend of the court” (amicus) brief. During the legal process EDF helped advise CARB and, through the 
amicus brief, provided the court with relevant information in support of cap-and-trade and the Scoping Plan 
(Egelko, 2011; O’Conner, 2011).  
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Other critics of the AIR lawsuit claimed that the EJ groups were erroneous in their opposition to 
cap-and-trade because the mechanism represented less than one-fifth of the Scoping Plan’s 
overall GHG reductions, with the vast majority of reductions coming from other measures 
(Figure 34). However, the EJAC countered that the cap-and-trade mechanism was the key 
component of the Scoping Plan that would directly control and regulate GHG emissions from 
the industrial sector. LAO’s chief analyst, Mac Taylor supported this assertion in an independent 
analysis he produced for the state’s legislative leaders. He stated that less than 1 percent of 
2020 GHG emissions reductions in the Scoping Plan were intended to come from direct 
“command-and-control regulation” of the industrial sectors. In short, he claimed, although the 
industrial sector (including power plants, refineries, and cement plants) is the third largest 
producer of GHG emissions, under the Scoping Plan, the industrial sector’s contribution to 
emission reductions is to come almost entirely through its compliance obligations under cap-
and-trade (Taylor, 2012). 
 
Throughout the legal battle and the final adoption of the Scoping Plan, the state Legislature, 
including members of the Latino Legislative Caucus, largely remained silent. The bill’s author, 
former Assembly Speaker Fabian Núñez, called the court ruling “disappointing” and stated “it’s 
a false assertion, there won’t be more pollution…it’s another roadblock to California being able 
to achieve its predominance in the environmental world by being the first state in the country 
to implement CO2 reductions in a serious way” (Rogers, 2011).  Núñez however, chastised CARB 
for not taking the concerns of environmental justice groups more seriously early in the Scoping 
Plan process, such as implementing the ‘Community Empowerment Amendment’.   
 
Without substantive support from their Latino allies in the state legislature or mainstream 
environmental organizations, the court order proved to be a hollow victory for EJ advocates. 
Though the courts compelled CARB to examine alternative approaches, the agency merely 
produced a supplemental analysis to comply with the judgment. In this analysis, CARB 
maintained that its selection of the cap-and-trade mechanism was the only valid and feasible 
policy direction based on a thorough consideration of all available alternatives (CARB, 2011a). 
CARB exhibited a cavalier attitude in defending its use of a cap-and-trade program and also in 
its response to public comments received on the supplemental FED.  
 
During a 45-day public comment period, CARB received a total of 109 comment letters, many of 
them from EJ organizations, concerning the potential impacts of co-pollutants on socially 
vulnerable populations. When CARB approved the supplement to the FED on August 24, 2011, 
it dismissed many of these comments as inconsequential. Such comments, they stated, were 
outside the scope of the environmental analysis of alternatives; CARB referred the public to 
previously conducted public health analyses of AB 32. 
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[CARB] staff made minor modifications to the supplement based on responses to comments and 
other updates…None of the modifications alter any of the conclusions reached in the 
supplement or provide new information of substantial importance relative to the 
supplement…Although ARB disagreed with the findings of the court, to remove any doubt about 
the matter and to be consistent with ARB’s interest in public participation and informed 
decision-making, ARB prepared the Supplement to the 2008 FED and circulated it for public 
comment for 45 days (CARB 2011a, Pg. 1).  
 
 
The lead litigant in the lawsuit against CARB, the Center for Race, Poverty, and the Environment 
(CRPE) responded to the supplemental FED with a terse statement claiming that it was merely a 
post hoc rationalization of CARB’s 2008 decision to adopt a cap-and-trade mechanism and a 
contradiction of good-faith efforts at public participation. “[C]ARB’s supplement and its actions 
to continue implementing cap-and-trade while creating the alternatives analysis makes a 
mockery of the letter and spirit of CEQA, public participation and informed decision-making” 
(CARB, 2011a, Public Comment 89-1). 
 
Satisfying the court’s ruling, on October 20, 2011, California went on to make history as the first 
state in the U.S. to formally adopt a comprehensive program of regulatory and market-based 
mechanisms to achieve reductions in GHG emissions. As the centerpiece of California’s climate 
change efforts, CARB unanimously approved the cap-and-trade program (2011). Several CARB 
board members, however, noted their apprehension in moving the state into uncharted 
territory and the potential for unintended environmental health consequences. In recognition 
of this fact, CARB adopted an adaptive management plan that attempted to address localized 
air quality impacts expressed by environmental justice groups (Figure 35). The plan created a 
framework for the state agency to identify whether unanticipated environmental health 
impacts have occurred relating to implementation of the cap-and-trade program, and respond 
accordingly (CARB, 2011b). Alegria De la Cruz, the CRPE’s legal director, however, sharply 
characterized the plan as too vague, unenforceable, and heavily reliant upon CARB’s expertise 
and discretion:  
 
The adaptive management plan…allows for action if emissions increases happen. But CARB has 
said that if it finds there are increases, it has to find that emissions increased as a result of the 
cap and trade rule. Those causal connections will make it nearly impossible for CARB to take any 
action when [co-pollutant] emissions increases happen. Given these two impossibly high 
hurdles…this adaptive management plan will most certainly not address health concerns raised 
by the cap and trade rule (De la Cruz, 2011).  
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Figure 35 
CARB (2011b) Adaptive Management Process 
 
 
 
With the adoption of the cap-and-trade program and the adaptive management plan, California 
went on to conduct its inaugural auction of emissions allowances on November 19, 2012. 
Before the launch of the auction, Núñez (2012) publically reiterated his preference for a 
‘neocommunitarian’ strategy. He stated that California was at the cusp of an extraordinary 
opportunity in which the state could “limit pollution, protect public health, and spur a clean 
energy revolution.” As author of AB 32, he reaffirmed that the Legislature recognized that a 
market-based program like cap-and-trade, offered a range of environmental and economic 
benefits (Núñez, 2012).   
 
One year after its first auction, California’s climate program was widely hailed as a success and 
cited as proof of the viability of market-based mechanisms. In 2013, the state raised nearly $1 
billion from auction proceeds. Although the cap-and-trade program is not designed to raise 
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money, the first year of auctions demonstrated that the sale of GHG allowances can generate a 
significant amount of money. In the first quarter of 2014, allowances were selling at just over 
$11 per ton of CO2 (CARB, 2014).88 California’s program is now the world’s second-largest 
carbon market (trailing only the European Union), and covers 85 percent of the state’s GHG 
emissions (EDF, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
88 AB 32 requires that auction proceeds be invested in further reducing GHG emissions. 
  
134 
 
Section 4.11: Conclusion -Bridging Climate Science and Policy – Whose Reasoning and 
Epistemology Counts? 
 
 
The case of California’s cap-and-trade system highlights the role that expertise and economic 
incentives play in environmental policymaking. In the Legislature, environmental justice groups 
worked primarily with legislators of color, influencing multi-scalar connections between public 
health, jobs, and climate change. In particular, key members of the Legislative Latino Caucus 
advanced a neocommunitarian strategy that emphasized ‘community empowerment’ and ‘job 
creation’ in disadvantaged neighborhoods. However, as AB 32 went through the regulatory 
rule-making process at CARB, environmental justice groups quickly lost their capacity to affect 
the implementation of the law. 
 
Incorporating environmental justice in California’s climate change policy became problematic 
for several reasons. First, the structural conditions that have created environmental health 
inequities at the community level were concealed by CARB’s primary focus on universal 
scientific variables such as the amount of carbon emissions produced, and market-based 
mechanisms, regardless of place or context. These approaches separate climate change from 
political and socio-economic factors, and most importantly, the human-local scale (Jasanoff, 
2010; Hulme and Mahony, 2010). Moreover, CARB regulators continually pushed up the scale 
of climate change to the ‘global.’ They framed climate change as an environmental problem 
with little or no public health consequences and a problem best solved by efficient market 
mechanisms. Secondly, under these approaches, experts – not activists -- hold the key to 
knowledge about both the problem and the solutions (Barugh and Glass, 2010). The negative 
environmental and social impacts of climate change on local communities, as a result, were 
often ignored (Park, 2009; Bulkeley, et al, 2013). 
 
Climate change presents a complex environmental health and justice challenge; its scientific 
nature disempowers communities to independently examine the issue. In crafting AB 32, EJ 
advocates and their Latino legislative allies never fully came to a resolution with Governor 
Schwarzenegger over the question of how to attain the emission reduction targets, whether 
through command-and-control regulation or through cap-and-trade. Instead, they evaded the 
question altogether and delegated the decision to CARB.  This helped reify the role of the 
‘expert’ and the global scale of climate change by affording CARB wide discretion on the 
research techniques and scientific methods to implement AB 32. California appellate court 
Judge Stuart Pollak (2012) noted this assertion, stating that AB 32’s provisions were: 
 
exceptionally broad and open-ended. They leave virtually all decisions to the discretion of the 
[CARB] Board, from determining the nature of a scoping plan, to determining the best available 
research techniques, to determining incentives for emissions reduction that are "necessary and 
desirable," to weighing economic, environmental and public health benefits, to determining 
what is most "feasible and cost-effective.” 
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Moreover, while environmental justice groups were able to collaborate and relate to legislators 
of color based on a shared ‘lived’ experience, staff experts at CARB and its leadership remained 
largely dominated by white individuals. For example, when the Scoping Plan was adopted in 
2008, the entire CARB board membership was white, as was the executive agency staff. When 
the Supplemental FED was adopted in 2011, the racial composition slightly improved to include 
one African American on CARB’s nine-member board, and one Asian American on the agency’s 
six-member executive staff.89  Consequently, the challenge to AB 32 revealed how climate 
change science and policy in California still remains highly homogenous by race and class in its 
leadership. These variables raise significant questions about how they impact the production of 
knowledge, policy, and science around climate change (Park, 2009; Agyeman et al, 2003).  
 
Such variables likely came into play when CARB, in the regulatory process weighed the 
importance of various normative goals stipulated under AB 32. While AB 32 included 
opportunities for investment in disadvantaged neighborhoods through the ‘Community 
Empowerment Amendment’ and the reduction of co-pollutants, CARB perceived these goals as 
being strictly permissive. CARB regulators saw their statutory mandate as reducing the state’s 
overall GHG emissions most “cost-effectively” (California Health and Safety Code, sections 
§38560, 38561). To further this cost-effective mandate, CARB used public participation 
processes as a method to ‘manage’ aggrieved communities and bring the EJ movement into the 
fold of the neoliberal project. Such an approach is evident in CARB chair Mary Nichols’ 
statements that the agency enlisted extensive and unparalleled public participation 
opportunities while simultaneously developing a cap-and-trade program.  
 
Our process for developing the Scoping Plan was unprecedented in its openness and 
transparency, including many opportunities for substantive comment and interaction as the 
plan went through the draft process and through the final adoption. Ironically, some of the 
plaintiffs sit on CARB’s Environmental Justice Advisory Committee (created by AB32) and 
enjoyed unparalleled access to CARB staff and board members throughout plan preparation. As 
to the underlying concerns about cap-and-trade, we are in the early stages of developing a 
proposal...Now is the time to begin focusing on mechanisms to assure that the program is 
designed to assure that the communities that are most negatively impacted by industrial 
pollution receive a proportionately greater share of the benefits... (quoted in Hecht, 2009).  
 
While Nichols’ comments indicate that the public participation process may have been more 
robust than other regulatory processes, it did not necessarily result in the agency adopting the 
participants’ recommendations. Lievanos (2012) has problematized this type of misalignment 
between the regulatory outcomes from the formal structures of public participation and the 
normative goals of legislation as an issue of “state resonance”. He argues such conflicts occur 
when environmental justice is institutionalized according to the state rather than social 
movement values.   
                                                           
89 As of Spring 2014, two board members of color (both Latino men) had been appointed by Governor Jerry Brown 
to CARB, and two individuals of color were part of CARB’s executive team (1 Asian American woman and 1 Latino 
male).  
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Cases like the implementation of California’s ambitious climate change law, accordingly create a 
fundamental tension between distributive justice and the pursuit of economic efficiency. 
Environmental justice advocates focus squarely on the fair distribution of environmental health 
burdens and benefits. This is in contrast to the main goal of market-based systems, which is to 
achieve ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ by allowing the state to achieve global GHG 
reduction targets at a lower cost (Kaswan, 2008; Chinn, 1999).  As further asserted by Kaswan 
(2010), however, to achieve economic efficiency, market-based systems like cap-and-trade 
often must ignore distributional impacts. In essence, if cap-and-trade continues to operate in a 
streamlined process in California without input from local communities, the greatest reduction 
in GHG emissions will occur in areas where the co-benefits of human health are the lowest.90  
 
 
 
 
If facilities with high costs of control are located in polluted areas and rely upon allowance 
purchases rather than reducing emissions, air quality will not improve. Meanwhile, if facilities 
with low costs of control are located in less polluted areas, then the emissions reductions will 
be concentrated in the areas where they are least necessary. Thus, pursuing economic 
efficiency could come at a cost of distributive justice (Kaswan, 2010; Pg. 240).  
 
 
Despite the potential for uneven geographical distribution of health co-benefits, policymakers, 
academics, and economists continue to tout cap-and-trade as the perfect solution to climate 
change. This is due to the mechanism’s ‘cost-effectiveness’ in reducing global GHG emissions 
and perceived ancillary economic benefits, particularly job creation. California’s 
institutionalization of cap-and-trade provides a poignant example of how environmental 
governance is embedded within a complex socio-political and economic system in which 
particular agendas, and expertise influence the development of climate policy and 
environmental justice outcomes. As London et al. (2013) contends, the California experience 
also illustrates a strategic understanding of the divergent epistemologies held by state experts 
and environmental justice advocates on cap-and-trade as being grounded in “contentious 
politics of scale, the market and race” (Pg. 798).  
 
At the same time, however, the California experience points to the possibility of new civic 
epistemologies of climate change. The next chapter examines the new multi-scale policy 
approaches EJ groups are using to legislatively mandate direct engagement of issues of “race” 
and equity when analyzing and implementing climate change interventions. I analyze how 
environmental justice groups are rescaling the market-based mechanism of cap-and-trade to 
create multiscalar civic epistemologies in California. These CCStreets approaches replace the 
geographically-neutral focus on carbon reductions with new, localized interventions to address 
mitigation, adaptation, and health co-benefits for the most socially vulnerable populations.    
 
 
                                                           
90 Firms with the most antiquated facilities that emit the highest amount of GHG emissions are often located in 
low-income communities of color. These companies are likely to purchase the most emissions allowances (Kaswan, 
2008).    
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CHAPTER 5 
Cap and Trade-Offs: Rescaling Neoliberal Practices for Community Benefits  
 
 
 
Despite a philosophical conflict with cap-and-trade, environmental justice groups are creating a 
new civic epistemology that rescales the program’s geographically-neutral approach to address 
impacts in disadvantaged communities. The central element of this rescaling activity is a ‘cap-
and-dividend’ strategy, better known as a Climate Change Community Benefits Fund (CBF). 
Under cap-and-dividend, the state directs a dividend (or rebate) totaling 35 percent of AB 32 
auction proceeds, to be invested in low-income communities most affected by air pollution. 
CBF recipients can use the money for activities and programs that mitigate the effects of 
climate change and co-pollutants.   
 
Through the passage of CBF legislation, several EJ groups are attempting to use a market-based 
system to redress the limitations and inequities faced by communities harmed by pollution. The 
CBF allows for the scaling up of local knowledge and practices to fund CCStreets approaches in 
climate policy. These approaches validate community-based projects that reduce global GHG 
emissions while aiming to harness policy solutions such as transit-oriented development, 
renewable energy, and urban forestry projects to lower the risks of asthma and respiratory 
diseases. The creation of the CBF illustrates that opposition to cap-and-trade from EJ groups is 
not a rejection of the goals of AB 32, but a demand that climate solutions produce more 
equitable outcomes for all Californians.  
 
In this chapter, I first provide an analysis of how, after four years of lobbying and gubernatorial 
vetoes, EJ groups established a CBF in 2012 through enactment of Senate Bill (SB) 535.  Second, 
I examine the scientific instruments environmental justice groups are utilizing to shift 
California’s climate action strategy towards a focus on direct benefits to disadvantaged 
communities. Finally, this chapter discusses how EJ groups are using multiscalar policies to 
reconceptualize the phenomenon of climate change.  
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Section 5.1: The Cap-and-Trade Dividend 
 
 
Might the challenge of climate change provide an opportunity to rethink the meaning of 
development and economic growth in ways that promote redistribution of power and wealth 
while simultaneously protecting the environment? (Hartmann, 2010; Pg. 242)  
 
 
The concept of ‘cap-and-dividend’ first seriously entered the public discourse in May 2009, 
when Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s administration established the California Economic 
and Allocation Advisory Committee (EAAC). The 16-member panel was composed of 
economists and climate policy experts charged with providing guidance to the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) in measuring the economic impacts of the AB 32 Scoping Plan and the 
best ways to allocate emissions allowances under a cap-and-trade program (EAAC, 2010). In his 
welcome letter to EAAC members, Schwarzenegger (2009) emphasized one particular concept 
he urged them to explore. “[T]he concept of returning the value of allowances back to the 
people, including through an auction of allowances and distribution of auction proceeds in the 
form of a rebate or dividend, in order to minimize the cost to California consumers and 
maximize the benefits to the state’s economy”. In later months, however, the governor’s 
administration seemed to back away from its initial interest in cap-and-dividend.  
 
At an October 7, 2009 EAAC meeting, David Crane, Schwarzenegger’s special advisor for jobs 
and economic growth, failed to mention the concept in his testimony to the committee. 
Instead, he emphasized that the EAAC’s recommendations for implementing AB 32 needed to 
be developed in the “most effective and economically positive fashion” (Inside Cal EPA, 2009a). 
Similarly, several EAAC members at the meeting seemed unenthusiastic about suggesting a cap-
and-dividend approach. While committee members did not specifically criticize the proposal, 
they indicated such an option would be inefficient because it failed to fund key programs to 
lower GHG emissions through technology advancement. Committee members believed the key 
to addressing climate change required an approach that promoted innovation, while 
stimulating the economy (Inside Cal EPA, 2009a).  
 
While EAAC members were cool to the idea of the cap-and-dividend policy, mainstream 
environmentalists objected to a plan with a proposed rebate on an equal per capita basis to 
offset the potential price increases for goods and services, such as electricity. They opposed the 
redistribution of auction proceeds on an equal basis on the grounds that dividends would go to 
people who “do not need them” (Boyce, 2009). A representative of the Sierra Club California 
stated “we don’t favor returning carbon revenue to people as a cash giveaway…when it is likely 
to leave inadequate funding for essential climate measures.” The Sierra Club instead favored 
spending allowance revenue on green technology and energy efficiency programs for low-
income households (Inside Cal EPA, 2009a).   
 
On an independent and separate track, environmental justice groups like the Ella Baker Center, 
Asian Pacific Environmental Network (APEN) and the California Environmental Justice Alliance 
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(CEJA) were lobbying to persuade the EAAC to direct a significant portion of the auction 
revenue to disadvantaged communities. By doing so, the program could reduce not only global 
GHG emissions but also co-pollutants of climate change (i.e., O3 and PM 2.5). In their 
comments, EJ groups cited a memo by EAAC member James Boyce, an economics professor at 
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, that outlined three key policies: (1) investment of 
allowance revenue to a community benefits fund; (2) establishment of a co-pollutant 
surcharge; and (3) creation of a zonal trading system (Boyce, 2009; EJ advocates, 2013 – 
interviews with author). Under Boyce’s proposal, the community benefits fund would provide 
at least 10 percent of auction revenue to fund local community “environmental improvement” 
projects and programs in “overburdened communities.” The co-pollutant surcharge would levy 
an additional fee on allowances in overburdened jurisdictions, while directing fee revenue to 
community benefits funds in the jurisdiction where it was collected. The zonal trading systems 
would require a minimum level of emissions reductions in high-priority locations where 
potential co-benefits were the greatest (Boyce, 2009).   
 
The environmental justice advocates also noted that Boyce’s recommendation for the climate 
change community benefits fund was similar to a “California Carbon Trust” proposed in 2008, 
by the California Economic and Technology Advancement Advisory Committee (ETAAC) in a 
report to CARB outlining options for auction revenues: 91 
 
By setting aside a fixed portion of its funds to be distributed to projects based on cumulative 
impacts, geographic location, demographics, and/or associated co-benefits, this Trust could 
also help to reach important environmental justice goals. Distributing funds based on 
geography or demography would ensure that disadvantaged communities receive a pre-
determined amount of funding from projects that not only reduce carbon emissions, but also 
foster community development and protect low income consumers from rising energy 
prices…the Trust could choose to favor projects with ancillary benefits, such as green collar job 
creation, technology demonstration, or criteria and toxic pollution clean-ups. In these cases, 
the Trust would pay not only for carbon reductions, but would also consider co-benefits such 
as local air quality benefits (ETAAC, 2008; Pg. 2-5).92 
 
 
Ultimately, in its final report in March 2010, the EAAC only came to a consensus on 
recommending a cap-and-trade program and various other cost-efficiency measures. The EAAC 
could not reach agreement on any version of a cap-and-dividend approach. According to the 
final report, “some members of the committee favored distributing allowance value (auction 
proceeds) to households in the form of income tax reductions or avoided income tax increases” 
(Pg. 4).  Other committee members preferred distributing allowance value through rebate 
                                                           
91 AB 32 mandated CARB to create the Economic and Technology Advancement Advisory Committee (ETAAC) and 
instructed ETAAC to advise on activities that will facilitate investment in and implementation of technological 
research and development opportunities under California’s Climate Change program (ETAAC, 2009).  
92 Similarly, in a paper funded by the California Chamber of Commerce and the Western States Petroleum Group 
titled “Addressing Environmental Justice Concerns in the Design of California’s Climate Policy,” Schatzki and Stavins 
(2009) proposed that allowance revenue “could be directed toward funding or creating incentives for measures 
designed to improve air quality or health services in particular communities of concern” (Pg. 28).  
  
140 
 
checks to all households on an equal per capita basis, or suggested “allowance value [revenue] 
could be used to assist disadvantaged communities” (Pg. 53). Similarly, a December 2010 health 
impact assessment of a cap-and-trade program by the California Department of Public Health 
(CDPH) also provided an inconsistent endorsement of a climate change community benefits 
fund. CDPH indicated its support for establishing such a fund but advised “the distribution of 
[auction] revenues requires further broad-based public discussion” (Pg. 98).  
 
The lack of a full endorsement by CARB’s advisory bodies meant delays of several years in 
turning a climate change community benefits fund from concept to reality.  As detailed in the 
previous chapter, when CARB re-approved the AB 32 Scoping Plan on August 24, 2011, it chose 
not to immediately adopt any measures to compensate environmental justice communities for 
the potential impacts of a cap-and-trade program. CARB noted in the Scoping plan that the 
“most appropriate use for some of the allowances and revenue generated under AB 32 may be 
to retain it within or return it to the [industry] sector from which it was generated.” The agency 
included a sparse recommendation that revenues could be used to “enhance greenhouse gas 
emission reductions that also provide reductions in air and other pollutants that affect public 
health.” However, CARB indicated it would not adopt such measures until it sought more input 
from a broad range of experts and stakeholders in a separate “open public process” (2008; Pg. 
70). Additionally, in the formal October 20, 2011 resolution adopting cap-and trade, CARB 
(2011d) stated “the Board has considered the community impacts of the Final Regulation 
Order, including environmental justice concerns,” and concluded the cap-and-trade regulation 
was consistent with CARB’s environmental justice policies and that it would equally benefit 
residents of any race, culture, or income level (Pg. 6-7).  
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Section 5.2: Towards a Legislative Redress of Carbon Markets 
 
 
Anticipating that CARB would eventually ignore recommendations for the equitable distribution 
of cap-and-trade revenue, EJ advocates pursued a parallel legislative approach. In a strategic 
move, they chose to return to their Latino allies in the state Legislature in early 2009 to ensure 
the carbon markets established by CARB would have statutorily mandated robust social and 
environmental provisions. Keenly aware that environmental justice considerations in AB 32 
were written permissively and supplanted by a strict mandate of “cost-effectiveness,” 
environmental justice groups were confident they could realign California’s statewide climate 
change policy to explicitly focus on a positive interaction between race, place, and the market.  
 
The rationale to seek a legislative mandate for a CBF was first provided by Shankar Prasad, a 
science fellow for the Coalition for Clean Air (CCA). Prasad previously served as deputy 
secretary for science and environmental justice at the California Environmental Protection 
Agency (Cal EPA). As a trained scientist and physician, Prasad had more than 20 years of 
environmental health and public policy experience. In his years of public service, he informed EJ 
advocates only two things brought about real change in environmental governance: “one is the 
legislative mandate; and the other is a state budget appropriation” (Prasad, 2013- author 
interview).  
 
Prasad had witnessed the establishment of several environmental justice goals and policies 
without any substantive implementation. In particular, he recalled where former Assembly 
Member Judy Chu’s legislation establishing an “Environmental Justice Small Grants” program to 
fund a variety of environmental and public health projects, was eventually signed into law in a 
weakened form in 2002. As originally introduced in the Legislature, Assembly Bill (AB) 2312 
would have required Cal EPA to deposit 10 percent of all revenue collected from environmental 
fines and penalties into a fund created by the bill (State of California, Legislative Information, 
2002). The fund would be used for awards to grassroots organizations working to solve 
environmental problems; such awards could be used for an organization’s participation in 
decision-making processes at the local and state levels.  
 
Regulated industries, including those represented by the California Manufacturing and 
Technology Association (CMTA), strongly opposed AB 2312. Opponents claimed the legislation 
created the potential for inappropriate use of state funds. They argued it could “support 
litigation of any kind, advocacy against either government or private entities, or development 
of technical assessments that may be used to challenge government assessments” (CMTA, 
2002). Cal EPA, similarly, was concerned the funds would divert revenue collected from fines 
that were already earmarked for specific purposes, including personnel costs and 
administration (Inside Cal EPA, 2002). The opposition prompted the Assembly to add 
amendments to the bill removing the dedicated revenue source for the Environmental Justice 
Fund. Another amendment simply called for the Legislature to approve funding for 
environmental justice- related projects. The lack of a mandate and committed source of 
funding meant the fund would be inconsistent: the Legislature could appropriate no money to 
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the fund year after year, or endow it with millions of dollars on a consistent basis (Prasad, 2013 
– author interview).  
 
AB 2312 was signed into law in 2002, but prolonged state budget deficits prevented the 
Legislature from appropriating funds to the program for several years. Finally in 2006, the 
Environmental Justice Fund received a modest $350,374 from existing programs within Cal EPA. 
In that year, Cal EPA awarded 18 grants of up to $20,000 to community-based organizations 
and federally recognized tribal governments for environmental improvement projects. After 
2006, funding was more sporadic, totaling between $250,000 and $280,000 per award cycle. In 
fiscal years, 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2012, the fund received no funding at all (Cal EPA, 2013).93  
According to Prasad, the lack of dedicated funding made the Environmental Justice Fund’s 
viability difficult. “There was no funding stream attached to an Environmental Justice Program 
in any of the agencies or departments. So it all had to be carved out somehow from existing 
programs” (Prasad, 2013 –author interview). Each year, Prasad had to plead with Cal EPA 
department heads and program managers to “donate” a portion of their budgets to help fund 
local environmental justice projects.  
 
Consequently, fearing that the environmental justice community would face a similar fate with 
cap-and-trade revenue, Prasad developed a concept paper in March 2008 as part of his duties 
with CCA. The paper, titled “AB 32 Community Benefits Fund to Reduce Cumulative and 
Disproportionate Impact,” argued that the state should be required to invest revenue 
generated by any carbon pricing mechanism (whether a carbon tax or cap-and-trade) in climate 
measures that simultaneously tackled unhealthy air quality and greenhouse gases at the local 
scale (Prasad and Carmichael, 2008). Armed with this proposal, he approached environmental 
and social justice groups like the Center for Race, Poverty, and the Environment (CPRE) and the 
California chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
about sponsoring legislation to create a community benefits fund.  
 
Though these groups were apprehensive about returning to the legislature, they understood 
from Prasad’s Cal EPA experience - as well as their own encounters with regulatory processes - 
that real change would require a legislative mandate. According to Nidia Bautista, CCA’s 
legislative advocate in Sacramento, advancing CBF legislation was a delicate issue for EJ groups, 
many of which were skeptical about cap-and-trade.  
 
I think they were concerned that by engaging in this [legislation] that they might be validating 
the cap-and-trade program. And honestly some of them were understandably concerned that if 
we were moving forward with legislation, we might also be undermining their efforts at the 
time. As you know in 2009 they had a lawsuit against the California Air Resources Board…We 
wanted to be really respectful of that but at the same time we just felt like the political 
momentum was…that a carbon tax was unlikely and it didn’t get the traction that cap and trade 
was getting. So if [the State of California was] moving forward with [cap and trade], we should 
at least guarantee that we are making the commitment in AB 32 for direct investments in 
disadvantaged communities (Bautista, 2013 – author interview). 
                                                           
93 $250,000 was provided in fiscal year 2013. 
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Eventually, CRPE, along with the California NAACP and the Greenlining Institute, agreed to co-
sponsor the proposal with CCA. They return to Sacramento in January 200994 to approach a 
legislator about authoring CBF legislation. While environmental justice groups like CPRE did not 
support a cap-and-trade system, it shared the belief that implementation of AB 32 needed to 
be done in a way that maximized benefits to local communities most adversely impacted by air 
pollution. According to Sofia Parino, CPRE’s senior staff attorney, CPRE ensured the CBF 
legislation was written in a fiscally neutral manner and; did not specifically link the CBF to cap-
and-trade. As initially proposed, the legislation simply stated that the CBF would be funded 
from AB 32 revenue, which at the time could have included revenue from a carbon tax, since 
CARB had yet to formally adopt a cap-and-trade regulation.     
 
CPRE became a sponsor of [the CBF] in its early stages. This is while we were still working on the 
AB 32 litigation and thought there was a possibility that we could get something other than cap-
and-trade.  We saw some of the groups that were bringing forward this legislation were not EJ 
groups in the beginning…so we felt that we needed a voice and somebody that had a connection 
to the community…We were really fighting that we didn’t want [AB 32] tied to cap-and-trade. 
At the time the CBF was still tied to other [undetermined] revenues from AB 32 (Parino, 2013 – 
author interview).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
94 Though in early 2009, CRPE and the other AIR litigants had yet to file their lawsuit against CARB, they were 
preparing to do so at the time. The AIR lawsuit was officially filed on June, 11, 2009.   
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Section 5.3: Introduction of AB 1405 – The First CBF Legislative Attempt  
 
 
With Assembly Speaker Fabian Núñez term-limited out of office, environmental justice groups 
turned to Núñez’s childhood friend, Assembly Member Kevin De Leon, for assistance. A former 
union organizer, immigrant rights advocate, and close political ally to the author of AB 32; 
environmental justice groups felt De Leon was the appropriate person to introduce the CBF 
legislation. CCA’s Nidia Bautista said the co-sponsors specifically approached De Leon because 
“he represents a community that obviously would be impacted by climate change…and he had 
already demonstrated some leadership on the issue” (Bautista, 2013 – author interview). 
Throughout his legislative career, De Leon made a commitment to improving air quality in his 
Northeast Los Angeles district, which is crisscrossed by six freeways and has some of the worst 
air quality in the nation.  
 
In an attempt to secure his childhood friend’s legacy and fulfill AB 32’s promise that low-income 
communities of color would not be last in line for the benefits of cleaner air and new jobs in the 
clean tech economy, De Leon agreed to sponsor the legislation. As Núñez and the Latino 
Legislative Caucus had done in 2006, De Leon continued to promote neoliberal approaches to 
link California’s climate change program to public health and job creation.  In February 2009, he 
authored Assembly Bill (AB) 1405, stating during its introduction:  
 
Monies set aside in the [Community Benefits] fund will give access to health and environmental 
clean-up funds to our state’s most economically disadvantaged and most often polluted 
communities. According to the guidelines set forth in AB 32, these funds will also ensure these 
communities see the benefit of California’s investment in the clean technology economy. We’re 
looking at a win-win for these communities, cleaner neighborhoods and better jobs with skills 
that will be in demand in the new economy.  
 
 
The introduction of AB 1405 was heralded as the first attempt to fulfill the provisions of AB 32, 
which required to the extent feasible the “direct public and private investment toward the most 
disadvantaged communities in California…”(California Health and Safety Code, section §38565). 
Its co-sponsors claimed two major areas in which AB 1405 established a precedent for investing 
in local communities: (1)  a minimum threshold of 30 percent of fees generated under AB 32 to 
be deposited in a Community Benefits Fund, for investment in disadvantaged communities to 
accelerate GHG emissions reductions, mitigate co-pollutants, and create jobs; and (2) a 
requirement that CARB develop a scientific methodology to identify the state’s poorest and 
most polluted communities (Taruc, 2013 – author interview).     
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   Figure 36: AB 1405 Fact Sheet (CCA, 2009) 
 
 
As AB 1405 moved through the legislative process, it encountered strong opposition from 
industries regulated under AB 32. In its first Assembly policy committee hearing in April 2009, 
major industry organizations, including the CMTA, argued that the legislation was premature 
and that CARB’s Scoping Plan would appropriately address environmental justice concerns. 
Additionally, they argued, there was no need for a separate fund for environmental justice 
purposes because the Legislature would be involved continuously with CARB’s AB 32 program 
through the annual budget appropriation process.   
 
AB 1405 is premature since a cap and trade regulation is still in development at CARB. It is 
unknown what, if any auction will be included in the program. CARB must balance cost-
effectiveness, co-pollutant impacts, and technological feasibility as they develop the regulation. 
AB 1405 allows CARB to ignore these criteria, and there is no economic or environmental 
analysis to justify the bill. An arbitrary amount of funding for broad unrelated purposes with 
unknown economic and environmental impacts is the bill’s shaky foundation (CMTA, 2010).   
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The co-sponsors of AB 1405 met with the California Chamber of Commerce (Cal Chamber) and 
the Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA) in a good-faith effort to address their 
concerns. In the meeting, industry representatives expressed their support “in concept” for a 
CBF but were concerned that the fund could siphon off billions of dollars from cap-and-trade 
revenue. However, when the AB 1405 co-sponsors pressed industry on what they felt would be 
an appropriate amount, they asserted that “only $100,000 or so should be placed in the pot” 
for environmental justice purposes (Bautista, 2013 – author interview). It quickly became 
apparent during the meeting that the polluting industries had a sense of ownership over the 
potential AB 32 revenue.  
 
Industries felt that due to AB 32’s “cost-effectiveness” mandate, fee revenue should be 
returned to the industrial sectors from which it was generated as subsidies to upgrade facilities 
for direct emissions reductions, and not used for the CBF. As Bautista aptly put it: “I think for 
some of the industries, they felt like they were the one’s paying the fees, and it was their 
money. They felt that they shouldn’t have to give it to anybody, and industry should have 
control over it” (2013 – author interview). The industries’’ position directly conflicted with the 
key environmental justice principle of “polluter pays.” Meanwhile, the co-sponsors of AB 1405, 
saw no room for compromise on the legislation; in their view, industries were paying for the 
right to pollute. The fees generated under AB 32 were “public” dollars because industries were 
polluting a public good, the ‘environment.’ In essence, they argued that cap-and-trade revenue 
belonged to the general public, not industry, and should be invested by the public (Medina, 
2013; Seku-Amen, 2013 – author interviews).      
 
Without a compromise, CMTA and the Cal Chamber continued to oppose the bill during policy 
committee hearings. Nevertheless, the Assembly passed AB 1405 and sent it to the state 
Senate, by the time it went to the floor for debate on September 1, 2009, AB 1405 had 16 
legislative co-authors and support from more than 30 environmental, social justice and public 
health organizations. Simultaneously, the business lobby increased its efforts to defeat AB 1405 
on the Senate floor. Opponents had a greater chance in the Senate, which is considered more 
politically conservative than the Assembly; there, many controversial bills fail to receive the 21 
votes needed to pass legislation off the floor (Senior capitol staffer, 2012 – author interview). 
Industry groups like CMTA began to actively lobby senators before AB 1405 was scheduled for a 
floor vote. They accused Assembly members like De Leon of working on a “money grab” before 
CARB had even implemented a cap-and-trade system. Meanwhile, Dorothy Rothrock, CMTA’s 
vice president of government relations, informed senators the purposes and projects the bill 
sought to fund were “very broad and not necessarily associated with the impacts of AB 32 
compliance, or the cap-and-trade program” (Inside Cal EPA, 2009b).  
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Figure 37: AB 1405 was listed on the Cal Chamber annual list of Job Killer Bills. Graphic Cal Chamber (2013) 
 
 
The business lobby’s rhetoric of cost-effectiveness and charges that AB 32 was intended to 
reduce global GHG emissions, not “raise funds,” hit home with many senators. With less than a 
week left in the 2009 legislative session, AB 1405 lacked the votes to make it off the Senate 
floor and to the governor’s desk. According to Bonnie Holmes-Gen (2010), policy director for 
the American Lung Association of California, at the time there was “very serious industry 
opposition to AB 1405. The state Chamber of Commerce said it’s a job killer” (Figure 37).  
Additionally, CARB opposed the bill, arguing that it was premature since the Economic 
Allocations Advisory Committee (EAAC) had not developed its final recommendations. In an 
August 13, 2009 letter to De Leon, CARB stated that the EAAC “has explicitly included equity as 
one of the issues to be addressed in its deliberations…We do not believe it is wise or necessary 
for the Legislature to determine the method or proportion of revenues to be allocated to any 
specific fund unit, at a minimum, until the committee has given us its recommendations.”  The 
combined opposition from business lobbies and CARB, eventually led De Leon to move AB 1405 
to the Senate Floor Inactive File on September 10th; making it a 2-year bill. By delaying a vote on 
the bill until the next legislative session, the sponsors felt they would have ample time and 
resources to convince a majority of senators and the governor on its merits.  
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Section 5.4: Establishing New CBF Coalitions and Confronting Vetoes  
 
 
While De Leon and the sponsors regrouped to determine how to proceed in the upcoming 
legislative session, it became apparent that CRPE could no longer publicly support AB 1405. As 
described in the previous chapter, CRPE was involved in the AIR lawsuit against CARB, which 
was filed on June 11, 2009.  As the main litigant in the lawsuit, CRPE faced increasingly difficult 
odds in justifying to its EJ constituency why it supported legislation in Sacramento that could 
potentially be linked to a cap-and-trade system. By the Fall of 2009, CRPE withdrew its support 
of AB 1405, and informed De Leon and other co-sponsors that the move was intended to 
eliminate any perception of inconsistencies in their position on cap-and-trade. According to 
CRPE’s senior staff attorney, CRPE’s continued support of AB 1405 could be seen as 
incentivizing cap-and-trade and implying to EJ communities that it was an appropriate policy 
approach.   
 
I think about the same time when the bill moved to a two-year bill, it was also clear that cap-
and-trade was going to be the mechanism. And we weren’t going to have some other type of 
market-mechanism or there weren’t going to be any fees or anything like that. So we decided 
we weren’t going to sponsor the next iteration …because fiscally [AB 1405] was neutral but in 
practicality it was [funded] from cap-and-trade.  Our communities gave us a strong sense that 
they didn’t want to have anything to do with it. That it was dirty money…and one of our clients 
often stated that they didn’t want a ‘gold plated inhaler’…I did understand this idea that we 
were being paid off in a way and feelings from some of our communities that we don’t want to 
become addicted to it…such that if there were ever a point to find a better system we would be 
afraid to because of what it would mean economically, like losing programs. So it was really a 
difficult decision for us going forward (Parino, 2013 – author interview).  
 
 
Though CRPE withdrew its support for AB 1405, it did not oppose the legislation. It took the 
politically nuanced position of “neutral.” In this manner, CPRE could maintain its opposition to a 
cap-and-trade system without undermining the establishment of a community benefits fund. 
Perhaps in an attempt to maintain their allies and not burn political bridges in Sacramento, 
CRPE helped secured the California Environmental Justice Alliance (CEJA) as an official co-
sponsor of AB 1405 before CRPE withdrew its support for the bill. At the time, CEJA had just 
been formed as a statewide coalition of EJ organizations to advocate at the state and local 
levels for policies protecting public health and the environment. As one of the founding 
members of CEJA, CRPE strategically recruited CEJA to ensure that AB 1405 supporters 
maintained a balance of expertise in policy development and on-the-ground experience.95 With 
CEJA anchoring an environmental justice perspective, other EJ and social justice groups from 
the San Francisco Bay Area also joined as co-sponsors (EJ advocates, 2013 – interviews with 
author). 
                                                           
95 CEJA membership includes CRPE, the Asians Pacific Environmental Network (APEN), Communities for a Better 
Environment (CBE), Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice, Environmental Health Coalition, and 
People Organizing to Demand Environmental & Economic Rights (PODER).  
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The Ella Baker Center for Human Rights and the Asian Pacific Environmental Network (APEN), 
encouraged by their early success in creating an equitable Energy and Climate Action Plan 
(ECAP) for the city of Oakland, saw the advancement of a CBF as an opportunity to link their 
grassroots work on community-based climate solutions to the state level. According to Emily 
Kirsch of the Ella Baker Center, establishing a CBF was important, regardless of the fee 
mechanism chosen, as long as the money being collected was set aside for people and 
communities most impacted by air pollution (Kirsch, 2011 – author interview). Moreover, the 
Ella Baker Center believed community-based groups across California could offer models for 
equitable climate mitigation and adaptation projects. Limited by small staffs and budgets, a CBF 
could help such groups secure even greater reductions in GHG emissions and health co-benefits 
in pollution-adjacent communities:           
    
 
 
We are tying the work of the Oakland Climate Action Coalition to the work of the Ella Baker 
Center’s Green-Collar Jobs Campaign at the state level. As we look at AB 32 and the billions of 
dollars that will be generated by making polluters pay for their pollution, we can point to cities 
like Oakland and point to plans like our ECAP and say that’s where this money should go, to 
implement climate solutions rooted in equity (Kirsch, 2012). 
 
 
Similarly, Marie Rose, the statewide organizing director for APEN, stated EJ organizations like 
hers, felt a responsibility to use the lessons learned and their successes at the local scale to 
influence larger statewide policy: 
 
Oakland has a really strong Energy and Climate Action Plan. The biggest barrier to that being 
implemented is funding. A lot of cities have climate action plans that are grand ideas, but how 
are they going to get the resources to support the implementation or creation of the 
infrastructure for those kinds of ideas? So that’s why it’s important to do state advocacy, to 
make sure that state funds are going to flow back to the local communities, whether it’s local 
government or non-profits (2013 – author interview).  
 
With the addition of new bill sponsors, and De Leon settling into his leadership role as a 
more seasoned chairman of the powerful Assembly Appropriations Committee,96  the prospects 
for moving AB 1405 to the governor’s desk for signature seemed brighter in the 2010 legislative 
session. According to CCA’s legislative advocate, De Leon spent the next several months 
personally lobbying key senators to gain their support for the CBF bill (Bautista, 2013 – author 
interview). His growing reputation as an effective chairman in the Assembly persuaded several 
senators from politically moderate districts to reconsider their position on AB 1405. Moreover, 
in January 2010, De Leon announced his intention to run for the open 22nd state Senate district 
                                                           
96 De Leon was appointed chairman on June 13, 2008. The Assembly Appropriations Committee reviews all bills 
with any fiscal impact after passage by a policy committee. The goal of the committee is sound, responsible fiscal 
policy. The chairperson of the Appropriations Committee has enormous power to bring home special projects 
(sometimes referred to as "pork barrel spending") for his or her district as well as having the final say on whether a 
member’s legislative proposal is considered “too costly” for the state to implement (Senior capitol staffer, 2013 – 
author interview).  
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seat in Los Angeles. The lack of major rivals portended De Leon would capture the seat. De 
Leon’s rising political stature and the possibility of election to the state Senate prompted, some 
senators to develop a more collegial relationship with De Leon by supporting AB 1405.    
 
His leadership was huge. He would walk the halls to go lobby members. He drove out to the 
Imperial Valley to go meet with a member. He offered to drive out to the Inland Empire to 
meet with a member…He offered to drive up to Santa Ana to meet with another member. He 
really worked it. He made several efforts to meet with the [Governor’s] administration. So, his 
leadership [role] was huge. We couldn’t have picked a better author (Bautista, 2013 – author 
interview).  
 
 
After several months of lobbying for AB 1405, De Leon moved the CBF legislation from the 
Senate Inactive File on August 19, 2010. The bill was subsequently amended to reduce the 
required minimum investment threshold of 30 percent to just 10 percent. The author and co-
sponsors rationalized that a 10 percent threshold might be more palatable and seem less 
arbitrary to opponents and moderate Democratic senators. When the amended version of AB 
1405 finally came up for a floor vote on August 30th, the new amendments and lobbying 
strategy immediately paid off. AB 1405 passed the Senate with 22 votes, one more than 
needed. The measure passed almost on a strict party-line vote, with all Republicans and 1 
Latino Democratic senator from Orange County opposing it. AB 1405 returned to the Assembly, 
which immediately voted to concur with the Senate amendments; and sent it to Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s desk for consideration (California Legislative Info, 2010).  
 
While AB 1405 swiftly made it out of the Assembly and to the governor for consideration, it did 
not escape controversy. During the Assembly concurrence vote, Republican Assembly Members 
took the opportunity to denounce California’s AB 32 climate change program. In particular, they 
questioned whether communities were truly negatively impacted by GHG emissions and why 
such communities deserved to receive money from the cap-and-trade program. Several 
Republican members further argued that global GHG emissions did not cause health impacts, 
like other pollutants, such as nitrogen oxide or particulate matter. They stressed that the cap-
and-trade program would actually hurt low-income communities of color by raising energy and 
fuel prices (California Channel Archives – August 31, 2010).  
 
Assembly Member Chuck DeVore (R-Irvine) stated that AB 1405 “lays bare what all this cap-
and-trade is about regarding climate change…because it’s not about the climate. At the end of 
the day, it’s about power and taking money from certain industries and carving that money out 
and shipping it to politically favored groups.” In defending the measure, De Leon and other 
Democratic members, countered that AB 32 required “co-pollutant” reductions where possible, 
and that funding from AB 1405 would help reduce both GHG emissions and its co-pollutants. 
They further argued that a CBF could help create new “green jobs” in California’s most 
disadvantaged communities (California Channel Archives – August 31, 2010; Inside Cal EPA, 
2010).   
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While not as vocal or divisive as Assembly Republicans, CARB opposed AB 1405. As it did in the 
2009 legislative session, CARB maintained that it was premature for the Legislature to dictate 
specific provisions of the cap-and-trade program. At the time, CARB was still drafting 
regulations to implement the system, which were on track for adoption in November 2010, 
contingent on any potential court delays from the AIR lawsuit (Inside Cal EPA, 2010).97 
Consequently, Schwarzenegger echoed CARB’s position, in vetoing AB 1405 on September 30, 
2010 he stated the measure was premature and questioned the need for legislation to address 
climate impacts to disadvantaged communities. In his veto message, Schwarzenegger also 
encouraged EJ advocates to work with CARB during the pending regulatory process instead of 
sponsoring legislation. The pending regulatory process, he said, presented an opportunity for 
an open public discussion on the issue:    
 
When the Legislature passed and I signed AB 32, we made a commitment to California’s 
disadvantaged communities that we would ensure that the impacts of climate change and the 
impacts of reducing climate change would not fall disproportionately on their communities. 
Throughout [CARB’s] process, they have kept this commitment in mind and have fashioned 
every aspect of this program in a manner that attempts to lessen any disproportionate impact 
on these communities. I am confident CARB will keep on this path as they continue the 
important work of fashioning market-based mechanisms that will reduce the burden on 
California’s business community while still achieving our climate change reduction goals 
(Schwarzenegger, 2010a).  
 
 
According to a senior appointee in the Schwarzenegger administration (2013 – author 
interview), AB 1405 was vetoed mainly because the dynamics at play at the time with the state 
Environmental Justice Advisory Committee (EJAC), CARB, and the AIR litigants. There was a 
sense from the CARB leadership that if EJ groups were suing them, “why should we reward 
them?” The situation had become so politically charged by June 2010 that more than 100 
environmental justice advocates protested outside the home of CARB chair, Mary Nichols over 
the enforcement of toxic diesel pollution from railway operations (Leung, 2010).98  
 
Another factor in the governor’s veto was his chief of staff, Susan Kennedy, whom the senior 
appointee noted was still upset with EJ groups over the passage of AB 32 in 2006. Kennedy, the 
appointee claimed, was annoyed that Schwarzenegger had accepted language EJ advocates 
wanted in the context of “disadvantaged groups” and the establishment of the EJAC, yet, never 
came on as official supporters of AB 32 or joined the governor during the signing ceremony. 
This background, consequently, may have made Kennedy and others in the administration 
                                                           
97 As previously mentioned, the EAAC released their final report on March 2010 and the committee was unable to 
come to a consensus on a CBF or any type of a cap-and-dividend program.  
98 In June 2010, CARB had recently released a plan detailing a number of pollution reduction goals for railway 
operators, but EJ activists claimed the proposals were too weak. According to Penny Newman, executive director 
of the Center for Community Action & Environmental Justice, “we had a march in front of Mary Nichols’ house to 
bring home to her how serious the situation is…I think people are outraged. You can’t stand by and continue to let 
people be harmed. It’s killing people. It’s literally killing people” (Leung, 2010).   
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more inclined to accept the business lobby’s rationale for vetoing AB 1405 (Senior 
Schwarzenegger appointee, 2013 -author interview).  
 
Governor’s Schwarzenegger’s veto was primarily due to the influence some of the [business] 
lobby had and Susan Kennedy’s refusal toward giving in to the people who did not support AB 
32 in the first place…In a political sense, that was the stumbling block. [The] Chevrons of the 
world really took [AB 1405] as a job-killing bill…They basically portrayed it as a taking. However 
clear it was made that the community benefits fund will not be given as a voucher, it will be 
focused on state programs that bring about emissions reductions in specified areas; they 
portrayed it as actually taking money away from the big picture…facilities upgrades and new 
technology…[T]hat was the message that somehow convinced Susan Kennedy, the 
administration, including Mary Nichols, who quite frankly was a little reluctant in the beginning 
(Senior Schwarzenegger appointee, 2013 – author interview).  
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Section 5.5: Another Legislative Session, More Coalition-Building and Some Political Intrigue    
 
 
 
 
Figure 38: SB 535 Fact Sheet. Source: CCA, 2012. 
 
 
Undaunted by Governor Schwarzenegger’s veto, newly elected Senator Kevin De Leon was even 
more determined to ensure AB 32 funds were invested in California’s ‘disadvantaged 
communities in the 2011 legislative session. With the inauguration of Jerry Brown, a 
progressive Democrat, to his third term as governor (Brown had served as governor between 
1975-1983), De Leon believed the CBF legislation had a much stronger possibility of being 
enacted. In moving forward new legislation, he wanted to get past the lawsuits and the 
collective grudges between CARB officials and EJ groups. The senator was looking to change the 
political dynamic since he didn’t see himself as being from any EJ group or the governor’s 
administration. According to Alfredo Medina, who was responsible for environmental issues in 
the senator’s office, De Leon understood his responsibility in representing communities that 
had been impacted by climate change and air pollution. By enacting CBF legislation, he hoped 
to ensure that his communities were not forgotten and were accounted for in the AB 32 cap-
and-trade equation (2013 – author interview).    
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         Figure 39: SB 535 Fact Sheet. Source: APEN, 2011.  
 
 
 
On February 17, 2011, Senator De Leon reintroduced the CBF legislation as Senate Bill (SB) 535, 
the “Communities Healthy Revitalization Fund” or CHART (Figures 38 and 39). The legislation 
maintained the same co-sponsors as the final version of AB 1405. However, it added an 
important political ally to the list: the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a 
mainstream environmental group. In the previous two years, NRDC and other mainstream 
environmental groups supported the CBF legislation but did not actively lobby or put any 
resources into its passage. At the time, they supported “in concept” the investment of AB 32 
funds in disadvantaged communities, but were ambivalent about legislatively mandating it. 
NRDC’s addition as an official co-sponsor of SB 535 marked a turning point in gaining broader 
support for the legislation. As one of the original sponsors of AB 32 and staunch defender of a 
cap-and-trade system, the NRDC provided additional authority and legitimacy for establishing a 
CBF. In courting NRDC as a co-sponsor, Senator De Leon hoped it would influence CARB officials 
and Governor Brown.  
 
As anticipated, the new CBF coalition helped SB 535 sail through the Senate and Assembly 
policy committees with broad support among environmental and community-based 
organizations.99 In committee voting in favor of SB 535, several lawmakers cited that the 
Legislature should exert more direct control over key policies under the cap-and-trade program, 
rather than allowing CARB to determine all the decisions. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), 
the legislature’s nonpartisan fiscal and policy advisor had previously endorsed this reasoning. In 
2009, the LAO’s Mark Newtown, urged lawmakers at a Senate budget subcommittee hearing to 
take a more substantive role in establishing rules for the cap-and-trade program. “The use and 
design of cap-and-trade mechanisms are very complex and involve a lot of policy choices, and 
we think those should be signed off by the Legislature. And we highly recommend a policy bill 
that would provide direction for cap-and-trade.”   
 
Conversely, business and industry groups continued to attack the legislation, arguing that it was 
jumping ahead of regulatory proceedings at CARB. At a June 27, 2011 Assembly Natural 
Resources Committee hearing, Brenda Coleman, a lobbyist with the Cal Chamber, further 
                                                           
99 SB 535 passed in the Senate with 23 votes. However, two members of the Latino Legislative Caucus, senators 
Lou Correa and Gloria Negrete-McLeod, voted against SB 535. Both senators represent moderate suburban 
districts in Southern California (State of California, Official Legislative Information).  
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questioned whether “disadvantaged” communities would suffer any additional health impacts 
from implementation of a cap-and-trade program. She cited a recent CARB report that 
determined the program would not cause an increase in co-pollutants. The California Council 
for Environmental and Economic Balance (CCEEB) similarly asserted that SB 535 wrongly 
conflated the impacts from criteria air pollutants such as particulate matter and ozone and the 
“alleged” impacts from GHG emissions. A CCEEB lobbyist further testified that global GHG 
emissions had “no localized impacts on residents” and that the state had regulatory 
mechanisms to control co-pollutants, which would be fully enforced while cap-and-trade was 
implemented (California Channel Archives, 2011; Inside Cal EPA, 2011).      
 
Despite the strong opposition by industry, the CBF legislation appeared on track to pass out of 
the Legislature and reach the Governor’s desk in record time. Yet SB 535 met a political road 
block on August 25, 2011 in the Assembly Appropriations Committee – the same committee 
that De Lon had previously chaired. The committee held the legislation without discussion 
during a hearing on all pending fiscal bills.100 In a private meeting, the chair of the committee, 
Assembly Member Felipe Fuentes informed De Leon that SB 535 would not be considered for 
passage at the time (Medina, 2013 – author interview). According to several other Capitol 
sources, the committee held SB 535 under direct instructions of Assembly Speaker John Perez. 
The Speaker was allegedly angry that De Leon had recently withdrawn his support for Perez’s 
high-profile bill, AB 46. The measure sought to dissolve Vernon, a tiny city located in both 
member’s districts that had been riddled with corruption problems. As retribution, it was 
believed that Perez held SB 535 in the Appropriations committee. The move made SB 535 a 
“two-year” bill, ineligible for committee consideration until the next legislative session (Senior 
capitol staff members, 2013 - author interviews). 
 
AB 46 died four days later on the Senate floor. De Leon led the charge to vote down the Perez 
measure, arguing that it was no longer necessary since he had negotiated an agreement with 
Vernon city officials to voluntarily adopt a package of governance reforms. Among those 
reforms included $60 million payout by the city to fund community and environmental projects 
in the small, working-class cities surrounding Vernon. De Leon at the time argued that the 
reform package was superior to dissolving Vernon, in part because it brought direct benefits to 
the residents who live around the largely industrial city. The 5.2-square-mile city, located south 
of downtown Los Angeles, had about 1,800 businesses but only 112 residents at the time; 
furthermore, the city is surrounded by densely populated Latino communities. In media 
accounts, De Leon stated that the fund would help mitigate years of pollution, traffic, and other 
problems caused by Vernon's factories and the "predatory" policies of its top officials (Allen, 
2011; Maddaus, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
100 As previously noted, AB 1405 passed out of this committee without identifying substantial costs to the state.    
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Section 5.6: The Scientific Tools of Environmental Injustice  
 
 
I do have what I believe to be a major responsibility to protect those that have little or no voice. 
Whether they are being choked by freeways or stationary emitters of CO2 or traditional 
pollutants, if they don’t have a voice here, then they have no voice anywhere else. So I’m looking 
forward to a very close and proactive working relationship with you Mr. Rodriquez. 
 ---Senator De Leon to Cal EPA Secretary Matt Rodriquez during his Senate Rules Confirmation 
Hearing (Senate Television, 2012).  
 
 
With the second setback for CBF legislation in as many years, De Leon and the SB 535 co-
sponsors retreated, taking the following months to determine their next course of action. After 
several strategy meetings, the coalition decided to focus on implementing a key provision of 
the CBF legislation through the regulatory process at Cal EPA while awaiting the bill’s fate in the 
Assembly Appropriations Committee. The various iterations of the CBF legislation had required 
the state to develop a scientific methodology for identifying and investing in environmental 
justice communities. Advocates envisioned this methodology – based on a ten year effort by EJ 
advocates to commit California to create a comprehensive Cumulative Impacts Tool (CI) -- 
would systematically identify communities most burdened by multiple sources of pollution and 
most vulnerable to its effects. By identifying such communities across California, advocates felt 
the state would better understand where to prioritize limited resources.  
 
Focusing their efforts on the regulatory implementation of the CI tool was a strategic move. The 
interim Cal EPA Secretary, Matt Rodriquez was scheduled in early 2012 to be confirmed by the 
Senate Rules Committee, of which De Leon was a member. Through the Senate confirmation 
process, SB 535 supporters hoped that De Leon could get a commitment from Rodriquez to 
fully implement a CI tool within the next year.  Moreover, by gaining Cal EPA’s pledge, it also 
could bolster SB 535’s probability of being signed by Governor Brown, as the legislation would 
be consistent with his administration’s on-going regulatory efforts (Bautista, 2013 – author 
interview).  
 
Since 2004, statewide policies highlighting the significance of cumulative impacts had been on 
the books and thoroughly documented in rigorous scientific literature.101 Yet, political leaders in 
Sacramento continually punted on adopting a state-sanctioned CI tool. This impasse finally 
forced CEJA to form a strategic partnership in 2010 with academic experts, Manuel Pastor 
(University of Southern California), Rachel Morello-Frosch (UC Berkeley), and Jim Sadd 
(Occidental College) on the on-going development of their Cumulative Impact screening tool, 
the Environmental Justice Screening Methodology (EJSM). While CARB funded the initial 
                                                           
101 Cal EPA has a working definition of cumulative impacts adopted in 2005 as follows: “Cumulative impacts means 
exposures, public health or environmental effects from the combined emissions and discharges, in a geographic 
area, including environmental pollution from all sources, whether single or multi-media, routinely, accidentally, or 
otherwise released. Impacts will take into account sensitive populations and socioeconomic factors, where 
applicable and to the extent data are available.”  
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analytical work on the EJSM and developed it with input from agency scientists and an external 
scientific peer review committee, the academic experts had solicited feedback early on from EJ 
groups regarding their interpretation of preliminary results and selection of appropriate 
indicators. The strategy of soliciting peer review from agency personnel, scientific experts, and 
community stakeholders was aimed at ensuring that the final EJSM was methodologically sound 
and transparent to diverse audiences in the regulatory, policy, and advocacy arenas (Sadd et al,  
2011).   
 
 CEJA contracted with the academic researchers in 2011 to test the draft EJSM tool in 11 
environmental justice communities statewide. In the process, they organized more than 70 
community residents and 30 community organizers to “ground-truth” the model and test its 
validity (CEJA, 2012). The final EJSM tool, moreover, was developed as a collaborative, 
community-academic research model, with residents and EJ advocates in each of the targeted 
geographic areas trained to verify the accuracy of data and incorporate local knowledge into 
the model (Figure 40).  
 
This community-based participatory research approach was intended to not only verify the 
results, but also help inform community members about their environmental surroundings and 
build local capacity.  Moreover, the approach provided on-the-ground observations from 
residents that public databases often miss. For example, CARB has several definitions for 
“sensitive sites” and “hazardous receptors,” but according to CEJA they might not include 
places that residents identify as hazardous or sensitive, such as nail salons. Ground-truthing 
was cited by the coalition as a method to check the accuracy of “official” government data, 
which can contain erroneous facility locations or completely omit them (CEJA, 2012).  
 
 
 
Figure 40   Source: CEJA (2012).  
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The environmental justice advocates described the EJSM as including the most comprehensive 
indicators of environmental, health, and socioeconomic factors to develop a relative scoring 
system to assess cumulative impacts at the neighborhood level. The scoring system is based on 
23 indicators of cumulative impacts that have been identified in academic and scientific 
research and through community-based input. The EJSM integrates three measures to produce 
an overall cumulative impact score for a census tract. These measures include: 
 
• the proximity of people to environmental hazards, and the number of sensitive land 
uses (such as parks and playgrounds, childcare centers, schools, and hospitals); 
• the exposure and risk experienced by residents from air pollution; and 
• the overall extent of social and health vulnerability, as measured by demographic, 
economic, health and political indicators (CEJA, 2012).  
 
 
Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapping techniques and land-use data, the EJSM 
assesses the number and volume of indicators present, and their proximity to sensitive land-
uses in a particular census tract. This screening is used to develop a “cumulative impact” score, 
and color-coded maps. As illustrated in Figure 41, the scores range from 3-15, with 15 being 
“highly impacted” (CEJA, 2012). 
 
 
 
Figure 41.  Cumulative Impact Score for the 6-County region of Southern California. Source: CEJA 2012. 
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Through the EJSM, more than 15 square miles of California environmental justice communities, 
in urban and rural settings, were field-tested. CRPE and UC Davis Professor Jonathan London 
supplemented this work in developing the Cumulative Environmental Vulnerability Assessment 
(CEVA) methodology, specific to environmental concerns in the Central Valley. This dual 
engagement allowed EJ groups to compare the two models, understand how the tools were 
best applied, and increase their comprehension of the science of cumulative impact 
methodologies (CEJA, 2012). According to CEJA and their allies, after years invested in 
developing and testing methodologies, they considered themselves experts on cumulative 
impacts and understood how the state could effectively implement a science-based tool. Their 
EJSM field work revealed that low-income neighborhoods and communities of color across 
California are subject to high poverty rates, surrounded by hazardous land uses, and exposed 
daily basis to emissions from toxic industries (Vanderwarker, 2013 – author interview). 
 
Consequently, the field-testing by EJ groups increasingly put pressure on state regulatory 
scientists to develop their own methodology for assessing cumulative impacts and meeting the 
provisions of AB 32 (California Health and Safety Code section §38570(b)(1) and section 
§38562(b)(2)). The state eventually developed a draft CI tool, partly based on the EJSM. The 
state however, chose to bypass a community-based participatory research approach in the 
development of their tool. State scientists at the Office of Environmental Health Hazard 
Assessment (OEHHA) and CARB truncated several indicators selected by EJ advocates in the 
EJSM tool and focused on a regional screening approach, instead of a neighborhood-scale 
assessment (CARB, 2010; OEHHA, 2012). In releasing their drafts, OEHHA and CARB indicated 
that it would need more input and analysis from a broad set of stakeholders, including 
representatives of business and nongovernmental organizations before a final version of the 
tool could be released for public comment (CARB, 2010; Alexeeff et al, 2012).  
 
CEJA and their allies were angered by the realization that the state process potentially could 
take several more years. CEJA believed the state had no reason to delay the implementation of 
a CI tool, since the best-available science on cumulative impact screening already existed in the 
EJSM and CEVA tools. CEJA (2012) argued that OEHHA’s geographic scale, using zip codes did 
not effectively identify highly impacted communities. Since zip codes encompass a large 
geographic area that contains both impacted and unimpacted communities, some results might 
reflect a “washing out” of some environmental justice communities. CEJA identified 11 other 
key deficiencies in the state’s CI tool, including the lack of a pesticide exposure indicator (CEJA, 
2012).     
 
Moreover, CEJA asserted that the EJSM was ready to implement since it had been peer-
reviewed and thoroughly field-tested through a community-based approach. They claimed it 
would be a poor use of limited state resources for CARB and OEHHA to undertake a time-
consuming regulatory process to finalize another tool when a scientifically peer-reviewed 
model already existed (CEJA, 2012).  
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CEJA supports Cumulative Impact tools in statewide policy; the time has come to take 
action on this critical issue. For years, a concern with incorporating CI into policy-making 
has been that we lack the scientific basis to identify communities that face 
disproportionate impacts. We now have the science. Like all science, it is constantly 
evolving, but with the existing models out there, we now have highly regarded 
methodologies that are based in academic literature and scientific analysis (CEJA 
comment letter to OEHHA, 2012).       
 
 
According to a former senior Capitol staff member, Cal EPA may have deliberately stalled the 
implementation of a CI tool in the face of opposition from industry (2013 – author interview). 
Since academic experts developed the EJSM with CEJA, without significant input from the 
business community, businesses challenged the scientific validity of the EJSM. The tool was 
perceived as being too biased, while the formulas assigned to indicators were cited as arbitrary, 
and potentially distorting findings. For example, some business representatives worried that 
the EJSM placed too much weight on measures that might not reflect actual exposures, such as 
proximity to hazardous waste sites (2013 -- author interview). Industry groups for years have 
raised concerns about the use of cumulative impact studies, arguing that they could prompt 
additional environmental reviews and health assessments beyond the scope of existing 
regulations. At a public meeting held to review the draft OEHHA CI tool, a representative from 
the Chemical Industry Council of California expressed concern that “the obvious intent of some 
is to push [CI] into the regulatory realm.” Other industry representatives at the meeting urged 
caution in using the tool because communities with high scores might scare away industry and 
business investment (Inside Cal EPA, 2012).     
 
According to Mari Rose Taruc, APEN’s statewide organizing director, CEJA understood the 
implications from the growing opposition to the state implementing any type of CI 
methodology, particularly one developed by environmental justice groups. As a result, CEJA 
shifted their focus to support OEHHA in finalizing a state-sanctioned CI tool in a timely manner. 
They amended SB 535 to provide CalEPA with only general criteria to identify disadvantaged 
communities, which include: (1) areas disproportionately affected by pollution and other 
hazards that can lead to negative public health effects, exposure, or environmental 
degradation; or (2) areas with a concentration of low-income people who suffer from high 
unemployment rates, low homeownership levels, high rent burdens, or low educational 
attainment levels (California Health and Safety Code, section §39711). By proposing flexibility in 
the state’s development of a CI tool, instead of mandating a specific methodology, advocates 
anticipated a smoother route to passage for SB 535 in the upcoming legislative session. 
 
Earlier on there was a bit of debate of which tool to use to identify communities. Because really 
SB 535 was one of the first pieces of legislation and law to say you have to use tools to identify 
where these impacted communities are at…We had thought that the [EJSM] was a superior 
tool…but we understood that first identifying cumulative impacts and where these communities 
are at across the state, is big to even just identify them. We always get asked, well what is 
environmental justice and where are you? Policymakers and technical experts always ask us for 
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this information. For us to be able to point to a scientific tool, the things that we know from the 
community that are true but have to be supported by research; so it was just great to have this 
tool to point to (Taruc, 2013 – author interview).  
     
 
With a shift in strategy, the co-sponsors and Senator De Leon set their sights on the upcoming 
Senate Rules Committee confirmations of Cal EPA Secretary Matt Rodriquez, OEHHA Director 
George Alexeeff, and several CARB appointees. During the public hearings and in private 
meetings, Senator De Leon questioned nominees on their position to fully implement a CI tool 
within the year and their support for investing cap-and-trade funds in disadvantaged 
communities. As part of this line of questioning, De Leon directly placed gubernatorial 
appointees on the public record regarding their positions (Bautista, 2013 – author interview). 
This strategy proved effective in getting Cal EPA Secretary Rodriquez in his February 12, 2012, 
confirmation hearing to commit his support for a CI tool, and reaching a compromise with the 
Legislature on investing cap-and-trade funds in disadvantaged communities.   
 
 
Part of AB 32 and part of what CARB is doing is providing information. Let’s get as much 
information on these areas as we can. One of the things I want to work on, not just in AB 32, but 
generally, is to continue to get information so that we can identify disadvantaged communities 
in the state. Why do we need this information? So that we can then focus programs on various 
kinds to help areas that are disadvantaged…[In regards to investing in impacted communities], 
I have been unable to come to a position on what floor or threshold we should have…we know 
we have to work with the Legislature on how these funds will be expended. I think we will be 
able to, I mean I know we are going to have to come to an agreement with the Legislature on 
how these funds can be expended (Rodriquez, 2012 – response to Senator De Leon at Senate 
confirmation hearing).    
 
 
 
According to CCA’s Nidia Bautista, the commitment De Leon extracted from Secretary 
Rodriquez and other gubernatorial appointees was instrumental in getting OEHHA to develop a 
draft CI tool by the end of 2012. Staff scientists and appointees in the Brown’s administration 
who were skeptical about adopting a CI tool in previous years were now required to follow 
through on its implementation. The state officially finalized and adopted a CI tool, 
CalEnviroScreen in 2014. The tool uses a science-based method to develop a statewide analysis 
of the communities most burdened by pollution from multiple sources and most vulnerable to 
its effects. In developing CalEnviroScreen, Cal EPA (2014) asserts that, while traditional risk 
assessments may account for the “heightened sensitivities of some groups, such as children and 
the elderly,” it has not considered other characteristics that have been shown to affect 
vulnerability to pollution, such as socioeconomic factors or underlying health status (Pg. 1).  
 
While CalEnviroScreen is a peer-reviewed, science-based tool developed by government 
experts, it represents a culmination of more than a decade of collaboration with EJ groups, 
academics, and industry officials (Cal EPA, 2014). In particular, the final CalEnviroScreen tool 
was significantly influenced by screening models initially developed jointly by environmental 
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justice groups and university researchers. Before OEHHA formally adopted the tool, CEJA and 
their allies continued working with the state to engage in the development of the various 
iterations of CalEnviroScreen. Through this process, the researchers and EJ groups added 
several indicators from the EJSM methodology to CalEnviroScreen, including neighborhood 
scale analyses at the census tract level rather than zip codes (EJ advocate, 2013 –author 
interview).   
 
 
Figure 42: Formula for Calculating CalEnviroScreen Score.  Source: Cal EPA, 2014.  
 
 
As depicted in Figure 42, the overall CalEnviroScreen score is calculated from the pollution 
burden and population characteristics groups of 19 indicators by multiplying the two scores. 
Each group has a maximum score of 10; the maximum CalEnviroScreen score is 100. A 
percentage for the overall score is calculated from the ordered values. Maps are then 
developed illustrating the percentiles for each of California’s approximately 8,000 census tracts. 
As shown in Figure 43, these maps illustrate areas in the state with the highest pollution 
burdens and social vulnerabilities.  
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Figure 43: CalEnviroScreen Statewide Result. Source: Cal EPA (2014) 
 
 
The CalEnviroScreen tool, however, does not include ‘race/ethnicity’ as an indicator because 
the tool will be used to distribute state grants to disadvantaged communities. Under the 
California Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209), state agencies are prohibited from using 
racial/ethnic preferences in governmental programs and decisions. A separate analysis by Cal 
EPA found that more than 35 percent of the state’s Latino population and 28 percent of the 
state’s African American population, resides in communities ranked in the top 20 percent for 
cumulative impact (Figure 44). Only 7 percent of the state’s total White population lives in such 
communities (Cal EPA, 2014). Cal EPA concludes in its analysis that “Hispanic/Latinos and 
African Americans disproportionately reside in highly impacted communities…Whites are over-
represented in least burdened communities” (Cal EPA, 2014; Pg. 4).   
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Figure 44: Proportion of Each Demographic Group’s Population in Each Category of CalEnviroScreen Score. 
Source: (Cal EPA, 2014; Pg. 6).  
 
 
Consequently, while CalEnviroScreen does not provide an official analysis based on 
race/ethnicity, it nevertheless represents an unprecedented tool that provides state 
policymakers and stakeholders with a method to scientifically identify the disproportionate 
environmental harms. In doing so, groups can gain a better understanding of the relationship 
between social vulnerability and the pollution burdens facing California communities (Cal EPA, 
2014). The adoption of the CalEnviroScreen tool also represents a scientific inscription of 
environmental justice in California’s climate governance. It provides EJ groups a basis to 
integrate a socio-scientific narrative of socially vulnerable communities, and influence the civic 
epistemology of climate change. As previously noted, civic epistemology includes a range of 
knowledge production processes, such as government statistics, quantitative data, and 
methods of reasoning that typify public decisions around environmental issues. The 
CalEnviroScreen tool, as a scientific inscription (producing maps, graphs, charts, and other 
data), affects the manner in which actors conceptualize the complexities and dynamics of socio-
scientific problems, like environmental impacts. The tool has the potential to focus in on and 
simplify contextual data from the larger narrative of environmental justice: for example, the 
use of maps and charts can illustrate pollution burdens and their relationship to population 
characteristics.  
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Consequently, an essential element in translating science to policy action is the ability to use 
simplified representations (inscriptions) to understand and make policy decisions about the 
larger narrative from which the inscription was derived. In this method, an inscription, such as 
the CalEnviroScreen tool, can be seen as a conceptual tool for making sense of the world (Barab 
et al., 2007). Thus, the enrollment of this new inscription in climate governance, is 
supplementing technical practices to consider various socio-economic conditions when crafting 
policy solutions.   
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Section 5.7: The Ultimate Cap and Trade-Off - Enacting the CBF   
 
 
It has been noted that those who like sausages should not watch them being made. Former 
Governor Ronald Reagan remarked on one occasion that the same rule applies to the making of 
laws (Former California Senator H.L. Richardson, 1978, Pg. 45).  
 
 
After Senator De Leon helped defeat Assembly Speaker Perez’s bill to dissolve the city of 
Vernon, an entire year would pass before SB 535 was finally released from the Assembly 
Appropriations Committee. The CBF legislation emerged from the committee on August 16, 
2012, on the condition that De Leon and co-sponsors accept substantive amendments. These 
amendments deleted the establishment of the “California Communities Healthy Air 
Revitalization Trust” fund. They instead required at least 10 percent of revenues from CARB’s 
GHG reduction program to be earmarked for investment in “disadvantaged communities” and 
deposited in the newly conceived “Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Reductions Fund”.  
 
The GHG Reductions Fund was to be established by Assembly Speaker John Perez’s own bill, AB 
1532. To ensure Perez’s bill would survive, the appropriations committee required De Leon to 
accept an amendment to SB 535 that kept it from taking effect unless Assembly Bill 1532 was 
also enacted (California Health and Safety Code, section §39723(3)). According to several 
Capitol sources (2013 – author interviews), Speaker Perez forced the amendments on De Leon 
as punishment for derailing his legislation the previous year. Rather than simply voting down SB 
535 in committee, Speaker Perez permanently linked himself to the legacy of California’s CBF by 
taking away a key provision of the CBF bill from De Leon. This form of retribution also denied De 
Leon from being cited as the only legislator credited for establishing the ‘first-in-nation’ Climate 
Change Community Benefits Fund.    
 
Despite the political marksmanship between Perez and De Leon, linking the two bills fate 
actually strengthened support for establishing a CBF from cap-and-trade revenue.102 The 
amendments adopted by the Assembly Appropriations Committee mandated that not only 10 
percent of cap-and-trade revenues to be directly invested in projects located in disadvantaged 
communities, but a minimum of 25 percent of revenues also fund projects to provide “general” 
benefits to disadvantaged communities. Through AB 1532, CARB and the state Department of 
Finance were now mandated to develop an investment plan every three years for auction 
revenues through a public process, that maximizes the state’s economic, environmental and 
public health benefits (California Health and Safety Code, section §38565).   
 
Most notably, the newly drafted version of SB 535 explicitly fulfilled the goals established in AB 
32. It provided disadvantaged communities with resources to address existing environmental 
health problems and to ensure that benefits from renewable energy projects would be 
                                                           
102 As previously noted, on October 20, 2011, CARB formally adopted a cap-and-trade program. The first allowance 
auction was scheduled to take place in November 2012.  
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available to all residents. As described in the previous chapter, AB 32 allowed for investments 
“toward the most disadvantaged communities in California” and provided “small businesses, 
schools, affordable housing associations, and other community institutions” with the 
opportunity to “participate in and benefit from statewide efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions” (California Health and Safety Code, section §38565). SB 535 and AB 1532 secured 
direct investment in programs that create the following co-benefits: 
 
1. maximizing economic, environmental and public health benefits to the state; 
2. fostering job creation by promoting in-state greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
projects carried out by California workers and businesses; 
3. complementing efforts to improve air quality; 
4. directing investments toward the most disadvantaged communities and households 
in the state; 
5. providing opportunities for businesses, public agencies, nonprofits, and other 
community institutions to participate in and benefit from statewide efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions; and 
6. lessening the impacts and effects of climate change on the state’s communities, 
economy and environment.103 
 
 
The legislation also placed upon CARB additional mandates, such as a requirement to 
implement several priority funding categories, like sustainable transportation and affordable 
housing, for GHG reduction strategies. According to APEN, affordable housing and public transit 
are among low-income communities’ most pressing needs, and addressing those needs in its 
cap-and-trade investment plan could yield even greater benefits for the state’s GHG reduction 
efforts. Thus, by linking SB 535 and AB 1532 and requiring additional mandates, the CBF 
became more appealing to diverse constituencies.      
 
 
 
Figure 45: AB 1532 and SB 535 joint Fact Sheet. Source APEN (2012a). 
 
 
 
                                                           
103 California Health and Safety Code, section §39712(b).  
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Consequently, by the time SB 535 and AB 1532 came up for their respective floor votes in the 
Assembly and Senate, both measures had the support of three former Cal EPA secretaries, two 
former board chairs of CARB, and endorsements from nearly 200 public health, labor, clean 
tech/energy, conservation, environmental and social justice, and immigrant rights 
organizations.104 Most notably, the California Latino Legislative Caucus identified both 
measures as “Priority Bills” and several ethnic minority chambers of commerce added their 
support (Figure 45). The heightened profile of the legislation ultimately led several moderate 
Latino legislators who previously opposed SB 535 to reverse course and vote for the new 
iteration of the CBF bills.  
 
The expansive statewide support, and backing by influential members of the Latino Legislative 
Caucus, secured the passage of both bills, which Brown signed into law on September 30, 2012. 
Environmental justice groups hailed the signing of the two bills as a major victory. It validated 
the climate policy agenda that community advocates had spent years developing and lobbying 
to bring relief to polluted and economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. In an email to 
supporters, APEN’s Mari Rose Taruc, stated that “Immigrants and refugees have wanted to 
advance climate solutions to solve both the environmental and economic crisis in their 
communities but haven’t had much support to do so until now” (APEN, 2012b). In media 
outlets, blog posts, and press releases, the co-sponsors of SB 535 further stated that the 
investment from cap-and-trade proceeds would fund projects to improve air quality in polluted 
communities, and place more clean energy jobs into these communities. 
 
Our work on SB 535 began in 2009 when our [Oakland] Green Collar Jobs Campaign saw a way 
to ensure that Cap and Trade revenue could actually make a difference in California communities 
most hurt by poverty and pollution…[T]hanks to the hundreds of you who have written, called, 
and showed up in Sacramento to advocate for these vital bills. Together we have secured a 
brighter, greener future for California communities that need it the most.  
--- Blog post from the Ella Baker Center the day after Governor Brown signed SB 535 and AB 
1532 into law (Ella Baker Center, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
104 At this time, CEJA withdrew its support of SB 535 and took a neutral position. As a statewide EJ organization, it 
did not want to endorse legislation that could be seen as validating cap-and-trade. CEJA’s member organizations, 
APEN and PODER remained as co-sponsors and supporters of SB 535 (Parino, 2013– author interviews).   
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Section 5.8: The SB 535 Coalition and the Implementation Process    
 
 
 
Figure 46 illustrates the roles and responsibilities of the various entities that are involved in developing the 
investment plan, as well as allocation and implementation of the auction proceeds.  Source: CARB (2013a). 
 
 
The celebration of the passage of SB 535 was purposely short-lived as the co-sponsors quickly 
shifted towards implementation. This phase was crucial, as the Department of Finance and 
CARB were required to develop a three-year investment plan to allocate the billions of dollars 
from the cap-and-trade program; the agencies were scheduled to release a draft of the plan for 
public comment in early 2013 (Figure 46). “After it was signed into law, the co-sponsors, APEN, 
the Coalition for Clean Air, Public Advocates and the Greenlining Institute, then said that we 
want to continue with implementation. So we turned our supporter list from SB 535 into an 
implementation coalition - the SB 535 Coalition” (EJ advocate, 2013 –author interview).105   
 
                                                           
105 It is important to note that while environmental and social justice groups supported AB 1532, they did not co-
sponsor that piece of legislation. Perhaps in a sign of loyalty to Senator De Leon, the first author of the CBF 
legislation, in advocating for the investment plan funding priorities, they only referred to themselves as the “SB 
535 Coalition.” 
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The SB 535 Coalition convened strategy meetings in October 2012 with grassroots, community-
based organizations about developing a framework to secure the benefits promised to 
disadvantaged communities by SB 535. From those meetings, the coalition went on to conduct 
several webinars and regional and statewide workshops. These workshops helped facilitate 
engagement in CARB’s public process for adopting the investment plan and aided in soliciting 
ideas from disadvantaged communities about potential funding opportunities. Chief among 
these engagement efforts was a November 2012 survey of 28 environmental justice 
organizations. The survey results helped the coalition better understand the needs of 
California’s disadvantaged communities and the programs that the SB 535 Coalition should 
prioritize in the CARB investment plan. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47   Source: SB 535 (2013) Coalition webinar. 
 
 
The survey results identified five existing statewide programs as high priorities for near-term 
investments, such as affordable transportation and housing, low-income energy efficiency and 
renewable energy programs, and urban forestry projects. (Figure 47). These existing statewide 
programs were chosen because they were viewed as providing the greatest investment and 
health co-benefits opportunities in disadvantaged communities.  
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Figure 48: SB 535 Priority Funding Fact Sheet.   Source: SB 535 Coalition (2013). 
 
 
 
Throughout the winter of 2013, the SB 535 Coalition gained strong momentum for a majority of 
their recommendations for near-term priority projects.106 They developed elaborate reports, 
fact sheets, and lobbying strategies to ensure their funding priorities were included in the 
investment plan (Figure 48). This included organizing the attendance of EJ and social justice 
leaders at CARB’s Investment Plan hearings and the submission of comment letters highlighting 
their near-term recommendations (Mayer, 2013 – author interview).  
                                                           
106 The SB 535 Coalition also identified several mid- to long-term priority areas, such as low carbon freight 
transportation and water efficiency programs. However they noted these areas required further analysis, 
stakeholder outreach, and legislative authority to implement.  
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However, as the coalition lobbied their priority programs, they met resistance with their 
proposal to fund affordable housing projects near transit as a climate mitigation solution. 
According to Guillermo Mayer, senior attorney with Public Advocates and SB 535 Coalition 
member, administration officials initially expressed doubt that affordable housing had a 
meaningful role to play in climate action planning. “When we first started talking on the state 
level about affordable housing, it wasn’t even on the radar of a lot of decision makers as a 
strategy…I think people weren’t seeing the links between GHG reductions and affordable 
housing and also the links between affordable transit and actually maintaining existing 
ridership” (Mayer, 2013 – author interview).  
 
Many policymakers did not understand that constructing transit-oriented development (TOD) 
projects in existing high-density neighborhoods can be an effective GHG mitigation measure, 
but has the potential to displace low-income people, seniors, and renters as older housing stock 
is replaced with new market-rate units. In actuality, Mayer claimed that housing displacement 
from TOD projects could have the effect of undercutting GHG mitigation strategies as lower-
income residents would be forced to move out to cheaper suburban locales with even fewer 
transit options. As a result he asserted, many individuals would be forced to buy a car to 
commute to work and community services, thereby increasing a region’s vehicle miles traveled 
(VMT) and its GHG emissions. These assertions were supported by data analysis developed by 
the Oakland-based transportation justice nonprofit Transform and the California Housing 
Partnership. Their analysis showed that a 10 percent investment of cap-and-trade revenues 
would create 15,000 affordable housing units near transit. This equates to nearly 2 million 
metric tons of GHG reductions or 105 million fewer miles driven over a 55-year estimated life of 
these buildings (Figure 49). Their analysis also showed that low-income households living within 
½ mile of transit drive 30 percent fewer miles. This rate increases to 50 percent fewer miles 
traveled when these households are within ¼ mile of transit with frequent service. Conversely, 
higher-income households living within ¼ mile of transit drove twice as many miles as did low-
income households (Transform, 2014).  
 
Following months of lobbying and presentations of studies linking housing displacement and 
increased VMT, the SB 535 Coalition finally persuaded CARB officials, the Department of 
Finance, and the governor’s office that affordable housing near transit was a worthy climate 
mitigation strategy. “We were able to convince administration officials about the link…we had 
to point to some studies that we were able to compile together that pointed us in that 
direction, and we got it in [the investment] plan (Mayer, 2013 – author interview).  
 
  
173 
 
 
Figure 49: Benefits from a 10 percent cap-and-trade investment in affordable housing as a GHG mitigation 
strategy. Source: Transform (2014).  
 
 
 
 
In May 2013, CARB finally the first investment plan for cap-and-trade proceeds for approval by 
the Legislature. The plan provided strategic direction for identifying priority state investments 
to achieve GHG reduction goals and yield valuable co-benefits at the statewide scale, and most 
importantly in disadvantaged communities.107 Unlike the regulatory process for the AB 32 
Scoping Plan, the investment plan included a majority of recommendations proposed and 
favored by environmental justice advocates. In the 2014-2015 fiscal year, the state is providing 
$285 million to GHG mitigation projects located within, and benefiting, disadvantaged 
communities (CARB, 2014b).  These projects include urban forestry, low-carbon transportation, 
transit operations and affordable housing, energy efficiency programs and waste diversion 
(Figure 50). For projects to be eligible, CARB requires that they “provide direct, meaningful, and 
assured benefits to disadvantaged communities” (2014; pg. 1). Due in large part to the 
influence of the SB 535 Coalition, CARB’s guidance memo for agencies administering 
investments places a strong emphasis on projects that create health co-benefits from reducing 
health harms (e.g., asthma and obesity) due to air pollutants and the built environment. The 
guidance also stresses a priority for projects that reduce heat-related illnesses and increase 
thermal comfort (CARB, 2014b). 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
107 The Governor’s January 2013 budget request had proposed investing $500 million from auction proceeds in 
accordance with the investment plan; however the governor’s May 2013 Revised Budget, which was approved by 
the Legislature, instead provided for a one-time $500 million loan from the GHG Reduction Fund to help offset the 
overall state budget deficit. According to CARB officials, the delay in distributing the auction proceeds would 
provide state agencies additional time to design and modify existing state programs in accordance with the 
investment plan (CARB, 2013a).  
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Figure 50: FY 2014-15 Cap-and-trade investments for disadvantaged communities (CARB, 2014b).  
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Section 5.9: Coming Full Circle on Climate Change Community Benefits Funds   
 
 
For APEN, our statewide work, our state policy work has to come back to Richmond and 
Oakland…We have to be able to see those benefits come back to the communities that 
we are working in (Taruc, 2013 – author interview). 
 
 
The quote above from APEN concisely summarizes the environmental justice community’s civic 
epistemology of climate change – climate policy and initiatives must be confronted at multiple 
scales. It must provide real and direct benefits for local communities most impacted by the 
phenomena. This public way of reasoning was carried forward even after the SB 535 Coalition 
successfully influenced the final draft of the state’s investment plan. APEN, Public Advocates 
and several other SB 535 Coalition members, working through the 6 Wins for Social Equity 
Network, strategically shifted their statewide efforts to focus on auction revenues that were 
specifically dedicated to regional governments. 
 
The 6 Wins Network’s108 advocacy campaign was centered in the San Francisco Bay Area, where 
the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) and Association of Bay Area Governments 
(ABAG) were responsible for developing a regional blueprint required by state law (SB 375) as a 
condition of receiving cap-and-trade funding and state/federal transportation grants.109  The 
regional blueprint (also known as the Sustainable Communities Strategy) must integrate land-
use planning and transportation networks in a way that achieves passenger vehicle GHG 
emissions reductions while addressing housing needs and other regional planning objectives. 
ABAG and MTC’s blueprint, called “Plan Bay Area,” determines how billions in public 
transportation money will be spent over 28 years in the 9-county region. The plan seeks to 
influence how and where the region will house the 2.1 million new residents projected to live in 
the region by 2040 (Maracantonio, 2013).  
 
The 6 Wins Network had worked for several years attempting to get the regional governments 
in the San Francisco Bay Area to commit to their equity-driven alternative regional blueprint. In 
2011, it developed the Equity, Environment and Jobs (EEJ) Scenario focused on creating a more 
healthy, prosperous, and sustainable region for Bay Area residents of all races and incomes. 
However, partly due to intense lobbying by the building and real estate industry, MTC and 
ABAG eventually chose not to adopt the EEJ scenario or many of the local transit, affordable 
housing, and displacement recommendations the 6 Wins Network advocated (Maracantonio, 
2013).  
 
                                                           
108 The Network defined their “6 Wins for Social Equity” as follows: community power, local transit service, healthy 
and safe communities, economic opportunity, affordable housing, and investment without displacement.  
109 For more information on this law, commonly known as SB 375 Sustainable Communities (Steinberg, Chapter 
728, Statutes of 2008), see Barbour, Elisa, and Elizabeth A. Deakin. 2012. Smart Growth Planning for Climate 
Protection. Journal of the American Planning Association, 78 (1): 70–86.  
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Nevertheless, bolstered by the SB 535 Coalition’s recent success in Sacramento, at the final 
hearing on the adoption of Plan Bay Area on July 18, 2013, the 6 Wins Network secured 
substantive amendments incorporating several of the issues community advocates had sought 
throughout the Plan Bay Area process. In the words of Public Advocate’s Richard Marcantonio: 
 
The final plan adopted last night includes decisive improvements on many of the issues low-
income communities and communities of color have been fighting for over the past three years. 
In particular, three amendments will help protect families in these communities from 
displacement, improve their access to local transit service, and give them a voice in how billions 
of dollars in cap-and-trade revenues will benefit them (Marcantonio, 2013).  
 
 
One of the key amendments referenced by Marcantonio was secured through Contra Costa 
County Supervisor John Gioia, who also was a recent appointee to CARB. Gioia introduced an 
amendment (similar to the mandates required by SB 535) that commits the San Francisco Bay 
Area region to an inclusive public process to set priorities for cap-and-trade revenue. Gioia’s 
amendment to Plan Bay Area, guaranteed that at least 25% of cap and trade revenues eligible 
to the region would be spent to benefit disadvantaged communities.  
 
With the adoption of the SB 535 cap-and-trade investment plan and the Gioia amendment in 
the Plan Bay Area, the concept of a Climate Change Community Benefits Fund had come full 
circle. While California’s cap-and-trade program still remains controversial with some groups, EJ 
advocates have deepened the state’s commitment to disadvantaged communities by making 
environmental justice a core goal of climate change policies. Moreover, the EJ advocates 
approach to demand that climate policies produce co-benefits remains a fundamental factor for 
continued support by California residents. In a 2013 statewide survey, a majority of Californians 
(52 percent) specified that cap-and-trade auction revenue should be used to improve 
environmental conditions in disadvantaged communities. Most interestingly, 65 percent of 
Californians also indicated that the state should act immediately to meet its climate goals, even 
in difficult economic times– up nine percentage points from 2012 (PPIC, 2013). In essence, the 
establishment of the CBF is providing opportunities to explicitly link California’s climate change 
policies with air quality, public health, and economic goals. When fully implemented, 
investments will not only accelerate the reduction of global GHG emissions; they will also help 
improve environmental health conditions and induce revitalization in historically disadvantaged 
communities.  
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Section 5.10: Conclusion - Rescaling Climate Policy and Influencing California’s Civic 
Epistemologies  
 
 
The adoption of California’s Climate Change Community Benefits Fund illustrates how and why 
particular governments develop linkages between climate change and population health at 
various scales. In California, environmental justice groups are simultaneously pressuring the 
state to consider both the burden of climate change (e.g., environmental injustice and uneven 
geographic impacts) and the benefit of mitigation policies for environmental health in practice. 
This chapter illustrates that environmental governance entails a variety of decision points that 
involve determining who makes particular policy choices, and which criteria and knowledge are 
used in making those decisions. From the scientific knowledge of state regulators, to the local 
knowledge of EJ activists, the struggles over the institutionalization of environmental expertise 
in governance regimes creates contentious climates.  
 
Environmental justice groups are challenging normative issues that are bound up with scientific 
representations of nature. In their challenge, they are mobilizing support among diverse actors 
to addresses the social and economic changes needed to implement socially-robust climate 
change policy (Jamieson, 2001). While EJ advocates in California have made significant progress 
in validating their civic epistemology of climate change, they did so primarily through 
oppositional tactics, such as the enactment of legislation or the filing of lawsuits to effect 
regulatory agency behavior. By working within the confines of regulatory processes, EJ groups 
often have to engage in “trade-offs” or compromises to bring about social change (London et 
al., 2008).  
 
While most EJ groups are philosophically opposed to market-based mechanisms, social 
movements like the SB 535 Coalition have had to embrace pragmatic approaches to ensure that 
‘compensation’ via cap-and-trade revenues is directed to the communities most impacted by 
air pollution. It has only been through the establishment of a CBF that the goals of AB 32 to 
protect and invest in disadvantaged communities are starting to be fully realized.  Moreover, as 
we have seen through these oppositional tactics and trade-offs, climate policy can only achieve 
public credibility and political authority when the boundaries of the relevant moral-political 
space are redrawn so as to accommodate the interests of all parties (Jasanoff, 1997; Pg. 242).   
 
 
These compromises have been attributed to the process of institutionalizing the goals of a social 
movement into a preexisting political context with often conflicting organizational dynamics and 
regulatory imperatives. Indeed, as issues move from social movements into policy, the meaning 
and methods of state and regulatory enforcement are highly contested. Understanding the 
dynamics of these power relations and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the parties as 
they intersect to form this policy arena is critical to a full analysis of environmental justice in 
California (London et al, 2008; Pg. 289). 
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Though these contestations and pragmatic trade-offs, EJ groups are revealing that climate 
change is not just an environmental problem that requires a singular, top-down policy solution. 
EJ groups have shown the utility of multiscalar approaches that tackle a global environmental 
problem as well as public health issues at the neighborhood level. By scaling-up community-
based approaches and local knowledge, they offer an alternative conceptualization of what the 
phenomenon of climate change means not just in the physical sense, but what it means in 
different places and scales, to different peoples, and at different times. Through the case of 
California’s Climate Change Community Benefits Fund, we have followed environmental justice 
actors through contentious geographies and entered into a network where climate change is 
simultaneously constructed as a universal and localized as a particular.      
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CHAPTER 6 
California’s Climate Beyond Borders:  
Trans-local Climate Justice Movements at the Capitol 
 
 
 
In Acre, Brazil, the demarcation of indigenous territories is paralyzed because they want to take 
our lands to make profits from environmental services through programs like REDD [forest 
carbon offsets]. We will not and cannot trade our hunting, our fishing, and our lives for pollution. 
You cannot trade pollution for nature. We are for life – therefore we are against REDD. 
- Ninawa, president of the Federation of Huni Kui people of Acre, Brazil, in his remarks to California 
environmental justice leaders regarding international forest carbon offsets (2012a).   
 
 
The passage of Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act has made California a 
world leader on climate change science and policy innovation. AB 32 is considered a 
landmark bill that could spark other subnational governments to adopt similar programs. In 
recent years, California has proposed creating another international precedent, by allowing 
businesses that otherwise would have to reduce their emissions at home; to forgo those 
obligations. Instead of following state requirements, California business could opt to invest 
in forests in Acre, Brazil and Chiapas, Mexico by purchasing “carbon sinks” to offset the 
pollution they generate.  
 
The potential use of these so-called “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation” (REDD) carbon offsets has provoked international discontent from indigenous 
rights leaders in the Global South and California environmental justice advocates. This 
emerging trans-local climate justice movement argues that such offsets produce emissions 
“hot spots” where pollution continues at the point of source in California. At the same time, 
the burden of reducing emissions shifts to the Global South, where the commodification of 
tropical forests as carbon sinks results in land grabs and forced displacement of poor 
indigenous communities. The conflict over REDD offsets eventually led to an international 
delegation of indigenous leaders from Brazil, Mexico, and Ecuador to join California EJ 
advocates in Sacramento at a 2012 CARB hearing to oppose the state’s proposed carbon 
offset scheme.  
 
In this chapter, I first describe how California’s attempt to make its cap-and-trade program 
part of a larger international carbon market has significant social implications for local 
communities worldwide. Second, I examine the methods California environmental justice 
groups are using to influence climate change policy formation and implementation within 
and among nation-states. Finally, this chapter concludes that the phenomenon of climate 
change is not configured in a single place or scale. Rather, climate change is an object of 
multiple natures, which is brought into being by ensembles of heterogeneous actors, 
techno-scientific practices, and socio-economic variables. 
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Section 6.1: An Overview of California’s Global Climate Regime  
 
 
California as a ‘nation state’ is pivotal in the great struggle to transform the world economy. If 
we continue to pioneer and to prove that we can succeed environmentally as well as 
economically, other people will be able to follow. What happens here doesn’t stay here. It goes 
all around the country and all around the world.  
           – Governor Jerry Brown at the United Nations Climate Summit in New York City (Brown, 2014). 
 
 
 
Figure 51 
California has signed over 35 Climate Agreements with other governments.   Source: CARB (2014c) 
 
 
If California were a country, it would rank among the top 20 greenhouse gas emitters in the 
world, ahead of the nations of Spain and Italy. The state produces 1.3 percent of the total 
global emissions and 8.8 percent of the United States’ total emissions. By comparison, Germany 
(2.35 percent), Australia (1.25 percent) and Italy (1.13 percent) each account for less than 5 
percent of global GHG emissions (EDGAR Database, 2014; CARB 2014c). While California is only 
one of the nation’s 50 states, it has surpassed the U.S. in the comprehensiveness and range of 
its overall GHG emissions reduction plan. As a subnational actor, California is engaging in the 
climate change policy arena on par with the world’s nation-states (Mazmaian et al., 2008).  
 
State policymakers view California as a member of the global community and envision its cap-
and-trade program as part of larger domestic and international carbon markets. The state 
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ushered in a new era of international linkages on January 1, 2014, when California and the 
Canadian province of Quebec, fully integrated their cap-and-trade programs. The linkage, 
allowing carbon allowances from either jurisdiction to be used for both programs, is the first 
cross-national linked emissions trading program between two subnational jurisdictions. 
According to CARB (2013b), linking the two carbon markets creates a broader range of emission 
reduction opportunities, enhances market liquidity and reduces volatility caused by temporal 
events, like extreme weather or economic downturns. Linkage between the two programs 
reduces duplicate administrative services and overall costs (Stavins et al. 2014). In attempts to 
expand the state’s global reach, California has also signed Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) agreements with more than 35 nation-states and subnational governments (Figure 51). 
These MOUs cover issues that help facilitate global climate policy transfer and cooperation on 
low-carbon strategies while encouraging trade and investment in clean energy technologies 
(CARB, 2014c).   
 
While economists and policymakers applaud California’s efforts to develop more efficient 
carbon markets, environmental justice advocates claim that such linkage programs may 
adversely affect some Californians. They argue that linkage programs not only expand the 
state’s carbon markets but also encourage the trading of mechanisms that do not require 
emissions reductions within California’s borders. Polluters that cannot meet their GHG 
emissions reduction obligations can also purchase ‘alternative compliance mechanisms’ that 
are commonly referred to as “carbon offsets.” AB 32, allows these companies to apply offset 
credits equivalent to 8 percent of their mandated emissions cap. These credits, which are also 
traded on the carbon market can be generated by GHG reduction projects located anywhere in 
the United States and potentially the world (CARB, 2014c). The projects are operated by 
entities such as private landowners, non-profit organizations, and corporations not otherwise 
regulated under the cap-and-trade program to reduce GHG emissions in industry sectors such 
as forestry or farming. Each offset credit is equal to one metric ton of CO2 (CARB, 2008) and on 
average is $3 cheaper than carbon allowance credits (an offset credit costs $9, versus $12 per 
allowance credit). CARB considers offsets as an important mechanism to encourage GHG 
emission reductions in a variety of sectors while decreasing compliance costs of regulated 
entities (EDF, 2015).  
 
California’s cap-and-trade market regulates more than 400 large utilities and manufacturing 
facilities that emit in excess of 25,000 metric tons of GHG annually within the state. EJ 
advocates argue that the expanded use of carbon offsets can pose additional burdens to 
residents who live near the state’s refineries and power plants. Each offset credit purchased by 
a polluter means one less ton of GHG reduced (and its associated co-pollutants) at a California 
facility, or a one-metric ton increase in overall emissions. For example, in 2013 the Shell Oil 
Company (the U.S. subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell), which owns two oil refineries and 
numerous other high-polluting facilities in California, purchased 500,000 forest offsets to meet 
its AB 32 obligations. These offset credits will not reduce any emissions near the company’s 
California facilities. Instead, they will protect the environment in Michigan’s pristine Upper 
Peninsula, where the offset credits will help sequester additional carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere through the preservation of a 200,000 acre forest. The offset project is estimated 
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to produce more than $1.5 million in potential gross compliance cost savings for Shell (Blue 
Source and The Forestland Group, 2013).    
 
The purchase of forest offsets encapsulates the conflicting civic epistemologies of climate 
change as the state attempts to expand its climate regime beyond its borders. In particular, 
there is significant contestation over the extent corporations regulated under AB 32 are 
responsible for lowering GHG and co-pollutants emissions in their local communities (Table 16). 
According to Guillermo Mayer, president of Public Advocates and member of the SB 535 
Coalition, residents who are disproportionately burdened by air pollution should directly 
benefit from AB 32. “Instead of reducing the pollution locally through better technology 
upgrades or ramping down emissions, [polluters] get to buy trees in another part of the world. 
The residents nearby aren’t helped” (Mayer, 2014b). He and other EJ advocates argue that from 
an equity and public policy standpoint, offsets are an inefficient method for polluters to meet a 
portion of their emission reduction targets (Parino, 2013; Kirsch, 2011 – author interviews).   
 
To the contrary, mainstream environmental organizations like the Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF) and the Nature Conservancy, assert that carbon offsets are a major component of 
California’s GHG reduction strategy (Table 16). According to Emile Mazzacurati, managing 
director of Four Twenty Seven, a firm that advises business on carbon markets, offset credits 
provide polluters flexibility to search the country and potentially the globe for the most cost-
effective methods to reduce GHG emissions while investing in conservation projects.  
 
 
What this program (AB 32 offsets) is supposed to achieve is a reduction in greenhouse gases. 
Greenhouse gases are, by their nature, global. It doesn’t matter where they come from. They all 
go into the atmosphere (Mazzacurati, 2014).       
 
 
The California Air Resources Board (CARB, 2014d) has issued nearly 17 million credits since 
2011 for its five approved alternative compliance mechanisms (Figure 52).110 The agency, 
however, will not release information on which polluters are purchasing offsets. According to a 
CARB representative, “each entity’s strategy in purchasing offsets is considered market 
sensitive” (Halper, 2014).  The lack of government transparency only emboldens environmental 
justice advocates’ opposition to offsets (Truong; Mayer, 2013 – author interviews). The 
purchase of Shell’s offsets was only made public through a press release from the operators of 
the Michigan forestry project (Blue Source and The Forestland Group, 2013).  
 
 
 
                                                           
110 These mechanisms include Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS); Livestock; U.S. Forest; Urban Forest; and Mine 
and Methane Capture (MMC) projects. No offsets have been issued as of date for the Urban Forest or MMC 
projects. CARB is currently developing regulations for a Rice Cultivation offset projects (CARB, 2014d). Some 
voluntary offset projects that have been issued offset credits by approved voluntary registries for GHG reductions 
or removal enhancements that occurred between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2014 may be eligible for 
CARB offset credits. These projects are referred to as early action offset projects (CARB, 2014d). 
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Table 16 
Civic Epistemologies in a Global Climate Regime 
 
 CARB, Mainstream 
Environmentalists, 
Polluting Industries 
Environmental 
Justice Advocates 
Policymaking 
Approach 
Top-down  
and multilaterial 
government agreements.  
 
Bottom-up and Califronia 
community-based  
partnerships .  
International 
Linkages 
Facilitiates global GHG 
reductions and ensures 
the cost-effectiness of AB 
32.  
 
Expands carbon markets 
beyond California’s 
borders without the 
consideration of EJ 
communities.  
Offsets (1) Limited opportunity for 
offset projects in 
California.  
(2) Global offsets reduce 
GHG emissions most cost- 
effectively while investing 
in conservation projects 
anywhere.   
(1) For every offset credit 
purchased, one less ton of 
GHG (and associated co-
pollutants) is reduced at a 
California facility.  
(2) EJ communities do not 
benefit from investments 
in environmental 
protection/conservation 
projects derived from 
offsets located outside 
California.  
Public Health AB 32 can provide both 
global and local health co-
benefits. 
Efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions and improve air 
quality should emphasize 
California disadvantaged 
communities first.  
Global GHG 
Mitigation 
Primary reduction strategy 
focused on the seven 
global GHG emissions 
identified under AB 32: 
carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons,  
perfluorocarbons, sulfur 
hexafluoride, and nitrogen 
trifluoride.  
Inclusion of short-lived 
climate pollutants, such as 
black carbon. Unlike the 
seven GHG emissions 
listed in AB 32, black 
carbon has a global and 
local public health impact.    
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Figure 52. Source: CARB (February 2015) 
 
 
Most of the offset credits purchased in the near future, likely will not be linked to California 
environmental improvement projects. A review of CARB’s offsets database found, a large 
majority of approved offset projects administered by out-of-state operators (CARB, 2015). A 
CARB official indicated that many projects are being developed outside of California because 
the state has a long track record of mandating and voluntarily pursuing a variety of 
environmental protection projects. At the same time, there are few eligible large-scale offset 
projects in the state. “California is proactive and has many regulations to protect the 
environment…It is a challenge to identify sources of offsets in California” (Halper, 2014). 
Environmental justice groups strongly discount this perspective. They claim that communities 
located near major polluters, historically, have failed to benefit from the state’s clean-tech 
economy and investments in environmental protection have essentially bypassed many of the 
state’s disadvantaged communities (Truong; Mayer, 2013 – author interviews).  
 
 
Polluters may also avoid reducing their emissions by purchasing “offsets”. Offsets can be 
brought from a source nearly anywhere in the world and go to fund ecofriendly projects. So 
while trees are being planted in Canada, corporations can continue to pollute back home in 
California at levels equal to or even greater than they did before AB 32. [It] deprives nearby 
residents from the benefits of toxic, smog and particulate matter pollution reductions that 
would accompany many local greenhouse gas reductions. Environmental justice communities 
burdened by huge industrial concentrations of pollution would likely see no benefits when major 
polluters buy, instead of reduce their pollution. 
--Center for Race, Poverty, and the Environment (2013) explaining its position on offsets.  
 
 
This trend towards outsourcing environmental benefits was recently exemplified by a report 
produced by a carbon trading consulting firm that estimated the state of Louisiana could raise 
as much as $1.6 billion from forest and coastal wetland restoration projects over the next 50 
years by selling offset credits to polluting companies in California (Figure 53). Louisiana offset 
operators contend that the state’s forest and wetlands projects could produce more than 1.8 
million carbon equivalent offset tons a year, and close to 92 million carbon equivalent offset 
tons over 50 years (Schleifstein, 2015).   
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Figure 53 
Trees, like these cypress and tupelo in a Tierra Resources/Entergy/St. Charles Parish pilot restoration project in 
Luling, Louisiana, absorb CO2 from the air and store it in their wood. The operators of the pilot project are seeking 
approval under California’s offset program (Schleifstein, 2015).  
 
 
Consequently, the debate over the appropriate policy scale to address the phenomenon of 
climate change is further complicated by the state’s conflicting mandates and goals. AB 32 
requires the reduction of global GHG emissions while providing opportunities to improve local 
air quality in communities already adversely impacted by air pollution (California Health and 
Safety Code, section §38565). As the state’s cap-and-trade program expands beyond 
California’s borders, the capacity for the state to exert global climate leadership and 
simultaneously improve local air quality becomes increasingly difficult.  
 
The next section of this chapter examines the public health implications of offset usage beyond 
California’s borders. This is followed by the discussion of the formation of a distinct coalition 
between California environmental justice groups and indigenous rights organizations from the 
Global South. This coalition seeks to allow the use of carbon offsets to only within California’s 
borders in an attempt to avoid human rights violations abroad, while securing direct benefits to 
pollution-adjacent communities in California. The last section of the chapter analyzes the 
efforts by EJ groups to require the state to move beyond the seven greenhouse gases regulated 
under AB 32 and address global short-lived climate pollutants, like black carbon, which have 
local public health impacts.  
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Section 6.2: The Conflict Between Global Carbon Offsets and Community Benefits  
   
In an effort to further the cost effectiveness of AB 32’s cap-and-trade program, CARB’s 2014 
update to the Scoping Plan identifies international sector-based offset programs as a key 
strategy to ensure sufficient offsets are available to regulated entities. The update states that 
the cap-and-trade program includes a “placeholder for potential international sector-based 
offsets from programs designed to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD) through a future rulemaking” (CARB, 2014a; Pg. 88). CARB all but endorses 
the 2013 recommendations developed by a technical expert committee, the REDD Offset 
Working Group for establishing forest offset programs in the states of Arce, Brazil and Chiapas, 
Mexico. The working group’s recommendations were funded by regulated entities under the 
cap-and-trade program and advocate that international offsets would be significantly more 
affordable than U.S. domestic offset credits, thereby ensuring the cost-effectiveness of 
California’s carbon market (REDD Offset Working Group, 2013).111 
 
Since the adoption of its U.S. forest offset protocol, CARB (2011c) has strongly asserted that 
efforts to reduce deforestation are a valued method to address global climate change and 
promote cost-effectiveness. Specifically, they contend that preserving trees is critical because 
they capture and store carbon. However, when forests are burned or cut down, the carbon 
contained in these trees is released, and the capacity for sequestering carbon emissions is lost. 
Deforestation remains the second largest anthropogenic source of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere, trailing only fossil fuel combustion. “Deforestation rates have remained high, 
particularly in developing countries, averaging approximately 13 million hectares per year from 
2000 to 2010 -- roughly an area the size of England or Arkansas each year” (Wold et al., 2013; 
Pg. 2). This deforestation is mainly the result of the conversion of forests to agricultural land, 
unsustainable logging practices, and the expansion of settlements and infrastructure (Wold et 
al., 2013).  
 
Therefore, efforts like forest offset programs are seen as key to preserving forests and 
mitigating the impacts of climate change. In supporting the REDD Offset Working Group 
recommendations, mainstream environmentalists also argue that developing nations, like 
Mexico and Brazil, can play a major role in reducing deforestation. In particular, they argue that 
creating mechanisms to help developing countries to progress economically without relying on 
carbon intensive practices and energy sources is key to the success of a globally-linked climate 
reduction strategy (EDF, 2015). For these reasons, support for expanding California’s carbon 
market to include offsets in Latin America that reduce deforestation is increasingly gaining 
momentum in Sacramento. International offsets are seen as consistent with AB 32, which 
requires the consideration of establishing linkages with other subnational governments and 
countries. According to section §38564 of the California Health and Safety Code, the “state 
board shall consult with other states…and other nations to facilitate the development of an 
                                                           
111 As described later in this chapter, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in November 2010, signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) with the states of Chiapas, Mexico and Acre, Brazil requiring the establishment of a 
subnational REDD Offset Working Group to develop AB 32 linkage recommendations.  
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integrated and cost-effective regional, national, and international greenhouse gas reduction 
program.” 
 
The recommendations provided by the REDD Offset Working Group, however, fail to consider 
the impact of international linkage programs on environmental justice in California. AB 32 
requires that prior to inclusion of any market-based mechanism, the state board must: (1) 
design any market-based compliance mechanism to prevent increase in the emissions of toxic 
air contaminants or criteria air pollutants and, (2) consider the potential for direct, indirect, and 
cumulative emission impacts from these mechanisms, including localized impacts in 
communities that are already adversely impacted by air pollution (California Health and Safety 
Code, section §38570). The Working Group’s recommendations also overlooks AB 32’s 
“Community Empowerment” amendment, which requires public and private investment 
toward the most disadvantaged communities in California and provides an opportunity for 
community institutions to participate in and benefit from efforts to reduce GHG emissions 
(California Health and Safety Code, section §38565).  
 
According to EJ advocates, international forest offsets reducing secondary benefits, such as 
those relating to public health and community investment, undermine a central component of 
AB 32: its environmental justice provisions (Taruc, 2013 – author interview). As noted by legal 
scholar Alan Ramo (2013), the AB 32 Scoping Plan explicitly promised Californians secondary 
health benefits from its GHG reduction programs. The unfettered inclusion of international 
offsets may make that pledge ring hollow: 
 
The upshot is that while CARB promised health benefits here at home from cap-and-trade, those may 
potentially prove illusory in exchange for the appearance of reductions elsewhere in the globe. Whether 
these offsets really swamp California’s cap-and-trade program or simply spread the regulatory gospel 
around the world will be settled on the ground based upon the implementation of these programs (Ramo, 
2013).  
 
According to a study by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), offsets could potentially 
represent a large portion of all GHG reductions in California’s cap-and-trade program (Figure 
54). While the quantitative limit on the use of offsets is 8 percent of the total credits required 
to be held by each emitter (or 8 percent of their total emissions), this cumulative usage limit 
(calculating all state emitters’ maximum allotment) equals more than half (53 percent) of the 
total reductions required in California between 2013 and 2020 (Haya, 2009).  
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                                                                                         Figure 54 
The maximum offsets limit amounts to 53 percent of total reductions needed under AB 32. Source: Haya (2009). 
 
 
The UCS estimate represents a worst-case scenario of offsets usage in California’s cap-and-
trade system. Nevertheless, the implications from a high offset usage rate have raised public 
health concerns from other researchers. According to a study by UC Berkeley economist, David 
Roland-Holst (2009), a cap-and-trade program with offset credits could actually worsen criteria 
air pollutants in California, including total organic gases (TOG) like methane; reactive organic 
gases (ROG) like benzene; carbon monoxide (CO); and smog-forming pollutants such as 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and fine particulates (PM10, and PM2.5).  
 
The blue bars in Figure 55 illustrate how criteria pollutant levels would change if half of the 
emissions reductions under a cap-and-trade system were achieved through offsets limited to 
“In-state” projects – that is, offsets based exclusively in California’s nonregulated sectors, such 
as agriculture, landfill, and forestry. The results are mixed, with decreases in methane but 
increases in NOx emissions. Methane and benzene are reduced because GHG emission 
reduction strategies are moved to the methane-intensive agriculture and landfill sectors. 
However, smog-forming NOx pollution levels are higher because the entities buying the offsets 
are likely to have more NOx-intensive operations than the entities selling them. For example, an 
oil refinery that purchases an offset credit continues to emit GHG and NOx emissions, while the 
dairy that sold the offset credit reduces its emissions. Because the refinery has more NOx 
pollution associated with every ton of GHG, total NOx emissions increase as a result (Roland-
Holst, 2009).  
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Figure 55: The Effect of Offsets on Criteria Air Pollution levels in California 
Source: Roland-Holst (2009; Pg. 13)  
 
 
Roland-Holst’s (2009) study also illustrated a scenario in which half of the cap-and-trade 
emissions reductions were achieved through the use of out-of-state offsets. In this scenario, the 
level of each criterion air pollutant would be higher. However, if all of the cap-and-trade 
emissions reductions were achieved through out-of-state offsets, criteria air pollutants would 
significantly increase. As shown by the red bars in Figure 55, NOx and PM would increase by 
nearly 4,000 metric tons and 2,000 metric tons per year, respectively, in 2020. Roland-Holst 
concludes that, by substituting direct emissions reductions from regulated sectors with offsets 
from out-of-state projects, California could effectively export air quality benefits. He cautions 
that offsets should be closely monitored and limited since their usage could have a significant 
impact on California air quality (Roland-Holst, 2009).112 
 
While this research has shown that carbon offsets have the potential to reduce secondary 
health co-benefits, state policymakers continue to advocate for offsets within an integrated and 
cost-effective international climate change program. According to Virgil Welch, special assistant 
to CARB chair Mary Nichols, AB 32 is more than just about reducing emissions; it also intended 
to promote an economic imperative for investment in new clean technologies and business 
sectors not regulated under cap-and-trade.  
 
You have to understand what we’re doing here in California, in the national context. It’s not just 
about emissions reductions. What we’re talking about is a permanent shift toward a less carbon-
intensive economy…What we’re talking about is a long-term transition, and not just the 
immediate emissions reduction goals…While there’s an environmental imperative, there’s also 
an economic imperative (Welch, 2010).    
 
                                                           
112 The analysis assumes that every available GHG emissions reduction in the forestry, agriculture, and landfill 
sectors will be available as an offset. However, it is unlikely that every reduction can be easily and cost-effectively 
quantified and traded in the offset market. Therefore, co-pollutant reductions could be smaller than shown in 
Figure 55 (Roland-Holst, 2009).  
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Welch (2010) has also publicly stated that carbon offsets, like an international forestry protocol 
provide economic incentives under AB 32 to increase the capacity of forests to store carbon. 
Prior to the adoption of CARB’s U.S. forest protocol, there was little monetary benefit to 
conserve forests. With adoption of that protocol, however, a growing market for trading forest 
offset credits now exists. As previously noted, landowners who conserve forests can earn 
carbon offset credits based on an assessment of the amount of CO2 a forest can store and a 
market-driven price per ton of carbon. Landowners can sell offset credits to polluters, thereby 
generating revenue that provides them with an incentive to avoid cutting down trees.  
 
State policymakers, moreover, see the inclusion of a REDD forest offset protocol under AB 32 as 
a new opportunity to tackle the environmental and economic imperatives of global climate 
change. The consideration of REDD offsets was first set in motion on November 16, 2010, when 
former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 
the states of Chiapas, Mexico and Acre, Brazil. The agreement signed with the two foreign 
states outlined goals for linking a state-to-state forest offset program (Schwarzenegger, 2010b). 
The 2010 agreement specifically requires the establishment of a subnational REDD Offset 
Working Group to develop linkage recommendations to implement the world’s first compliance 
pathway for REDD. During the signing of the MOU, Schwarzenegger emphasized the ability of 
regions to take immediate actions against climate change, regardless of stalled multilateral 
agreements. 
 
With or without international agreements, the green revolution is moving full-speed ahead in 
states, regions and provinces. I have seen the power these regional governments carry in 
influencing and creating the new ideas that spur clean innovation, reduce emissions and create 
jobs, and this summit is an incredible opportunity to build on our sub-national successes. 
Together, we are ushering in a cleaner, brighter and more prosperous future that we can be 
proud to pass on to the next generation (Schwarzenegger, 2010c).  
 
 
California’s MOU was seen as setting a powerful precedent for connecting subnational REDD 
programs in the Global South with carbon markets in industrialized states. The MOU followed 
Acre’s adoption of a State Incentives for Ecosystems Services program approved in October 
2010. The law establishes the regulatory framework to incentivize forest protection and 
generate and certify carbon credits to reduce deforestation. Similarly, in recent years, the 
Mexican state of Chiapas has instituted various REDD-type readiness programs in anticipation 
of linkage with California’s cap-and-trade program (Sinsley and Kreindler, 2010).  
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Section 6.3:   Trans-local Climate Justice Movements at the Capitol  
 
 
 
Figure 56: 
Potential REDD Quantities in Chiapas, Mexico. Source RFF (2011).  
 
 
While California and Global South policymakers tout REDD’s benefits, indigenous groups are 
protesting the lack of consultation during the development of a program now targeting their 
lands for forest offsets (Conant, 2013 – author interview). According to Jeff Conant, an 
advocate with Friends of the Earth and author of A Poetics of Resistance: The Revolutionary 
Public Relations of the Zapatista Insurgency, Chiapas is the wrong place to test a new market-
based mechanism from California. The southernmost of Mexico’s 32 states and the birthplace 
of the 1994 Zapatista rebellion, Chiapas borders Guatemala and is the nation’s poorest and 
most indigenous state (Figure 56). Chiapas has a long history of conflicts over land tenure, in 
particular in the Lacandon jungle area, where indigenous peoples have for centuries faced 
forced removal from their native territories by state actors and business interests (Conant, 
2013 – author interview). The government of Chiapas’ forest conservation programs in recent 
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years have paid landholders in the region nearly $200 USD a month to conserve forests. The 
programs are being implemented as an effort to delimit “natural protected areas” in order to 
generate offset credits that can eventually be linked to international carbon markets, like 
California’s cap-and-trade system (Conant, 2013 – author interview).         
 
What this means in practice is a mandate for those receiving the money [landholders] to cease 
planting their traditional crops (which are seen as harmful to the jungle), and to increase 
patrolling of their territory against outsiders, designated as “invaders.” Those invaders, 
generally speaking, are indigenous communities who have never had formal title to the land, 
but who have been settled in the region for hundreds, if not thousands of years (Conant, 2011).  
 
Groups like Conant’s Friends of the Earth (FOE) and international indigenous rights 
organizations contend that REDD programs are creating a perverse economic imperative that 
could lead to new land grabs and forced displacement of poor indigenous communities in 
Chiapas and Acre. This conflict over extending California’s climate regime to the Global South 
prompted an international delegation of indigenous leaders from Brazil, Mexico, and Ecuador 
to travel to Sacramento to register their opposition at a CARB public hearing on October 18, 
2012 (CARB, 2012a). Several California environmental justice organizations joined the 
delegation, among them the Center for Race, Poverty, and the Environment (CRPE), the Asian 
Pacific Environmental Network (APEN), and the California Environmental Justice Alliance (CEJA). 
California EJ advocates held that the inclusion of international forest offsets was a mechanism 
that would fail to reduce California’s industrial pollution and could risk the forced displacement 
of socially vulnerable indigenous peoples from communities outside the U.S. (Figure 57). 
 
Figure 57: 
Overview of Environmental Justice Groups’ Opposition to International Forest Offset projects.  
Source: Brindis (2013) 
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At the CARB hearing, the coalition of indigenous rights groups and California EJ advocates 
expressed strong support for California’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gases and believed that 
conserving tropical forests is critical to protecting a global climate. However, they proclaimed 
that while no draft international forest offset protocol has been presented for public review, 
the MOU signed by Governor Schwarzenegger has set a precedent that is already leading to the 
eviction of indigenous peoples in Chiapas and Acre from lands in preparation for a California-
linked REDD program. The coalition further stated that REDD readiness programs are 
undercutting efforts by indigenous peoples to gain formal land tenure (CARB, 2012a).   
 
According to Rosario Aguilar, a public health worker in the indigenous communities of Chiapas, 
the state has a long history of profound social conflict, as well as three of the most intense 
agrarian land conflicts within its borders. As a result, she argued developing a REDD program 
would pose unacceptably high risks and should not be a part of California’s climate change 
policies (Aguliar, 2012a). She presented CARB members with an official Chiapas state document 
highlighting that nearly 200 communities have been displaced for REDD readiness programs 
(Figure 58).   
 
I brought with me here today an official brochure of the state of Chiapas, Mexico that they 
distributed at the United Nations climate change negotiation in the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) #16 in Cancun, Mexico. It is a brochure about the efforts to promote and implement REDD 
and related avoided deforestation initiatives. This official document…clearly proves that REDD 
results in evictions. In fact, they brag about having evicted 172 communities to do REDD (Aguliar, 
2010a).  
 
 
Figure 58: 
Source: Aguilar (2012b) scanned copy of State of Chiapas UNCOP16, 2010 “Chiapas, Mexico, Facing the Climate 
Change Challenge” promotional brochure. 
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Aguilar further argued that while REDD has yet to be officially implemented, it is already 
causing social conflict and suffering within Chiapas’ indigenous population. She displayed 
photos of communities that are resisting REDD and defending their livelihoods. Included in 
those photos was a portrait of Doña Juanita, one of the elders who founded the community of 
Amador Hernandez. Doña Juanita was described as a midwife with two legs in the photograph. 
However, it was noted that she recently had one of her legs amputated due to a lack of medical 
services. Aguilar claimed the Chiapas state government eliminated medical care to remote 
indigenous communities in an attempt to pressure communities to relocate so REDD projects 
could be implemented in those areas. (Figure 59).   
 
 
Doña Juanita no longer has one of her legs because…the government has suspended medical 
services to this community as one of the measures it is taking to pressure them to leave their 
forests, so that REDD can be done there. So indigenous communities that are living on the land 
are committed to saving the planet and combating climate change are suffering from the lack of 
medical services that the government has suspended to implement REDD (Aguilar, 2012a).   
 
 
 
Figure 59: 
Rosario Aguilar (2012c) speaking about Doña Juanita and the consequences of REDD projects. 
 
 
Ninawa, the president of the Federation of the Huni Kui people of Acre, Brazil, a western state 
bordering Bolivia and Peru, also addressed CARB. His testimony indicated that the state of Acre 
along with Chiapas, is one of the few states to have signed formal agreements with California. 
Yet these agreements were signed with no consultation with the indigenous people who live in 
these regions. He referred to the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People, 
which guarantees the right to free, prior, and informed consent in the development of projects 
like REDD (Ninawa, 2012b). He urged CARB not to include REDD offsets in their climate program 
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because REDD-type programs are already restricting access to ancestral lands and impacting 
their livelihoods (Figure 60).  
 
Indigenous people are feeling the effect of REDD programs. The government has stopped the 
demarcation of our indigenous land. These are lands that are being included in REDD projects 
and large companies, operators and, landholders have had an eye on. They are restricting our 
way of life and our ability to have access to our traditional hunting, fishing, and gathering sites. 
So for this reason we are urging you not to accept REDD in your trading program (Ninawa, 
2010b).    
 
 
 
Figure 60: 
Ninawa (2012c) – president of the Federation of Huni Kui people of Acre, Brazil testifying in opposition to  
REDD offset projects. 
 
 
After several more indigenous groups provided testimony to CARB, California environmental 
justice advocates proceeded to proclaim their solidarity with indigenous peoples. They argued 
that the integrity of California’s climate programs could be threatened if international offsets 
were included. EJ advocates strongly believed that GHG emission reductions should happen at 
the point of source. With direct emissions reductions, it was claimed, the public health of 
California communities next to polluting industries would be protected. Simultaneously, a 
refusal to implement REDD would prevent an onslaught of human rights violations abroad.  
 
We stand with our international brothers and sisters. We believe REDD programs…are bad for 
communities internationally that are being decimated from the program and [California] 
communities that are not receiving the benefit from local pollution reduction.  
-- Sofia Parino (2012), Senior Attorney with Center for Race, Poverty and the Environment.  
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When the CARB hearing concluded, the coalition of indigenous groups and California EJ 
advocates continued their lobbying efforts at the State Capitol (Figure 61). They met with senior 
staff from the offices of the governor and state legislative leaders, presenting them with a letter 
signed by more than 30 California-based organizations opposing REDD. During these lobbying 
meetings, the coalition informed policymakers of what they believed to be the inherent 
problems with REDD, as well as problems specific to the California-Chiapas-Acre context 
(Conant, 2013; Parino, 2013 – author interviews):   
 
 
REDD credits threaten to increase, rather than decrease global [GHG] emissions, and to delay 
emissions abatement in California. This can have particularly harmful effects on local 
communities who live around facilities that emit particulate matter, NOx, and other carbon co-
pollutants. Moreover, independent investigations into the promotion of international forest 
offsets have raised significant concerns with regard to the human rights of the indigenous 
peoples and local communities…We therefore like to ask that you not propose the use of 
international REDD offsets for compliance in California.  
--Trans-local climate movement letter to Governor Jerry Brown opposing REDD offsets (2012).  
 
 
Following the Capitol lobby day, the coalition took strategic advantage of several other 
converging opportunities to organize a “No REDD Tour” throughout Northern California. The 
coalition, viewing California as being on the front-lines of the global REDD debate, it developed 
a No REDD Tour to raise awareness of the immediate impacts of REDD on indigenous peoples in 
the Global South and on pollution-adjacent communities in the Global North (No REDD Tour, 
2012). The tour included speaking events, film screenings, and meetings between Indigenous 
leaders and California allies. These events coincided with meetings held by the REDD Offset 
Working Group and the annual Bioneers Conference.113  Advocates saw in the effort an 
opportunity to assemble an important constituency in the REDD debate that could provide a 
platform for indigenous and EJ leaders worldwide (No REDD Tour, 2012).   
  
                                                           
113 The national conference highlights the work of scientific and social innovators and helps support, nurture and 
propagate their ideas and models. Conference speakers come from interdisciplinary fields: environmental and 
socio-political activism.  http://www.bioneers.org/what-is-bioneers/our-mission/ 
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Figure 61: 
Coalition of Indigenous and Environmental Justice Groups Lobbying at the California State Capitol in Sacramento. 
Source: Conant (2012). 
 
 
 
The tour’s outcome led to a larger public discussion in subsequent months on California’s ability 
to monitor the integrity of international offsets in the face of on-going corruption in developing 
countries.114 For example, Golden Gate University legal scholar, Alan Ramo (2014) noted that 
any international offset implemented in a developing country would be dependent upon the 
host country or third parties to validate the offset. Corruption at any stage of the 
implementation of an offset, including initial reporting, verification, and monitoring, could 
undermine offset programs. While corruption is a difficult problem to measure comparatively 
on an international scale, Ramo’s (2013) comments have raised several concerns by Capitol 
staffers and EJ advocates. These included whether CARB has the capacity to monitor 
international offsets at similar levels to what it conducts for domestic offsets, and whether 
California should entrust countries facing high levels of perceived public sector corruption with 
the responsibility of validating offsets. They noted that CARB, unlike the federal government, 
                                                          
114 In 2012, the Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s Earth Foundation also sued CARB claiming the offsets are 
a loophole because the projects were not new efforts to lower GHG emissions and would occur even without 
investments from polluters. The complaint sought a court order repealing and invalidating the offset program and 
prohibiting the state from using offsets as a compliance instrument in the cap and trade program. The trial court 
denied the petition for writ of mandate, concluding that AB 32 gave the Board vast discretion in promulgating GHG 
reduction measures, and that the Board’s offset protocols were not arbitrary and capricious. In 2013, the court of 
appeal affirmed, holding that the Board did not exceed its power under AB 32. The case has been appealed to the 
State Supreme Court (Gullo and Doan, 2013).  
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lacks international authority to enforce AB 32’s provisions or intervene in another country’s 
sovereignty. In particular, senior Capitol staff members stated that California should not 
develop linkages where there is reason to believe that approving an international offset 
program may exacerbate or induce human rights violations in the developing world (Senior 
Capitol staff members, 2013; Parino, 2013 – author interviews).  
 
Concerns about outsourcing pollution through out-of-state offsets were further raised in 
November 2014, when CARB voided 88,995 tons of offset credits. These credits were generated 
by Arkansas-based, Clean Harbors Inc., the nation’s largest incinerator of chlorofluorocarbons 
(commonly known as Freon or ozone-depleting substances) and were voided because of the 
facility’s noncompliance with federal environmental laws. On May 13, 2014 the U.S. EPA 
ordered Clean Harbors to pay a $581,236 penalty for improperly identifying and disposing of 
hazardous waste, improper storage of hazardous waste, and failure to comply with air 
emissions standards. California’s cap-and-trade program gave CARB the power to invalidate 
previously-issued offsets upon determination that the relevant facility failed to comply with 
environmental, health, and safety (EH&S) requirements (O’Brien and Kempf, 2014). Existing 
regulations prohibit the incineration of chlorofluorocarbons within California, yet it is still 
allowed in many other states, like Arkansas, and incineration is an eligible project under CARB’s 
Ozone Depleting Substances offset protocol (CARB, 2011e).  
 
Clean Harbors’ incinerator is located in the southern Arkansas town of El Dorado, where a one-
fourth of its 18,000 residents live below the poverty line. In 2005, the town was listed as having 
some of the state’s worst air. In the past ten years, the Clean Harbors incinerator has been 
citied or fined more than a dozen times. According to Arkansas attorney Sam Ledbetter, 
referring to Clean Harbors, “if a scofflaw is someone who has serial violations, they would fit 
the bill.” Ledbetter sued Clean Harbors in 2005 over a fire that forced the evacuation of 
hundreds of socially vulnerable people; he sued again in 2012 following an incident in which a 
cloud of chlorine drifted over the town of El Dorado (Morain, 2014).   
 
Clean Harbors destroys 80 percent of the nation’s chlorofluorocarbons, an amount that reached 
230 tons in 2011 and 300 tons in 2013 (Morain, 2014). Before CARB invalidated some of its 
offsets, Clean Harbors’ demand to incinerate ozone-depleting substances was rising, largely in 
part because of California’s cap-and-trade program. In 2014, it was estimated that Clean 
Harbors used 87 percent of the 5.5 million ozone-depleting credits CARB issued (Lusvardi, 
2014). Clean Harbors recently announced plans to invest $100 million to build an additional 
rotary kiln incinerator, which will nearly double the El Dorado facility’s hazardous waste 
capacity. According to a company spokesperson, this is the "first time in 30 years that a new 
incinerator has been built in the United States” (Arkansas Business staff, 2014).   
 
Consequently, when CARB voided Clean Harbors’ credits, it did not identify the companies 
purchasing the offsets, as CARB considers the information proprietary. It is estimated that 
nearly 20 California companies invested in the Clean Harbors incineration offsets, according to 
the law office of Latham & Watkins, which represents some of the polluters (Morain, 2014). 
CARB regulations require each company to purchase additional credits to compensate for the 
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now invalidated 88,995 incineration offset credits. CARB had initially issued a preliminary notice 
of its plans to review 1.3 million credits issued between the years 2009 and 2012, when Clean 
Harbors was deemed potentially non-compliant. The invalidation of credits covering this period 
could have potentially cost California firms up to $13 million (Lusvardi, 2014). According to 
Latham & Watkins, such a sweeping determination could potentially raise “compliance costs 
and ultimately undermine the cap-and-trade program” (O’Brien and Kempf, 2014). 
 
Eventually, in their final determination, CARB chose to only invalidate 88,995 offset credits sold 
on February 2-3, 2012. CARB asserted that Clean Harbors’ Feb. 2, 2012 receipt of a U.S. EPA 
Region 6 inspection report describing potential violations, such as not treating calcium chloride 
brine material generated by the facility as a hazardous waste, triggered noncompliance for the 
purposes of California’s offset program. CARB, consequently, determined that noncompliance 
ended the next day, Feb. 3, 2012, when Clean Harbors stopped treating the calcium chloride 
brine material as nonhazardous waste (i.e., when it sent a final shipment of calcium chloride 
brine material for use in oil and gas production) (O’Brien and Kempf, 2014). Therefore, the 
agency’s final determination took into account the two-day period of noncompliance, and only 
invalidated offset projects purchased with reporting periods covering those days (O’Brien and 
Kempf, 2014; O’Brien and Kempf, 2014; Lusvardi, 2014). 
 
According to California EJ advocates, the Clean Harbors case represents the dangers of issuing 
offset credits instead of requiring direct pollution reductions in California. The invalidation 
meant 88,995 tons of GHG emissions and associated co-pollutants would not be mitigated in 
California’s most disadvantaged communities. It also resulted in poor air quality in low-income 
Arkansas communities (author interviews, 2014). The EJ advocates posited that, if CARB cannot 
properly monitor U.S. domestic offset operators that are clearly violating environmental, 
health, and safety laws, how will they validate offset programs and avoid human rights 
violations in the Global South? 
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Section 6.4: The California EJ Turn Towards the Global and Short-Lived Climate Pollutants  
 
 
 
If all this seems arcane, it is. Without question, chlorofluorocarbons should be destroyed. But 
maybe there is a simpler way, like passing a law requiring their destruction. Or maybe polluters 
could pay to, say, scrap old diesel engines that foul the air in the Los Angeles basin and Central 
Valley, or make sure that every dairy in California has a digester to reduce methane emissions 
from California cows. Of course, that might not be quite as cool for certain businesses.  
--Dan Morain (2014), editorial page editor for The Sacramento Bee.  
 
 
 
California’s cap-and-trade program currently allows polluters to purchase five types of offsets 
located within and beyond the state’s borders. One offset is used to destroy ozone-depleting 
substances in places like Arkansas. Two others conserve U.S. forests and urban forests, 
however, since 2011, CARB has not approved a single urban forest project. A third eliminates 
methane emissions from livestock in states like New York and Michigan. Although California has 
no coal mines within its borders, the state recently approved an offset that allows California 
polluters to mitigate methane emitted from coal mines.   
 
Urban forest offset have been a particularly contentious issue for some EJ advocates, who 
noted CARB’s lack of commitment in implementing them. Cities are unable to meet CARB’s 
offset protocol largely because of the 100-year, lifetime guarantee of tree offset projects, a 
difficult standard to achieve in dynamic urban settings. Other barriers to urban forest offsets 
include the high costs of urban trees and monitoring/reporting requirements, and limited 
eligibility for applicants. Unlike the other offset protocols, non-governmental organizations may 
not administer offset projects (CARB, 2011f). These narrow requirements have even prevented 
wealthy coastal cities like Santa Monica from registering urban forest offset projects with CARB.  
 
Despite these road blocks, urban trees offer great potential to reduce GHG emissions and co-
pollutants throughout California’s urban communities. A study of Seattle Washington, by the 
Green Cities Research Alliance (2012) estimated 2.1 million metric tons of CO2e is stored and 
sequestered annually in the city’s trees, and tree-like shrubs. These benefits are estimated at 
more than $11 million in annual savings from carbon storage and sequestration. Seattle’s forest 
also removes 725 metric tons of toxic air pollutants every year, providing an annual pollution 
removal value of $5.6 million.     
 
Consequently, CARB’s preferential treatment of offset projects beyond California’s borders 
eventually led State Senator Ricardo Lara, an East Los Angeles Democrat, to introduce Senate 
Bill (SB) 605 in February 2013. The legislation sought to limit the issuance of offsets to 
California; it quickly won strong support from environmental justice groups across the state.   
Supporters cited the opportunity to prioritize GHG reductions that reduced co-pollutants in 
California regions most impacted by air pollution while preventing human rights violations 
through REDD projects in the Global South. Breaking ranks with the larger environmental 
community, however, the Nature Conservancy and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
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opposed the legislation.115 In the last ten years EDF and the Nature Conservancy have consulted 
on, or sold scores of voluntary offset projects to polluters across the globe. At an Assembly 
Natural Resources Committee hearing in August 2013, their representatives testified in 
opposition to SB 605 because they felt it would impede efforts to expand successful 
international offset programs and gain approval of existing voluntary offset projects under 
California’s cap-and-trade program. 
 
 
The current version of the bill cuts off important opportunities for investments in projects that 
can stimulate reductions, not only in California and the United States but in other nations as 
well. Cutting off opportunities like international forestry leaves California outside of the realm 
where we can help to participate and influence in a global dialogue. Where we can start to 
reduce emissions...So we just cannot support a bill that keeps California outside of that 
conversation.  
--Tim O’Conner (2013), Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) lobbyist.  
 
 
Similarly, the oil industry, the California Chamber of Commerce (Cal Chamber), the California 
Manufacturing and Technology Association (CMTA) and carbon trading firms, like Four Twenty-
Seven Climate Consulting, all strongly opposed SB 605. They argued that SB 605 would severely 
narrow offset options and create upward pressure on allowance prices. Without out-of-state 
offsets, they claimed allowance prices would double, significantly impacting compliance 
strategies already in place and affecting big and small emitters alike. The opposition developed 
several elaborate economic models that estimated by the year 2020, CARB’s Price Containment 
Reserve (PCR) would be fully exhausted.116 Under such a scenario, California’s carbon market 
would be short in its compliance mechanisms, while polluters would face increase financial 
burdens in having to comply with the GHG emissions cap (Four Twenty-Seven, 2013a).    
 
 
[SB 605] would cut available offset supply by 70 to 90 percent compared to current projections, 
worsening the expected shortage of credits available for use in the California carbon market, 
and escalating credit and allowance prices.  While offset protocols for U.S. projects approved 
and under consideration are forecasted to meet between 30 and 70 percent of total demand, 
supply from California-based projects would likely meet no more than 6 to 16 percent of 
cumulative demand for credits through 2020. The offset shortage makes it very likely that prices 
would reach the highest tier of PCR in 2020, $82 a ton. Yet higher prices in the carbon market 
are unlikely to incentivize a significant number of new offset projects in California due to 
institutional, regulatory, and technical hurdles (Four Twenty-Seven, 2013a; Pg. 1).  
                                                           
115 At the time, mainstream environmental groups, like the Sierra Club, the Planning and Conservation League 
(PCL), and Friends of the Earth (FOE) supported SB 605. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) supported 
the bill after it was later amended to instead restrict offsets only within the United States.    
116 A Price Containment Reserve (PCR) is a cost-containment account created by CARB to control prices. It is filled 
with a specified number of allowances removed from the overall cap at the start of the state’s cap-and-trade 
program. At high prices, CARB stands ready to sell permits from a reserve to covered entities at specified tiered 
prices during quarterly auctions (limited quantities at prices of $40, $45, $50, etc.). The intent of the PCR is to 
prevent a scenario where allowances are too costly or unavailable to covered entities (Four Twenty-Seven, 2013b). 
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While Senator Lara succeeded in moving SB 605 out of the Assembly Natural Resources 
Committee, the onslaught of opposition was diminishing the bill’s chances at passage in the 
legislature. This became more apparent when Lara’s mentor and author of AB 32, former 
Assembly Speaker Fabian Núñez, now a partner at the high-powered lobbying firm Mercury 
Public Affairs, took an offset operator as one of his clients.117 This was coupled with the firm’s 
recent announcement of its intention to open a satellite office in Mexico City to help California 
businesses navigate the Mexican government’s trade regulations (Rosenhall, 2014; Núñez, 
2014). Consequently, in his support of offsets, Núñez asserted that they provide California the 
opportunity to clean up energy-intensive industries that are not currently regulated by cap-and-
trade. He went on to assert this opportunity extended to out-of-state industries, which in turn 
helps California expand its sphere of influence on global climate policy. 
 
 
That’s why I decided early on to support projects to trap and destroy coal mine methane. Enter 
my clients, mine methane capture offset project developers….Historically, mines have ventilated 
highly explosive gas and let it escape into the atmosphere…New technologies exist to trap and 
destroy the methane gas so it never reaches the atmosphere…Offsets are vital to keeping 
abatement costs low, and in doing so provide price certainty to business – a key goal I’ve 
embraced since authoring AB 32. By approving offsets from mine methane, CARB will deliver 
another win-win (Núñez, 2014). 
 
 
Another complication at the time came from the revelation that California’s largest Native 
American tribe, the Yurok, were in the process of developing forest offset projects on their 
reservation near Redwood National Park. CARB eventually issued the tribe more than 800,000 
offset credits in one of the first forestry projects approved under cap-and-trade. Yurok officials 
stated that offset projects aligned with their goals to increase the tribe’s land base and restore 
the forest near the Klamath River, which helps improve water quality and its salmon fishery 
(Barboza, 2014b). Under offset rules, the Yurok can harvest some timber from its offset project 
areas; however, they must factor logging into its carbon sequestration calculations. The tribe is 
using the proceeds from offsets sold to polluters to finance land acquisitions, including their 
2011 purchase of more than 22,000 acres from a lumber operator. Currently, the Yurok only 
owns half of the land that constitutes their reservation; timber companies own the rest. Tribal 
leaders intend to develop additional offset projects to purchase more land in and around the 
reservation (Barboza, 2014b). 
 
Consequently, by the time SB 605 reached the Assembly Appropriations Committee in August 
2013, it was clear that supporters of offset projects had gained significant traction behind-the-
scenes to stop the legislation. The committee placed SB 605 on the “Suspense File,” which is 
reserved for legislation that is deemed too costly for the state to implement. The move 
effectively put the measure on hold until the 2014 legislative session, when Senator Lara had 
                                                           
117 Lara served serval years as director of Núñez’s Assembly district office in Los Angeles. The former Speaker was 
also an early and strong supporter of Lara’s first bid for elective office (former senior Capitol staff member, 2014 – 
author interview).  
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the option to amend SB 605 to address fiscal issues and opponents’ concerns or let the 
legislation die (Senior Capitol staff member, 2014 – author interview). Additionally, while the 
legislation was on hold, in December 2013, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) arranged for 
a delegation of state legislators to visit Mexico to promote REDD-type projects there and to 
showcase opportunities for cooperation with California. EDF even paid to bring the champion of 
SB 605, Senator Lara to participate in the delegation, covering his $2,363 tab (Lueders et al, 
2014; Halper, 2014).118  
 
In subsequent months, Senator Lara and EJ advocates took a pragmatic approach in 
understanding that SB 605 had a slim chance of passage as written. They deleted all provisions 
relating to offsets in SB 605 and took a turn towards the global. They amended the bill to 
require CARB to focus its attention beyond just the seven global greenhouse gases regulated 
under AB 32.119 The new amendments required the agency to complete a comprehensive short-
lived climate pollutant (SLCP) reduction strategy by January 1, 2016. While the updated 2014 
CARB Scoping Plan aimed to develop a strategy to mitigate short-lived climate pollutants by the 
end of 2015, the agency was not required to meet that goal, hold public workshops, or identify 
new measures that offered co-benefits to California’s disadvantaged communities.  
 
With the new SB 605 amendments, Senator Lara and EJ advocates sought to legislatively 
mandate that California’s climate policy include SCLP’s, in particular, black carbon which is a 
global and local environmental problem.120 In the United States, black carbon is a major 
byproduct of diesel engine exhaust – the black, sooty smoke that emits from the tailpipes of 
diesel cars and trucks (Figure 62). It is emitted directly into the atmosphere in the form of fine 
particles (i.e., direct PM 2.5) and remains in the atmosphere for days to weeks (Grahame et al, 
2014). It is both a main contributor to climate change and a concern for public health in many 
disadvantaged communities.  
 
                                                           
118 In 2012, EDF also invited Senator Kevin De Leon and Senator Lou Correa to visit REDD-type projects in Chiapas, 
Mexico. In 2009, De Leon’s AB 1404 which would have limited the use of offsets was passed by the legislature but 
vetoed by the governor. Senator Correa, conversely, has been a strong proponent of offsets and used his Senate 
Select Committee on California-Mexico Cooperation in 2012 to promote AB 32 linkages with Chiapas (Lopez, 
2013a).  
119 AB 32 defines greenhouse gases to include the following gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perflurocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride (California Health and Safety 
Code, section §38505(g)).  
120 Short-lived Climate Pollutants also include tropospheric ozone, methane, and hydrofluorocarbons (Zaelke et al, 
2013).  
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Figure 62: 
Black Carbon Emissions by Major Source Category     Source: US EPA (2012e) 
 
 
At the global scale, black carbon has been identified as the second most important human 
emission contributing to climate change, after CO2. While black carbon only exists in the 
atmosphere for a short period, it increases global and regional temperatures by absorbing 
sunlight and reducing the cooling effect of reflective surfaces such as glaciers. Black carbon also 
harms plants when it lands on leaves, increasing plant temperature and impeding growth. It has 
also been noted to reduce the amount of solar radiation reaching the earth, which can also 
reduce photosynthesis (Zaelke et al, 2013). According to CARB (2014a), this short-lived climate 
pollutant has the potential (depending upon geography, weather conditions, and time of year) 
to trap up to 1,700 times more heat than carbon dioxide in the atmosphere over a 100-year 
period and up to 6,200 times more heat over 20 years (Figure 63).  
 
 
 
                  Figure 63      Source: CARB, 2014a 
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At the local scale, the U.S EPA (2012e) notes a link between exposure to black carbon and a 
range of illnesses. Increases in black carbon emissions raises significant public health concerns 
because it is a key component of PM 2.5, fine particles that can penetrate and lodge deep 
inside lung tissue, causing premature mortality and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. 
(Figure 64). In particular, children and older adults are the most susceptible to the negative 
health effects of black carbon, such as higher incidence of asthma or heart attacks. In 2012, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) classified diesel emissions as carcinogenic (Grahame et al, 
2014). The U.S. EPA (2012e) estimates that the average public health benefit of reducing 
directly emitted PM 2.5 in the U.S. can range from $290,000 to $1.2 million per ton of PM 2.5 
by 2030.  
 
     
 
 
 
Figure 64: 
U.S. EPA (2012e) Conceptual Diagram of the Epidemiological Evidence for the association of Black Carbon with the 
Continuum of Cardiovascular Effects, including sub-clinical effects (bottom level of the pyramid) and clinical 
effects, increasing in severity moving up the pyramid. 
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To effectively address a global and local problem, SB 605’s new amendments specifically 
included the establishment of an SLCP inventory, the identification of research needs, data 
gaps, and an analysis of existing and potential new control measures to reduce SLCP emissions. 
It also called for increased transparency in the formulation of the SLCP strategy through public 
workshops, and the inclusion of the following key environmental justice provision:      
 
 
Prioritize the development of new measures for short-lived climate pollutants that offer co-
benefits by improving water quality or reducing other air pollutants that impact community 
health and benefit disadvantaged communities (California Health and Safety code section 
§39730(4)).  
 
The EJ provision, in particular, required the SLCP strategy to identify disadvantaged 
communities using Cal EPA’s science-based, California Environmental Health Screening tool 
(CalEnviroScreen).121 
 
It is important to note that California has been a leader in the U.S. in reducing its overall 
emissions of black carbon. CARB (2014a) estimates that the state’s annual black carbon 
emissions decreased by about 70 percent between 1990 and 2010, in direct proportion to 
declining diesel PM emissions – a benefit of the agency’s regulations on diesel fuel and engines 
and other technology advancements. However, California’s major marine ports and their 
pollution-adjacent communities have not witnessed as, dramatic a reduction in black carbon 
emissions as compared to the state overall.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 65: 
Average Contributions of various Port-Related Sources to Total Nitrous Oxide (NOx) and Particulate Matter 
Emissions from a Container Port.  Source: NRDC and the Coalition for Clean Air (2004). 
                                                           
121 As previously noted in chapter 5, CalEnviroScreen was established by Senator Kevin De Leon’s SB 535, which 
was signed into law in 2013.   
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Marine ports, like Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Oakland are undergoing significant expansions 
to accommodate even greater international cargo volumes (England-Nelson, 2015; Lopez, 
2013b; Minz, 2013). The diesel engines at ports, which power ships, trucks, trains and cargo-
handling equipment continues to significantly contribute to regional and global air pollution 
(Figures 65 and 66). A 2004 report by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimated 
that air pollution at the Port of Los Angeles exceeds cumulative pollution emitted from cars, 
power plants, and refineries in the Southern California region. The Port of Los Angeles draws 
more than 40,000 diesel trucks every day, a figure expected to triple by 2025. This means that 
smog-forming emissions and diesel particulate pollution could significantly increase in a region 
that is already adversely impacted by poor air quality (NRDC and the Coalition for Clean Air, 
2004).  
 
 
 
Figure 66: 
West Oakland, California confronts multiple environmental risks from activity at  
the Port of Oakland. Source: Author (2013) 
 
 
To address the inequities in black carbon reductions at the state’s major ports, Senator Lara and 
EJ advocates also introduced a companion bill to SB 605. The companion bill, SB 1204, sought to 
create the California Clean Truck, Bus, and Off-Road Vehicle and Equipment Technology 
program to be administered by CARB. This new program would use cap-and-trade revenues to 
develop zero and near-zero emissions vehicles and equipment technologies for use at the 
state’s major marine ports and near disadvantaged communities. Although existing programs at 
CARB and the California Energy Commission address both light and heavy-duty vehicle sectors, 
environmental justice advocates argued that additional focused efforts were needed to 
improve market penetration and make the purchase and use of zero and near-zero emissions 
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vehicles and equipment a viable, and more affordable, option for vehicle operators. The 
program specifically would develop early demonstration projects to explore vehicle 
performance and integration, followed by larger pre-commercial demonstrations to evaluate 
real-world performance. Once such systems were developed and tested, the EJ advocates 
intended to seek incentive programs to achieve full market penetration, particularly in 
disadvantaged communities (EJ advocates, 2014 - author interviews).  
 
By the end of the 2014 legislative session, Senator Lara and environmental justice advocates 
across California could declare victory. Their pragmatic approach toward tackling global and 
local pollutants in SB 605 and SB 1204 gained the support of dozens of environmental groups 
and legislators, and more importantly, the signature of Governor Jerry Brown. Both bills were 
enacted into law in September 2014. As noted by the California Environmental Justice Alliance 
(CEJA), the EJ community had some of the biggest wins in the 2014 legislative session thanks to 
their strategic approach to expand the definition of global climate change pollutants in ways 
that created direct linkages with local air quality impacts.   
 
 
 
Reducing air pollution and fighting climate change all at once: Climate policy is finally seeing 
the huge win-win potential for efforts that battle global warming while improving already-
existing hotspots of air pollution, which disproportionately impact low-income communities and 
communities of color (CEJA, 2014 – emphasis in original).  
 
 
Most importantly, the end of the 2014 legislative session demonstrated the growing power of 
the environmental justice movement in the Capitol. EJ groups significantly influenced the 
conceptualization of climate change and its associated policies to include the needs and voices 
of low-income neighborhoods and communities of color. SB 1204 and SB 605 are strong 
examples of how cap-and-trade auction revenues can be used for projects that provide 
emission reduction benefits to California’s most disadvantaged communities while addressing a 
global phenomenon. In sum, the strategic lobbying and advocacy efforts by California EJ groups 
are showing a growing number of policymakers the importance of linking health and quality of 
life issues with climate change policies.   
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Section 6.5: Conclusion - California’s Climate in a Global World  
 
 
People of color are the new majority in California, and we care about the environment and 
climate change. These same residents are just beginning to flex their political muscle on climate 
and environmental issues. – California Environmental Justice Alliance (2014) 
 
 
Figure 67: 
Environmental Justice Press Conference outside the State Capitol in support of SB 605 and SB 1204  
Source: CEJA (2014).  
 
 
 
In recent years, California’s debate over international linkages and the scope of its climate 
change regime has grown to include pollution-adjacent communities alongside epistemic 
communities of climate experts. Advocates of pollution-adjacent communities are speaking as 
experts in their own right, and their influence in the environmental policymaking process in 
Sacramento is growing. EJ groups are expanding the state’s definition of global climate 
pollutants and challenging the spread of California’s regulatory gospel to the Global South. 
While it still remains uncertain whether the state will ultimately pursue offsets in Chiapas, 
Mexico, and Acre, Brazil, environmental justice groups have raised important questions 
regarding California’s ability to ensure reliable emissions reductions while preventing human 
rights violations and negative environmental consequences. Influential business groups and 
regulators continue to see California as playing an important international role in preserving 
forests as a method to decrease the cost of mitigating GHG emissions. However, California’s 
pending decision on whether to approve REDD offsets will no longer solely depend on 
economic demand for such offsets or global science touting the benefits of carbon 
sequestration. Rather, it will depend on regulators’ ability to build confidence in their capacity 
to develop effective and politically supported policies that address public health and social 
equity issues within, and beyond, California’s borders. 
 
Climate change policies have begun to empower disadvantaged communities to imagine a 
healthier and more sustainable future. The trans-local climate justice movement at the Capitol 
demonstrates just one example of how diverse peoples globally are influencing environmental 
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governance. EJ groups are strongly asserting that climate change policies not the property of 
the United Nations, California, or any government or corporation. Through such movements, 
we also understand that climate change is not configured within a single place or scale. Rather, 
climate change is an object of multiple natures in which ensembles of heterogeneous actors, 
techno-scientific practices, and socio-economic variables bring it into being.   
 
Consequently, the notion of community-led climate solutions is slowly becoming part of a larger 
civic epistemology of climate change in California. As countries around the world are preparing 
for the December 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP21), to 
be held in Paris, France, California organized its own pre-conference event, titled “Global 
Climate Negotiations: Lessons from California.” The September 2014 event, held a week after 
SB 605 and SB 1204 were signed into law, brought together government officials, business 
leaders, experts, and environmental justice groups to discuss the state policies that have placed 
California at the forefront of addressing climate change. The symposium showcased the state’s 
efforts to meet its overarching goal of reducing greenhouse gases worldwide, while improving 
the air in the state’s most polluted communities.   
 
Of particular note, was the inclusion of a key discussion panel on “Climate Solutions from the 
Bottom up - California Road to Paris.” Panel participants included R.K. Pachauri, chair of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), who flew in from India for the occasion; 
Senator Kevin De Leon (author of SB 535, the Climate Change Community Benefits Fund); 
former Cal EPA Secretary Terry Tamminen; and Long Beach Mayor Bob Foster (Figure 68). The 
panel discussed the success of AB 32 and the efforts of EJ advocates to ensure that pollution- 
adjacent communities were included in the movement toward a more sustainable California. 
For example, they discussed the guarantees in the Climate Change Community Benefits Fund 
that directs investments in clean energy, transportation, and green jobs to disadvantaged 
communities. In the 2014-2015 fiscal year, more than $200 million will be allocated towards 
projects that reduce pollution, while benefiting the most polluted neighborhoods. Also 
discussed were the new mandates requiring CARB to tackle global climate pollutants harmful to 
local public health, like black carbon in the short-term, a key step in achieving 2020 and 2030 
emission reduction goals.  
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Figure 68: 
Climate Change from the Bottom up Panel.  From left to right, Former Cal EPA Secretary Tamminen, Senator 
De Leon, IPCC Chair Pachauri, and Mayor Foster.  Source: CARB (2014e).  
 
 
Throughout the panel, Senator De Leon stressed that UN leaders must learn from the California 
experience. Otherwise, they risk widening disparities that currently exist between pollution-
adjacent communities and the rest of the world. Echoing these comments, IPCC chair Pachauri 
(2014) remarked that the state has the potential to be in the vanguard on global climate policy. 
“California is being watched by the rest of the world…If California sets this blazing trail, the rest 
of the world will have something to follow.”  
 
At the end of this historic panel session, there was optimism, that as UN leaders and climate 
activists gear up to advance climate change solutions in Paris, the discussion of addressing 
climate change could move beyond just polar bears, multilateral agreements, and global 
science. In sum, the panelists concluded that the California experience serves as a global model 
for governments and local communities to jointly create holistic solutions to climate change 
that safeguard and benefit populations most disadvantaged by climate pollution.       
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CHAPTER 7 
Dissertation Conclusion:  
Understanding the Civic Epistemologies of California’s Climate(s) 
 
 
 
How do you work and communicate together in the face of conflict? You look for humanity.  You 
seek common ground…and eventually you get in the heads of [CARB] staff – and you have an 
impact. It is nice to see our recommendations included in the updated AB 32 Scoping Plan. It is 
an improvement from the previous [2007] EJAC -- when there wasn’t even a facilitator for those 
meetings.  
– EJAC Chair, Martha Arguello, in her concluding remarks to committee members and staff (2014).122  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 68:  
The EJAC and CARB staff after finalizing the committee’s recommendations for the  
AB 32 Scoping Plan update.  Source: Author photo (2014) 
 
 
 
In 2013, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) announced it would develop its first five-
year update to the AB 32 Scoping Plan, as required by law. In turn, CARB reconvened the 
Environmental Justice Advisory Committee (EJAC) to advise the board on the update. 
Through a year-long process, the board and the EJAC collaborated in developing an updated 
plan that ensured environmental justice needs and concerns were fully integrated into the 
fabric of the state’s climate change programs. This process was drastically different from 
2007, when CARB released its first draft Scoping Plan to accusations of betrayal and charges 
that the plan’s development was a fait accompli. When the EJAC concluded its work on April 
                                                           
122 Martha Arguello also served as a member of the first EJAC, established in 2007.  
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11, 2014, EJ advocates and environmental regulators alike felt a sense of accomplishment 
and mutual respect (Figure 68). CARB would eventually go on to adopt many of the EJAC’s 
recommendations. Some of the recommendations included placing a higher value on 
maximizing co-benefits; a stronger focus on short-lived climate pollutants; and ongoing 
assessments of the impact of climate change policies on environmental justice communities.  
 
When CARB adopted its final Scoping Plan update in May 2014, several board members 
congratulated the committee for its hard work and dedication. While acknowledging that 
CARB did not agree with all of the EJAC’s recommendations, the committee was cited as 
instrumental in advancing a more equitable plan for all Californians.123 In particular, CARB 
member Phil Serna (one of two people of color now serving on the board)124 stated that 
while the EJAC and its mission may clearly apply only to the Scoping Plan under California 
law, the committee should have much broader utility in practice. “We ought to think 
carefully as board and as staff about how we maintain the utility of having the EJAC remain 
very engaged on everything that this board does to implement AB 32” (Serna, 2014). Several 
other CARB members concurred, going even further to advocate that additional resources 
for public health and environmental justice research be allocated at levels equal to those 
provided for economic and cost-effectiveness analyses required under AB 32.  
 
As articulations of civic epistemologies, the adoption of the 2014 Scoping Plan update and 
the Climate Change from the Streets (CCStreets) case studies, illustrate that a reciprocal and 
dialectical conception exists in the relationship between nature and society. Multiscalar civic 
epistemologies support an analysis of the ways in which science stabilizes a particular social 
order and in which knowledge practices can promote social change (Goldstein, 2010). Civic 
epistemologies suggest that knowledge and technical practice have a distinct function in 
sustaining and re-making society, in addition to making new discoveries and innovations. In 
manipulating nature through climate change governance, polities simultaneously 
incorporate their moral and political visions into the new nature(s) that science and policy 
bring forth (Jasanoff, 2011).   
 
California is embedded in diverse sociotechnical imaginaries of climate change. Through the 
multiscalar case studies, we have assessed the diversification of climate change and politics, 
tracing how scientific facts about the world are fused with social commitments (Goldstein, 
2010). Rather than simply assume that climate science and policy are shielded from 
competing socio-economic interests, the study of California’s civic epistemologies have 
revealed the mutual constitution of techno-scientific arrangements and closures that are 
epistemic as well as normative (Curnutte and Testa, 2012).125  
                                                           
123 For example, CARB members and staff disagreed with the EJAC over the use of carbon offsets.    
124 As previous noted in Chapter 4, when the Scoping Plan was adopted in 2008, the entire CARB board 
membership and executive agency staff was white. When the Supplemental FED was adopted in 2011, the racial 
composition slightly improved to include one African American on the board (out of nine board members) and one 
Asian American on the agency’s executive staff (there are six executive positions). 
125 The concept of civic epistemologies, grows out of Jasanoff’s (2004) earlier work on the idiom of ‘co-production,’ 
which suggests a blurring of boundaries between nature and culture.  
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It provides the analytical tools to grasp how science and society do not simply allow the 
circulation of objects that bear the stamps of their respective authorities. They co-produce 
instead each other’s settlements to the effect that that circulation is as much a statement about 
epistemic criteria or technical solutions as it is an assertion -- and at times a moment of 
revelation – of the norms and institutional arrangements that enabled it (Curnutte and Testa, 
2012; Pg. 161).  
 
 
Approaches like CCStreets, hence, are new experiments in climate governance. They disclose 
how the natural and social orders are co-produced together. They also emphasize the 
contingency of all expertise. Neither professional nor lay knowledge alone can ultimately 
resolve the problem of climate change. As an emerging framework, CCStreets questions 
institutionalized notions of expertise from the outset as well as hard demarcations between 
nature and society (Jasanoff, 2004).  
 
 
 
1. What Influences the Uptake of Climate Change from the Streets? 
 
People of color now comprise the majority of California’s 38.8 million residents. Many 
members of the state’s communities of color hold some of the strongest views about 
protecting the environment, public health, and acting quickly to address climate change. 
CCStreets approaches are increasingly seen as valid methods to address the problem of 
climate change and equity. The uptake of CCStreets proved successful in many instances 
because it changed several elements of civic epistemology (Table 17). Through CCStreets 
approaches, EJ groups focused their efforts on issues like air pollution and public health, 
linking them to new knowledges and community-based solutions. In this process, 
environmental justice communities are no longer merely perceived as “impacted;” they are 
now official “knowledge producers” in climate governance. Environmental justice groups in 
the case studies placed additional demands on policymakers that called attention to the 
relevance of the totality of their lived experience. In doing so, they connected climate 
governance to historical and current environmental racism, economic inequality, and other 
socio-cultural variables (Tesh and Williams, 1996).  
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TABLE 17 
Key Elements Influencing the Uptake of CCStreets 
 
 Expert-Lay 
Engagement 
Social Movements, 
and ‘Lived-Experience’ 
Adherence to  
Carbon 
Fundamentalism 
Experiments in 
Climate 
Governance 
 
Chapter 2: 
Survey of Local 
CAPs 
 
 
Low 
 
 
Low 
 
 
High 
 
 
Low 
 
Chapter 3: 
Urban Climate 
Change in 
Oakland 
 
 
High 
 
 
High 
 
 
Low 
 
 
High 
 
Chapter 4: 
Statewide 
Carbon Pricing 
and Health  
Co-benefits 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
Low 
 
Chapter 5: 
Climate 
Change 
Community 
Benefits Fund 
 
 
Medium/High 
 
 
High 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
High 
 
Chapter 6: 
International 
Forest Offsets 
and 
Black Carbon 
 
 
 
Medium/High 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
Medium/High 
 
 
a) Expert-lay Engagement  
 
The CCStreets case studies elucidate how civic epistemologies across diverse geographies 
and scales invoke variations in knowledge production, equity, and policy outcomes in climate 
governance (Table 17). An analysis of California’s civic epistemologies reveals that the 
predominant mode of climate policymaking and planning is centered on carbon 
fundamentalism. As a result, most governments framed climate change as an 
“environmental” or scientific problem without regard for the human and cultural dimension 
of the phenomenon. Policy responses increasingly emerge as an expert-driven process that 
emphasizes global GHG reductions as the goal and geographically-neutral economic and 
technological fixes as the solution. In this process, community-based strategies that 
integrate climate change interventions with public health outcomes are often excluded. Such 
  
216 
 
positivist approaches privileges experts as the bearers of knowledge about both the problem 
and the solutions.  
 
Through an analysis of civic epistemology, we grasp the contested roles and rights of residents 
in regard to the production of public knowledge. Governments often strive to define 
environmental issues and the terms by which residents are included in relevant policy 
decisions. This research adds to the emerging theoretical analysis of civic epistemologies by 
focusing on the interaction among experts and environmental justice groups in developing 
strategies that integrate climate change interventions with population health at multiple scales. 
Through CCStreets, I have shown how various environmental justice actors gather, evaluate, 
and use scientific and public health knowledge in different ways when determining what 
impacts from climate change pose risks and require policy intervention.  
 
The configuration of climate change in California, accordingly, depends on how knowledge is 
produced and the interaction between power and heterogeneous actors in society. We have 
seen how environmental justice groups (lay publics) are debating with experts over issues of 
truth and method in climate science and policy. They are specifically challenging the political 
use and control of expertise, by claiming to speak credibly as experts in their own right. By 
focusing on civic epistemologies, we can see how local knowledge emerges as supplements -- 
and in some cases -- alternatives to techno-scientific instruments. It can serve as a means to 
overcome problems of introducing a priori policy into various local contexts. In essence, the 
phenomenon of climate change in California is creating a distinct social order that is changing 
epistemic cultures and democratic societies. CCStreets approaches are pressuring professional 
experts and policymakers to give up some control over how climate change is defined and 
addressed, and how research is formulated and conducted. Moreover, the cases illustrate the 
technical ruptures that allow other ways of knowing and doing to be institutionalized into 
climate governance.   
 
 
b) Social Movements and ‘Lived-Experience’ 
 
Carbon fundamentalism coincides with a lack of capacity for collaborative climate planning 
across sectors and budget constraints from competing socio-economic initiatives. The time 
and resource-intensive activities already involved in positivist climate policymaking leaves 
little opportunity to demonstrate explicitly how strategies can reduce GHG emissions and 
achieve health and equity outcomes. Consequently, chapter 2 provides evidence that 
changing civic epistemologies to include CCStreets approaches is not easily achievable in all 
regions. Environmental justice groups are most effective when they expend a significant 
amount of social capital to organize local coalitions, develop knowledge frameworks, and 
build alliances with key policymakers to change the terms of political discourse of climate 
policy. In contrast, disorganized communities have minimal opportunities to persuade city 
officials to implement a CAP that integrates GHG reductions measures with public health and 
social equity (Table 17). 
 
  
217 
 
In chapter 3, however, we see that effective and well-resourced EJ social movements consist of 
more than a single NGO or group of activists. They form complex, decentralized networks of 
organizations mobilized by a collective identity and lived experience. As a movement, they 
produced a powerful dynamic that generated considerable political and media pressure to 
substantively integrate equity and health into the fabric of California’s climate policies. For 
example, motivated by disproportionate environmental burdens in the city of Oakland, EJ 
groups sought ways to more explicitly link urban planning, public health, and climate change.  
With the formation of the Oakland Climate Action Coalition (OCAC), environmental justice 
groups worked alongside city officials to create a CAP that implemented an urban climate 
change regime with components that went beyond abstract notions of the environment. 
OCAC’s success was due to the strength of its members, including members from throughout 
Oakland’s diverse communities. The coalition evolved into a powerful force that provided multi-
sector expertise on a variety of issues. The diverse expertise of OCAC members, which included 
politically influential and long-established community stakeholders, ultimately persuaded the 
city to let the coalition facilitate and fund a community-driven climate planning process.   
 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide an understanding of how environmental justice social movements are 
not restricted by scale or locality. In chapter 5, encouraged by their early success in creating an 
equitable CAP in Oakland, members of the OCAC joined statewide organizing efforts to amend 
AB 32 and establish a Climate Change Community Benefits Fund (CBF). Local EJ groups viewed 
the advancement of a CBF as an opportunity to link their grassroots work on community-based 
climate solutions with climate change policies at the state level. Groups like the Asian Pacific 
Environmental Network (APEN) and the Ella Baker Center felt a responsibility to use the lessons 
learned and their successes at the local scale to influence larger statewide policy. They 
understood that many cities had CAPs with grand ideas, yet few had the resources to support 
implementation. Through the CBF, California is now directing cap-and-trade money to 
disadvantaged communities for climate action planning investments.  
 
Chapter 6 also showed the emergence of a trans-local climate movement among indigenous 
rights leaders and California environmental justice advocates. This trans-local climate justice 
movement is allowing diverse publics to expand state definitions of global climate pollutants 
and challenge the spread of California’s climate regime to the Global South. While the trans-
local coalition has not halted the use of international carbon offset projects in Mexico and 
Brazil, the formation of the coalition is providing opportunities for open dialogue about how 
California can develop an effective and politically supported climate program that addresses 
health and social equity within, and beyond, California’s borders.  
 
 
c) Adherence to Carbon Fundamentalism 
 
As discussed throughout the dissertation, policy based on carbon fundamentalism often ignores 
the negative environmental and social impacts of climate change on environmental justice 
communities. As climate governance becomes the realm of experts, EJ communities are 
disempowered to examine the issue for themselves. Consequently, without proactive and 
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contextual policies to address equity concerns, climate change will likely reinforce current, as 
well as future, health disparities in marginalized communities.  
 
In chapter 4, I traced the strong adherence to carbon fundamentalism in the halls of the Capitol 
and the corridors of the state’s bureaucracy. California regulators continually pushed up the 
scale of climate change to the ‘global’-- framing climate change as an environmental problem 
with no direct local health consequences. This civic epistemology separates climate change 
from the human-local scale (Table 17). The structural conditions that have created 
environmental health inequities were concealed by CARB’s exclusive focus on universal 
scientific metrics and efficient market-based mechanisms. Conversely, the EJAC’s scope and 
scale of climate change was sharply criticized by CARB officials as beyond the intent of AB 32. 
CARB claimed the EJAC’s scope had the potential to derail the central goal of the legislation -- 
the reduction of ‘global’ GHG emissions. On the contrary, the EJAC strongly criticized CARB for 
not developing robust public health analyses of the potential impacts of the cap-and-trade 
program. They claimed the program would disproportionately impact communities of color and 
low-income neighborhoods. The committee, however, was unable to produce any new data to 
support these claims. As a result, regulators soundly rejected the EJAC’s assertions, arguing 
they were more grounded in emotion than science. Here, we see that environmental regulators 
retained legitimacy and power in climate governance because they were seen as objective and 
“technically disciplined.” In contrast, EJ groups were framed as undisciplined, emotional, and 
holding biased positions (Ezrahi, 1990).  
 
Ethnic and racial divisions provided another element influencing the adherence to carbon 
fundamentalism outlined in chapter 4. During the drafting of AB 32, EJ groups collaborated with 
legislators of color, finding common cause in a shared ‘lived’ experience. By comparison, CARB 
regulators charged with implementing AB 32 were mostly white. Through the implementation 
of AB 32, we see how climate policy in California still remains highly homogenous by race and 
class in its leadership. These variables raise significant questions about how they impact the 
production of knowledge, policy, and science around climate change. As AB 32 moved from the 
legislature to the regulatory rule-making process and the realm of scientific and policy experts 
at CARB, environmental justice groups found their capacity to affect the implementation of the 
law was greatly minimized. Chapter 4 concludes that, from the scientific knowledge of state 
regulators to the local knowledge of environmental justice activists, the struggles over the 
institutionalization of environmental expertise in governance regimes can create contentious 
climates.  
 
 
d) Experiments in Climate Governance 
 
CCStreets approaches are new experiments in climate governance. These experiments provide 
the methods through which to define what climate change entails and to test policy 
interventions. In California, we see the emergence of governance experimentation in which 
multiple variables influence how society addresses climate change. Through climate 
governance experimentation, we understand that the social and technical are heterogeneously 
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engineered by a range of competing actors and institutions. Hence, climate policymaking can be 
seen as a socio-technical process that contains a set of contingencies resulting from the co-
evolution of problems and solutions.  
 
The CCStreets case studies further reveal the importance of examining the development of new 
“inscriptions” (i.e., policy language, scientific metrics, scale, and maps) and how they are central 
to the process of gaining credibility as they stabilize climate experiments in methods that allow 
them to travel across space and time and in combination with other innovations (Amin and 
Thrift, 2002; Van House, 2001). Inscriptions have the potential to both enroll different actors 
into climate governance and influence the terms of debate within the policymaking process, 
such as determining the type of interventions to be implemented and the scale(s) at which they 
should take place. Thus, through experimentation we comprehend climate change as having 
multiple enactments, with variations in the methods governments and civil society actors 
choose to address the phenomenon.   
 
For example, in Chapter 3, we see contestation over carbon fundamentalism was evident in the 
early stages of the Oakland CAP. The city of Oakland as a producer and consumer of climate 
knowledge, held an important space in the development of civic epistemologies. It initially 
gravitated towards global climate metrics as the only valid method to address and quantify 
climate change. The direct engagement of the OCAC in developing the CAP, however, 
represents a divergence from carbon fundamentalism. OCAC’s involvement resulted in the 
inclusion of health co-benefits and the use of local knowledge in the CAP’s development. The 
construction of urban climate change in Oakland is the outcome of extensive experimentation 
with public participation in expert-lay advisory processes. These processes create new civic 
epistemologies that require experts to collaborate with diverse stakeholders in society. This 
occurred in contrast to other methods of civic epistemologies in the United States, in which 
GHG quantification serves as a technology of trust and accountability or a model of control 
(Miller, 2005). The OCAC, as a strong social environmental movement, joined policymakers who 
supported EJ goals, helping transform climate change into an object that is comprehended, 
measured, and governed on multiple scales (Table 17).     
 
In chapter 5, I examined the subsequent successes environmental justice advocates made in 
developing a new civic epistemology of climate change at the Capitol. This was primarily 
achieved through oppositional tactics, such as the enactment of legislation to change regulatory 
agency behavior and technical practice. The SB 535 Coalition enacted multiscalar policy 
approaches to legislatively mandate that race and equity are front and center when 
implementing climate change interventions. The Climate Change Community Benefits Fund 
redirected the geographically-neutral focus on carbon reductions to new localized approaches 
to address mitigation, adaptation, and health co-benefits in the most socially vulnerable 
communities. While many EJ groups are philosophically opposed to market-based mechanisms, 
social movements like the SB 535 Coalition embraced pragmatic approaches to ensure that 
compensation via cap-and-trade revenues are provided to the communities most impacted by 
air pollution. Through the establishment of the CBF, the promises of AB 32 to protect and invest 
in disadvantaged communities are beginning to manifest.  
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Chapter 5 also highlighted that through these contestations and pragmatic trade-offs, EJ groups 
are revealing that climate change is not simply an environmental problem requiring a singular 
top-down policy solution. Environmental justice groups have validated the utility of multiscalar 
approaches that tackle a global environmental problem as well as public health issues at the 
neighborhood level. By scaling-up community-based approaches and local knowledge, they are 
offering an alternative conceptualization of what the phenomenon of climate change means -- 
not just in the physical sense, but what it means in different places and scales, to different 
peoples, and at different times. In this chapter, environmental justice actors were followed 
through contentious geographies as they experimented with a new civic epistemology where 
climate change is simultaneously constructed as a universal and localized as a particular.      
 
The last CCStreets case study, presented in Chapter 6, on trans-local climate justice 
movements, shows that the phenomenon of climate change is not configured in a single place 
or scale. Rather, climate change consists of a network of highly mobile actors and interrelated 
scales that are attached to diverse civic epistemologies. In this chapter, I describe the additional 
experiments environmental justice groups are using to push regulators away from carbon 
fundamentalism to break down policy silos. EJ groups took advantage of legislation to again 
create ruptures in technical practice, convincing regulators to implement multiscalar policies 
that jointly address GHG emissions and other localized co-pollutants, like black carbon.  
 
In sum, the simultaneous consideration of both the burden of climate change (e.g. 
environmental injustice and uneven impacts) and the benefit of mitigation and adaptation 
policies for environmental health in practice makes the analysis of civic epistemology unique 
across the CCStreets case studies. As we have seen throughout this dissertation, climate 
governance entails a variety of decision points that involve determining who makes 
particular policy choices, and which criteria and knowledge is used to make those decisions. 
Through an analysis of California’s civic epistemologies of climate change, there is a strategic 
understanding of how particular agendas, politics, knowledges, and expertise influence the 
development of climate action policies and environmental justice. 
 
The CCStreets case studies, moreover, have demonstrated how new experiments for 
producing public knowledge are being linked to policy decisions at various scales. The 
multiple configurations of climate change policies in California represent a shifting of power 
and authority in environmental governance that traditionally favors elite actors. CCStreets is 
calling attention to the cultural and experimental dimension of climate change policy, 
knowledge production, and local practice. By combining technical practice with local 
knowledge, EJ groups are helping to create proactive and significant environmental change 
at multiple scales. 
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2. Implications for Climate Policy and Planning Practice 
 
A broader climate agenda, like CCStreets, can help move climate governance in the direction 
of holistically addressing public health and equity. In California, we see climate policy 
emerging as a framework for social change. However, as this research has argued, the 
environmental justice movement must develop new skills, knowledge frameworks, strong 
coalitions, and work with key policymakers to change the terms of political discourse of 
climate policy. An assessment of California’s nascent multiscalar climate policies and 
interviews with climate policy experts and EJ advocates, yielded, four areas in which state 
and local governments can incorporate CCStreets approaches in climate policies.  
 
 
a) Enhanced Community Engagement Efforts  
 
Often lost in the discussion of climate planning is the manner in which both the science and 
the policy are received by local residents and community groups. A community’s public 
reasoning around climate change is an important consideration for determining how policies 
will unfold. As this research has shown, governements that actively engaged community-
based groups had the most robust climate policies that addressed issues of social equity 
while integrating climate action and health on multiple scales. In the CCStreets case studies, 
we observed that climate policy employed a ‘contextual’ approach that: (1) acknowledges an 
understanding of how climate change is connected with other types of knowledge and 
conditions regarding the local environment; and (2) enables different ways of knowing to 
play a valid part in developing policy responses.  
 
These types of approaches, however, have limitations and are not easily scalable in all regions 
of California. As is the case with local governments, community-based organizations are also 
constrained by limited resources; in many areas, no active organizations exist. Consequently, 
for under-resourced communities, the opportunities to persuade state or local governments to 
implement climate policies that integrate public health and social equity face additional 
challenges. In these cases, governments should develop proactive methods to include residents 
from disadvantaged communities in the climate policymaking process. The state could provide 
additional funding to cities through the cap-and-trade program and other initiatives, such as 
the California Sustainable Community Planning Grants and Incentives Program, to conduct 
substantive community engagement efforts.  
 
In terms of the statewide climate policy, the Environmental Justice Advisory Committee should 
be established as a permanent advisory committee of CARB. The current mandate under AB 32 
to only reconvene the EJAC every five years during the Scoping Plan update process, is 
inadequate, especially as CARB considers and develops substantive AB 32 implementation 
policies each month. The agency should be required to reconvene the EJAC at least biannually 
to provide recommendations that will further support California in safeguarding and directing 
investments to disadvantaged communities. 
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Enhancing community engagement efforts can lead to better reflection of the diversity of 
California’s population in climate policies and goals. Communities of color have comprised a 
majority of the state’s population for more than a decade. As this dissertation has shown, these 
communities will also experience health and socioeconomic disparities from climate change at 
higher rates than other groups. Increased resources for collaborative climate planning 
processes will ensure that governments prioritize the needs of disadvantaged communities and 
safeguard them from the current and anticipated impacts of climate change.   
 
 
b) Cap-and-Trade Funding for Disadvantaged Communities  
 
While California’s climate laws do not mandate cities to develop a CAP or health analyses, 
funding from the cap-and-trade program is creating new opportunities to develop more holistic 
approaches to municipal climate planning. Senate Bill 535, which amended AB 32, requires the 
state to invest at least 10 percent of all cap-and-trade auction revenues in disadvantaged 
communities (California Health and Safety Code, section §39713). For the 2014-2015 fiscal year, 
the state is providing $85 million to GHG mitigation projects located within disadvantaged 
communities (CARB, 2014b).126 These projects include urban forestry, low-carbon 
transportation and transit operations, energy efficiency programs, and waste diversion. CARB 
requires that eligible projects “provide direct, meaningful, and assured benefits to 
disadvantaged communities” (2014; pg. 1). CARB’s guidance memo for agencies administering 
investments places a strong emphasis on projects that create health co-benefits from reducing 
health harms (e.g., asthma and obesity) due to air pollutants and the built environment. The 
guidance also urges a priority for projects that reduce heat-related illnesses and increase 
thermal comfort (CARB, 2014b). The California Strategic Growth Council recently announced 
that the Sustainable Community Planning Grants and Incentives Program will provide additional 
funding for cities to develop CAPs that target efforts in communities statewide that are in the 
top 10 percent of cumulative environmental impacts scores under CalEnviroScreen (California 
SGC, 2013). 
 
The mandate for investment in disadvantaged communities, however, does not apply to the 
state’s other landmark climate law, SB 375. This legislation provides priority transportation 
funding to metropolitan planning organizations (MPO) that meet regional GHG reduction 
targets. To ensure consistency with AB 32, the state Legislature could amend SB 375 to require 
MPOs to use at least 10 percent of funds provided through the bill for investment in projects 
located within disadvantaged communities. MPOs could also be required to provide funding for 
cities to develop CAPs with measures focused on health co-benefits in disadvantaged 
communities.   Such an approach could ensure that urban planning processes prioritize 
investments in disadvantaged communities to increase mobility and access to jobs, while 
improving air quality. Approaches that do not integrate planning with larger public health 
outcomes will likely continue to incur higher costs to society through lost work-days and 
increased occurrences of physical ailments. 
                                                           
126 Disadvantaged communities are identified using the CalEnviroScreen tool.  
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c) A More Active Role for Local Public Health Departments  
 
The recent amendments to AB 32 are guiding California away from a singular focus on global 
GHG reductions. Nevertheless, the earmarking of 10 percent of cap-and-trade revenue for 
disadvantaged communities, pursuant to SB 535, is unlikely to cover the full costs associated 
with climate mitigation, particularly at the urban scale. Local governments will need additional 
funding to fully implement programs identified in CAPs. Cities are constrained in their 
resources, if city officials fail to understand the immediacy of public health, climate planning 
efforts will continue to overlook or ignore health co-benefits. One approach to overcome this 
challenge calls for a more active role for local public health departments. The state provides 
limited resources to the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) to develop tools and 
guidance documents to aid local health agencies in integrating health co-benefits in CAPs and 
other statewide climate policies. The CDPH currently relies largely on external grant funding to 
engage local governments.  
 
CDPH recently launched the ‘Building Resilience against Climate Effects’ (BRACE) program 
through a four-year grant from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
Under BRACE, CDPH will select 10 county public health departments to assess health 
interventions that can reduce climate and health risks to vulnerable populations, while 
providing technical support in adaptation planning activities (CDPH, 2013). Such programs are 
crucial since surveys of California public health officers and practitioners have shown that they 
generally feel ill-prepared, both in terms of available information and resources, to respond to 
health threats posed by climate change (Bedsworth, 2008; 2009; 2012; Gould, 2013). A large 
majority of survey respondents indicated they would like more detailed information on the 
local risks posed by climate change, followed closely by more guidance from CDPH. In terms of 
resources, a majority of respondents said they would like more technical tools to prepare 
health impact analyses, followed by dedicated funding for climate activities (Bedsworth, 2009; 
2012; Gould, 2013).  
 
These surveys suggest the state could provide additional resources from the cap-and-trade 
program to fully fund the BRACE program and give local public health agencies greater capacity 
to play a more active role in climate planning activities. The Governor’s Office of Planning and 
Research (OPR), which is the state’s clearinghouse for urban planning tools and guidance 
documents, could also be required to more aggressively promote and incorporate CDPH’s 
efforts in its municipal climate planning activities. In recent years, OPR and CDPH have 
collaborated on important guidance documents relating to public health and planning. These 
collaborations include ways to integrate public health goals in CAPs, general plans, hazard 
mitigation plans, and extreme heat response plans. Such integration, unfortunately, has not 
reached OPR’s climate planning website, which lacks a section dedicated exclusively to public 
health. As a result, interested practitioners seeking guidance are unlikely to readily access the 
material. Interviews with planners revealed very few were aware such resources were 
available. Similarly, OPR’s educational workshops and conferences, held since 2007, have not 
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placed the issue of health co-benefits of CAPs at the forefront. OPR can consider taking a more 
concerted effort to ensure that local planners understand and are aware of the value of 
integrating health co-benefits in climate planning activities. OPR’s current climate planning 
education and outreach efforts continue to consider public health goals a secondary objective.  
 
Similarly, CARB should provide additional funding to CDPH and state research universities to 
conduct in-depth public health analysis of AB 32 Scoping Plan updates and related 
implementation proposals. As CARB members noted during approval of the Scoping Plan 
update in May 2014, the state is not allocating resources for public health and environmental 
justice research at similar levels provided for economic and cost-effectiveness analyses 
required under AB 32. A strong need exists for institutionalizing the analysis of the health co-
benefits of mitigation and adaptation strategies in CARB’s policymaking process.   
 
 
d) Free Streamlined Tools for Analyzing Health Co-Benefits   
 
This research has described how credibility is essential in the validation of climate 
knowledge. Translating the on-the-ground experience of EJ communities requires rigorous 
research and scientific data to prove claims, test new approaches, and bring them to scale. 
This includes the ability to develop more robust economic analysis of health co-benefits and 
the ability to communicate such work to policymakers and regulators. As we have seen in 
Chapter 5, with the development of the CalEnviroScreen tool, universities and nonprofits 
have partnered with environmental justice groups to develop new climate knowledge and 
alternative solutions.  However, significant gaps still exists. In the climate policymaking 
process, where EJ groups are continually attempting to establish broader credibility, 
scientific and technical support is vital.  
 
One approach is for environmental regulators and EJ groups to collaborate on improving 
existing climate tools and data methods. For example, in 2011, the California Air Pollution 
Control Officers Association (CAPCOA) and regional air quality districts developed the 
California Emissions Estimator Model (CalEEMod). This free tool provides a uniform platform 
to quantify potential criteria pollutants and GHG emissions associated with the construction 
and operation from a variety of land-uses and the benefits of implementing GHG mitigation 
measures (CAPCOA, 2011). The air districts could work alongside CDPH, Cal EPA, and 
environmental justice groups to develop an updated and streamlined model that also 
quantifies the estimated health cost-savings of mitigation measures. This model could be 
similar to the analysis developed by the city of San Francisco and the U.S. EPA for San 
Francisco’s CAP. A private sector planner stated that some planners understand the utility of 
health co-benefits “but they lack the economic-health benefit analysis that really bolsters 
the feasibility of implementation” (author interview, 2014). OPR and CDPH can take lead 
roles in promoting the tool to local governments and convening training workshops. A key 
focus can involve educating planners to interpret health and cost-benefit data. 
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Cal EPA can also work with CDPH, the California Natural Resources Agency (CNRA), and EJ 
groups to integrate the CalEnviroScreen tool with the Cal-Adapt tool. Cal-Adapt uses data 
sets and geographic mapping models to project local climate impacts, such as temperature, 
snowpack, precipitation, sea-level rise, and wildfire (CNRA, 2012).  The integration of 
CalEnviroScreen and Cal-Adapt would ensure that cities have access to a free and easily-
accessible tool that documents climate impacts to population groups, particularly 
communities with high levels of social vulnerability. In sum, the state has the opportunity to 
take a stronger leadership role in providing cities with free and streamlined tools. As one 
public agency planner urged, “CAPs can typically cost over $100,000 and many cities are 
yearning for low-cost, easy-to-use planning tools. There are opportunities to integrate EJ and 
public health tools with common CAP tools” (author interview, 2014). The integration of 
existing tools would avoid creating yet another tool or process that local governments would 
have to utilize and, in proprietary cases, pay for.  
 
 
 
3) What is the Next Generation of the Trans-Local Environmental Justice Movement? 
 
The scale of an actor is not an absolute term but a relative one that varies with the ability to 
produce, capture, sum up, and interpret information about other places and times.  
-Bruno Latour (1990; Pg. 56).  
 
 
In traditional environmental justice research, EJ campaigns have often been fought at the 
neighborhood scale. For environmental justice organizing, ‘localism’ has been seen as 
endemic for various reasons (Brulle and Pellow, 2006; Brown, 2007; Mohai et al., 2009; 
Carter, 2014). Those living closest to a pollution source are most at risk of impacts. Shared 
observations and concerns of neighbors, such as the awareness of cancer clusters or asthma 
cases, have typically preceded EJ campaigns. Finally, localism often prevails because of the 
“siege mentality of neighborhoods that have ample grounds to believe they have been 
targeted” for undesirable land-uses (Carter, 2014; Pg. 11).  
 
However, as we have seen with the CCStreets case studies, in California the environmental 
justice movement is gravitating towards a “relational view” that explores the reciprocal and 
dialectical relationships between people and place. EJ campaigns based on a relational view 
act as an alternative to the conventional framing of place by focusing on the mutually 
reinforcing relationships between “places, people, and meaning-making, on the one hand, 
and the political institutions and processes that shape these relationships, on the other” 
(Corburn, 2009; Pg. 15). As seen in the CCStreets cases, a relational view assigns greater 
attention to the institutional processes that shape both environmental health policy at 
various scales and locations. In California, it is astutely understood by EJ actors, that the 
environmental justice movement is situated between local scales at which the community 
protests unwanted pollution, and the more broad geographic scales where they are 
produced and can be resolved (Towers, 2000). Hence, California’s EJ movement is 
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developing emerging campaigns beyond the “parochial” and linking community concerns to 
regional, statewide, and trans-local scales.  
 
In chapter 6, we specifically see how California’s planned global expansion of its market-
based mechanisms is creating emerging alliances between indigenous groups in the Global 
South and California environmental justice groups. The case illustrates the powerful dynamic 
the trans-local coalition developed through its opposition of forest offsets in the Global 
South. The coalition raised important concerns regarding California’s ability to ensure 
reliable emissions reductions while preventing human rights violations and negative 
environmental consequences within, and beyond, the state’s borders. The chapter 
concluded, however, that it is uncertain whether the state will ultimately pursue offsets in 
Mexico and Brazil.  
 
The open-ended nature of the proposed REDD offsets scheme also raises substantive 
questions regarding the next generation of California’s EJ movement. Are the successes of 
the OCAC, SB 535 Coalition, and the trans-local coalition against REDD offsets all sustainable 
over the next several years? Will these coalitions revert to an environmental justice 
campaign based mainly on ‘localism’?  
  
In my dozens of conversations and interviews with California EJ advocates, I realized their 
strong understanding that many Global South nations face increased risks of drought, 
extreme weather events and disasters from climate change. Advocates further understand 
these same nations are least responsible for the problem and simultaneously have the 
lowest capacity and resources to cope with the resultant challenges. For example, in 2013, 
the Oakland-based Asian Pacific Environmental Network (APEN) and the California 
Environmental Justice Alliance (CEJA) supported Haiyan typhoon relief efforts in the 
Philippines as a trans-local climate justice initiative:   
 
CEJA stands with the Filipino people in response to the devastation caused by Super Typhoon 
Haiyan, considered to be the strongest tropical storm ever to hit landfall...Low-income 
communities around the globe are impacted first and worst by climate change. Even though 
poor communities, like those in the Philippines, have the smallest carbon footprint, these 
communities directly suffer the consequences from the energy choices made by wealthy 
nations and corporate polluters. We see the same pattern here in California, where low-
income communities are the most impacted by polluting power plants, extreme weather 
events and face political inaction on their behalf (CEJA, 2013).  
 
 
Consequently, in the same conversations with EJ leaders (in particular those working on 
statewide policy), I inferred that there was no real effort to develop proactive measures to 
link California’s AB 32 to help the nations that are most socially vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change. As noted in chapter 6, state policymakers view California as a member of the 
global community and envision its cap-and-trade program as part of larger domestic and 
international carbon markets. The state already ushered in a new era of international 
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linkages when California and the Canadian province of Quebec fully integrated their cap-and-
trade programs. In attempts to expand its global reach, California has also signed MOU 
agreements with more than 35 nation-states and subnational governments (Figure 51). 
California policymakers are determined to develop AB 32 linkage programs in the Global 
South. Consequently, this raises significant questions of the role California’s environmental 
justice movement will play in the expansion of California’s global climate regime. Will the 
movement produce proactive measures to assist socially vulnerable communities globally, or 
will it remain a reactive movement that merely opposes international linkages and carbon 
offset proposals based on philosophical grounds?   
 
The California EJ experience points to the former and the possibility of new climate 
experiments that produce local perspectives on global injustices. In particular, an area 
California EJ leaders can target is moving the state’s climate policies “beyond carbon 
dioxide.” Their strategic efforts through the passage of SB 605 and SB 1204 to expand the 
definition of global climate pollutants and create direct linkages with local air quality impacts 
can be a model for the Global South and a framework to expand California’s global climate 
regime. 
 
Recent studies by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) have shown that the health 
of Latin America depends on reducing black carbon. “Black carbon emissions threaten the 
health of millions in Latin America and contribute to climate disruption already seen in 
declining Andean glaciers and a drier Amazon Basin” (2014). The expanding use of diesel 
fuels and vehicles, along with high rates of urbanization, mean that a large proportion of 
people are being exposed to unhealthy levels of black carbon (Figure 69). According to the 
study, most countries in Latin America do not adequately monitor or try to combat black 
carbon. Thus, organized efforts to control black carbon would have immediate positive 
impacts on public health (NRDC, 2014).  
 
Figure 69:  
Anthropogenic Sources of Black Carbon Emissions 
In Latin America  
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While globally open biomass burning is the largest global source of black carbon emissions, 
in Latin America the transport sector is the main anthropogenic source of black carbon 
(Figure 69). According to NRDC research, vehicle fleets in the 15 countries studied in the 
region are growing at extremely high rates, indicating that more people will be at risk of the 
harmful health effects of black carbon unless solutions are implemented. 
 
The NRDC (2014) study concludes that a key black carbon strategy involves targeting 
centrally-fueled urban transport fleets, with a focus on retrofitting the oldest, dirtiest trucks 
and buses, or providing financial incentives to retire and replace them with cleaner, more 
fuel-efficient models. Consequently, such goals coincide directly with the mandates 
established pursuant to environmental justice sponsored legislation, SB 605 and SB 1204 
(see chapter 6). By embracing the international linkage potential of California’s AB 32, EJ 
groups in the state can help spur significant reductions of black carbon emissions in Latin 
America and beyond. Such proactive and reciprocal initiatives have the potential to provide 
important climate, public health, and other environmental benefits to millions of socially 
vulnerable people worldwide.  
 
The California environmental justice movement has long proclaimed that if you “care about 
global climate change, then fight for local air pollution.” While multiscalar strategies have 
succeeded in better safeguards for EJ communities within California, the success of a true 
trans-local climate justice movement depends on the commitment of networked EJ actors to 
develop new climate experiments that promote equity and public health outcomes 
throughout the Americas. Hence, California environmental justice leaders, policymakers, and 
scholars will need to collaborate across scales to identify appropriate research, policy 
mechanisms, and funding that can reduce local air pollution in the Americas and fight global 
climate change all at once. Much work still remains to be done to ensure that climate change 
is being addressed from the streets of Oakland to the streets of Rio.   
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Towards Healthy and Equitable Climate Futures 
 
 
The struggles over climate knowledges and their governance regimes were central to this 
research analysis. How, and whose, knowledge is validated is of key importance in climate 
policymaking. Through the exploration of environmental justice social movements, we see 
that diverse publics are influencing climate change policy formation and implementation 
within and among nation-states. We also understand that the phenomenon of climate 
change is not configured in a single place or scale. Climate change becomes an object of 
multiple natures in which we comprehend how it is brought into being and made an issue of 
concern by ensembles of heterogeneous actors, techno-scientific practices, and socio-
economic variables. Through the concept of civic epistemology, we further see how 
environmental justice groups are redrawing the scale of climate change to reveal new 
networks of disempowerment and empowerment. The concept elucidates more complex, 
situated stories of environmental change in society that expose not only cases of injustice 
and discrimination, but also cases of resilience, experimentation, new insights, and more 
healthy and equitable climate(s).  
 
In conclusion, we can understand that climate change is occurring at every scale, from the 
streets of Oakland to the United Nations. Environmental justice groups, frustrated by the 
inability of climate governance regimes to implement equitable approaches, are now taking 
their call to the streets, the legislative halls of government, and regulatory bureaucracies to 
invoke social change. By examining the multiple ways of knowing climate change as the 
phenomenon is configured throughout California, we have seen how EJ groups are creating 
new experiments for producing climate knowledge and connecting it to public decisions. In 
the process, they are shifting power and authority about the environment to multiple scales. 
This multi-dimensional view of climate-society interaction is allowing for negotiation among 
diverse civil society actors and granting residents from environmental justice communities a 
voice in the climate policymaking process. Thus, through these experiments and ruptures in 
technical practice, publics are beginning to facilitate the emergence of alternative, healthier 
and equitable climate futures.   
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